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Abstract 
In contemporary times, monetary policy is evaluated by examining monetary policy shocks 
represented by changes in nominal interest rates rather than changes in the money supply. 
In this thesis, we studied three interrelated concepts: the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, interest rate spreads and the spread adjusted monetary policy rule. Chapter 1 
sets out a theoretical background by reviewing the evolution of monetary policy from 
money growth targeting to the standard approach of interest rate targeting (pegging) in the 
new consensus. The new consensus perspective models the economy with a system of 
three equations: the dynamic forward-looking IS-curve for aggregate demand, an inflation 
expectation-augmented Phillips curve and the interest rate rule. Monetary policy is defined 
as fixing the nominal interest rate in order to exert influences on macroeconomic outcomes 
such as output and expected inflation while allowing the money supply to be determined 
by interest rate and inflation expectations. Having set out this background, Chapter 2 
empirically investigates long-standing questions: how does monetary policy (interest rate 
policy) affect the economy and how effective is it? This chapter seeks to answer these 
questions by modelling a monetary policy framework using macroeconomics data from 
Namibia. Using the new consensus macroeconomic view, this empirical analysis starts 
from the assumption that money is endogenous, and thus it identifies the bank rate (i.e. 
Namibia’s repo rate) as the policy instrument which starts the monetary transmission 
mechanism.  
We estimated a SVAR and derived structural impulse response functions and cumulative 
impulse response functions, which showed how output, inflation and bank credit responded 
to structural shocks, specifically the monetary policy and credit shocks in the short run and 
the long run. We found that in the short run quarterly real GDP, inflation and private credit 
declined significantly in response to monetary policy shocks in Namibia. Monetary policy 
shocks as captured by an unsystematic component of changes in the repo rate considerably 
caused a sharp decrease for more than three quarters ahead after the first impact in 
quarterly real GDP. Furthermore, structural impulse response functions showed that real 
GDP and inflation increased in response to one standard deviation in the private credit 
shock. In the long run, the cumulative impulse response functions showed that inflation 
declined and remained below the initial level while responses in other variables were 
statistically insignificant. South African monetary policy shock caused significant negative 
responses in private; however, the impacts on quarterly GDP were barely statistically 
significant in the short run. In all, this empirical evidence shows that the monetary policy 
of changing the level of repo rate is effective in stabilising GDP, inflation rate and private 
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credit in the short run; and in the long run domestic monetary policy significantly stabilises 
inflation too. The structural forecast error variance decompositions show that the variations 
of output attributed to interest rate shock show that the interest rate channel is relatively 
strong compared with the credit channel. This is substantiated by the fact that repo rate 
shocks account for a large variation in output compared with the variation attributed to 
private credit shock. We conclude in this chapter that domestic monetary policy through 
the repo rate is effective, while the effects from the South African policy rate are not 
emphatically convincing in Namibia. Therefore, the Central Bank should keep independent 
monetary policy actions in order to achieve the goals of price stability. 
In Chapter 3 we investigate the subject of ‘interest rate spreads’, which are seen as the 
transmitting belts of monetary policy effects in the economy. While it is widely 
acknowledged that the monetary policy transmission mechanism is very important, it is 
also clear that the successes of monetary policy stabilisation are influenced by the size of 
spreads in the economy. Interest spreads are double-edged swords, as they amplify and 
also dampen monetary effects in the economy. Hence, we investigate the unit root process 
with structural breaks in interest rate spreads, and the macroeconomic and financial 
fundamentals that seem to explain large changes in spreads in Namibia. Firstly, descriptive 
statistics show that spreads always exist and gravitate around the mean above zero and that 
their paths are significantly amplified during crisis periods. Secondly, the Lanne, 
Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2002) unit root test for processes with structural breaks shows 
that spreads have unit root with structural breaks. Most significant endogenous structural 
breaks identified coincide with the 1998 East Asia financial crisis period, while the global 
financial crisis only caused a significant structural break in quarterly GDP.  Thirdly, using 
the definitions of the changes in base spread and retail spread, we find that inflation, 
unconditional inflation, economic growth rate and interest rate volatilities, and changes in 
the bank rate and risk premium and South Africa’s spread are some of the significant 
macroeconomic factors that explain changes in interest rate spread in Namibia. Whether 
we define interest spread as the retail spread, that is, the difference between average 
lending rate and average deposit rate, or the base spread, which is the difference between 
prime lending rate and the bank rate, our empirical results indicate that there 
macroeconomics and financial fundamentals play a statistically significant role in the 
determination of interest rate spreads.  
In the last chapter, we estimate the monetary policy rule augmented with spread - the 
so-called Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule (STR). The simple Spread-adjusted Taylor rule is 
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suggested in principle to be used as simple monetary policy strategy that responds to 
economic or financial shocks, e.g. rising spreads. In an environment of stable prices or 
weak demand, rising spreads have challenged current new consensus monetary policy 
strategy. As a result, the monetary policy framework that attaches weight to inflation and 
output to achieve price stability has been deemed unable to respond sufficiently to 
financial stress in the face of financial instability. In response to this challenge, the STR 
explicitly takes into account the spread to address the weakness of the standard monetary 
policy reaction in the face of financial instability. We apply the Bayesian method to 
estimate the posterior distributions of parameters in the simple STR. We use theory-based 
informed priors and empirical Bayesian priors to estimate the posterior means of the STR 
model. Our results from this empirical estimation show that monetary policy reaction 
function can be adjusted with credit spread to caution against tight credit conditions and 
therefore realise the goal of financial stability and price stability simultaneously. The 
estimated coefficients obtained from the spread-adjusted monetary policy are consistent 
with the calibrated parameters suggested by (McCulley & Toloui, 2008) and (Curdia & 
Woodford, 2009). We find that, on average, a higher credit spread is associated with the 
probability that the policy target will be adjusted downwards by 55 basis points in response 
to a marginal increase of one per cent in equilibrium spread. This posterior mean is likely 
to vary between -30 and -79 basis points with 95% credible intervals. Altogether in this 
chapter we found that a marginal increase in the rate of inflation above the target by one 
per cent is associated with probability that the repo rate target will be raised by an amount 
within the range of 42 to 75 basis points, while little can be said about central banks’ 
reaction to a marginal increase in output. 
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Preface 
The purpose of changing the level of a monetary policy instrument is to signal to the 
markets the level of interest rate, which is regarded to be optimal with the goal of monetary 
stability. In this thesis, we examine the transmission of monetary policy and interest rate 
spreads in Namibia. Starting with the reviews of money and monetary policy in monetary 
theories across schools of thought, we investigate the research questions under three 
interrelated areas.  
A. Modelling monetary policy in Namibia: SVAR estimation in the new consensus 
framework. 
1. How effective is the monetary policy of changing interest rate levels in the 
stabilisation of output and inflation in Namibia? 
- We seek answers to this question by estimating the structural and cumulative 
impulse response functions of real output, inflation rate and private sector credit to 
structural shocks from the domestic repo rate, South Africa’s repo rate and private 
credit in the SVAR.  
- Secondly, we estimate and analyse the structural forecast error variance 
decomposition for output in order to determine the relative strength of interest rate 
(repo rate) and credit channels in Namibia. 
 
The results from this modelling provide a comprehensive quantitative picture about the 
transmission mechanism as generated by domestic and South African monetary policy 
shocks, and further contribute new knowledge about the effectiveness and relative strength 
of the interest rate and credit channels in Namibia. 
 
B. Understanding interest rate spreads in Namibia: an investigation of 
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals that explain changes in spreads in 
Namibia. 
In Namibia, interest rate spreads have been a cause of concern and a controversial issue in 
the financial sector. Specifically, the Central Bank and the general public have expressed 
enormous interest particularly to understand (i) the dynamic behaviours of interest rate 
spreads; (ii) the main determinants of interest rate spreads and the consequential effects of 
large changes in interest rate spreads on households and businesses credits. Our main 
analysis focused on: base spread - the difference between the repo rate (bank rate) and the 
prime lending rate; retail spread - the difference between the average lending rates and the 
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average deposit rates; risk premium (spread), which is the difference between prime 
lending rate and the short-term risk free rate (three-month T-bills); and interest rate 
differential - this is the difference between domestic repo rate and the South African repo 
rate. In Chapter 3 we examined: 
2. Unit root process and structural breaks in spreads and other macroeconomic 
fundamentals realised, and whether the degrees of integration in the spreads depend 
on the presence of structural breaks in these time series.  
3. What are the macroeconomic and financial fundamentals that explain the level of 
spreads in Namibia? Is there a significant relationship between ex ante base spread, 
retail spread and the macroeconomic fundamentals achieved in the country? 
This investigation is motivated by the quest to find empirical evidence that will inform 
academic debates and policy about how to address the issue of interest rate spreads in 
Namibia. This empirical evidence contributes immensely to the redevelopment and 
revision of Namibia’s Financial Charter and monetary policy in terms of addressing the 
issue of spreads. Our primary focuses are time series levels of spreads, and the relationship 
between macroeconomics fundamentals and changes in the spreads. 
C. Simple Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule (STR): Empirical evidence 
Finally, many researchers ponder the question of what information is missing or 
neglected by the new consensus monetary policy strategy, in particular the standard Taylor 
rule. The Taylor rule is well known to emphasise price stability as an overriding goal for 
monetary policy stabilisation. However, it has been revealed that price stability is not a 
sufficient condition for financial stability. We estimate the Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule 
suggested by Taylor (2008), Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Teranishi (2011). Our 
objective is to estimate the posterior parameter values in the simple STR and compare it 
with the standard Taylor Rule using the Bayesian method. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
An Essay about Money and Monetary Policy in the Mainstream and 
Post-Keynesian Economics 
 
 “As a signal of policy stance [i.e. interest rate], (…) interest rate should ideally 
provide clarity and good controllability. This explains why so many central banks 
signal with their official rates, which are natural and fully in their control. And to 
the extent that this policy rate, (…) is also a starting point of monetary 
transmission, it should ideally be something economically relevant” (Ho, 2010, p. 
91). 
1.0 Introduction 
Monetary economics has proven to be a complex area in macroeconomics. The 
complexity stems from the main component of monetary economics, that is: ‘Money’, its 
origin, nature, and its purposes in the economy. Generally, many evolving debates in 
monetary economics centre on the nature of money supply and monetary policy, and the 
transmission mechanisms and effectiveness of monetary policy. In contemporary times, the 
‘new macroeconomic consensus’ debate has expanded to include the concept of 
endogenous money, and the role of monetary policy when money is endogenously 
determined Arestis and Sawyer (2006).1 Further, what had been known as monetary policy 
has changed from the money supply centred monetary policy to interest rate policy, or 
simply the monetary policy without money. 
The new consensus monetary analysis is based on the system of three equations: 
firstly, the ‘IS curve –with aggregate demand linked to real interest rate’; second, the 
‘expectation-augmented Phillips curve’ – that links inflation to output gap and aggregate 
supply; and third, the monetary policy in the form of Taylor rule (see Laidler, 2007, p. 17). 
In this new consensus, the monetary policy framework is based on the assumption that 
money is endogenous, and central banks use controllable instrument, that is the short term 
bank rate to stabilize the economy. According to Mayes and Toporowski (2007, p. 5) 
monetary policy is distinctively evaluated through changes in interest rate shocks.  Mayes 
                                                           
1
 Apart from Goodhart (1989) the discussion about endogenous money was rare in the mainstream economics. 
However, this has changed because many economists agree that money is endogenous and central bank use 
interest rate as a control instrument to stabilize the economy. For example, Fender (2012) pointed that the 
assumption that central bank control and target monetary aggregate is irreconcilable with the fact that central 
banks are lenders of last resorts. 
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and Toporowski clearly assert that ‘monetary shocks are now supposed to be modelled as 
changes in interest rates, possibly in exchange rates, rather than as unexpected 
increases/decreases in the money supply that may be offset by open market operations.’’ It 
is against this background, that in this chapter first we reviewed the historical nature, roles 
of money and monetary policy in the mainstream economics (i.e. neoclassical, Keynesian 
and New Keynesian monetary theories) and Post Keynesian (PK) economics. At the end of 
this chapter we summarize what we have learned from the literature review about money 
and monetary policy; and we explained how this review informs our empirical studies in 
chapter two to five.  
The primary objective of this chapter is to set out the theoretical position of money 
and monetary policy in and outside the mainstream economics. We used this theoretical 
exposition to form the basis for the empirical studies examined in this thesis. The empirical 
studies we examined are: the transmission channels and effectiveness of monetary policy 
in Namibia; determinants of interest rate spreads, cointegration and dynamic effects of 
spreads on mortgages, consumers and instalment credits; and lastly, we empirically 
estimate the simple Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule (STR). An exposition of monetary 
theories in the mainstream and post Keynesian economics will help us to understand the 
evolution of monetary policy (i.e. the transition from money growth targeting to interest 
rate targeting) and its general implications on the development of monetary policy 
frameworks in the developing countries. From this literature review, we aim to provide 
explanations why modern monetary policy frameworks do not emphasize the money 
supply, but rather short term interest rate as the policy instrument. Finally, this exposition 
will clarify our decision why we used the repo rate as the policy instrument that generates 
monetary policy effects in the empirical estimation ahead. Ho (2010), identified the short 
term interest rate as the monetary instrument that generates the transmission mechanism to 
market rates, through intermediation spreads, to private sector credit and finally the real 
sector. In support of this view, we define monetary policy as ‘fixing of some nominal short 
term bank rate’ and willingness to lend at that rate set by the central bank (Woodford, 
2011). 
As the case is now, there is an equal recommendations for the interest rate setting 
monetary policy approach both in the mainstream and post Keynesian paradigms (Palley, 
2003). For instance, Palley (2003) alleges that all sides (mainstream and some Post 
Keynesians) agree that interest rate is the appropriate policy instrument required to conduct 
monetary policy, and therefore agents adjust their demand for money to the price of money 
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which is the interest rates.2 Similarly,  Romer (2006) asserts that central bank follows an 
interest rate rule and adjust money so that market interest rates can follow the interest rate 
target which is consistent with zero output gap and inflation target. We argue that 
approaching the subject of monetary policy in this way overcomes the contradictions of 
exogenous money and aligns with real practice of contemporary monetary policy. 
1.1 Organisation of the chapter 
  This chapter is divided into three main-sections. Section one discusses the historical 
nature of money and monetary policy in the mainstream and Post-Keynesian monetary 
theories. Section two discusses the importance of the monetary transmission mechanisms 
and clarifies the referenced interest rate in the ‘new consensus’ interest-rate targeting 
framework. Section three concludes with what we have learned about the nature and roles 
of money and monetary policy and how these influence the evaluation of monetary in 
contemporary times. We state here that this literature review is limited to the discussion 
about money and monetary policy excluding detailed treatments of real side of the 
economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2
 See also (Laidler, 2007, pp. 15-17) and (Mayes & Toporowski, 2007) 
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1.2. Monetary Theories: Money and Monetary Policy Perspectives3  
1.2.1 Monetary Theory in the Neoclassical Economics  
Our main aim for reviewing Neoclassical monetary theory is to trace the nature of 
money, its functions, monetary policy, and the transmissions of monetary effects to the real 
economy, if any exists. According to Knoop (2010), the cornerstone of neoclassical is 
based on the tenets of classical theory which assumes perfect competition, use of real 
variables in decision making and application of representative agent models with agents 
that have the same preferences and act alike in every way. There are three common 
theoretical approaches to the analysis of money. One, money is incorporated in the utility 
function whereby consumers derive utility directly from real balances, or money is 
assumed to ‘save labour time in making payments’ in the utility function (see Handa, 2000, 
pp. 81-82). Second, money is held in advance to cater for certain types of transactions – the 
so-called Cash-In-Advanced (CIA) models. The third approach is that, money is used to 
transfer purchasing power from one period to another –this is called Overlapping 
generation model (OLG). In all these approaches the common thread is the general 
equilibrium analysis.4 The set up (as shown in Appendix A.1) is that we have agents 
(households and firms) with rational behaviours, who decide to maximize utility under 
rational expectation conditions.  
However, one of the weaknesses of general equilibrium is that it does not explain 
how money came to exist; but rather it determines the relative prices that should prevail 
when all markets are simultaneously in equilibrium. Canova (2007, p. 52) points out that 
‘discovering monetary role in general equilibrium is very difficult with a full set of Arrow-
Debrue claims , money is a redundant asset’. Walrasian equilibrium neglects importance of 
nominal variables and emphasizes real variables in determining equilibrium quantities. 
Thus, neoclassical economists use the quantity theory of money to explain the nature and 
functions of money. This is done either in a partial equilibrium of the quantity theory of 
money as in equation (1.1) below or it is slotted in the utility function in the full dynamic 
general equilibrium (A.1) in the Appendix. Denis (1981) purports that the role of money in 
Neoclassical economics is not to determine relative prices, as this is derived from general 
                                                           
3
 Our review excludes discussion about the New Classical Economics, and the Real Business Cycle theories. 
Economic models of these two do not contain much on the nature, role of money, and stabilization through 
monetary policy. For example, Gottschalk (2005, p. 101) reveals that “money [in RBC] is completely 
ineffective in these models; and monetary policy makers are powerless.” While New classical seeks to re-
establish the classical paradigm –competitive markets and the Walrasian equilibrium analysis which neglect 
the role of nominal variables. 
4
 Perloff (2008) defines general equilibrium as the study of how equilibrium is determined in all markets 
simultaneously. In neoclassical thus we have agent households & firms, technology and competitive markets. 
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equilibrium. Money is the medium of exchange, as will be later explored comprehensively 
in relation to its demand. 
The Neoclassical theory of money or classical demand for money is one of the 
oldest theories of money and is linked both to the Salamanca School in Spain in the mid-
16th century and to Irvin Fisher in 1911 (Belke & Polleit, 2009). The starting point of 
analysing money is the famous ad-hoc relation for quantity equation of exchange. In the 
partial equilibrium, the equation of exchange can be stated in absolute terms as follows: 
 = ,                                                                                                                         (1.1) 
whereby  is the stock of money narrowly defined as currency and notes plus demand 
deposits, this component is exogenously determined;  is the transaction velocity of the 
quantity of money in circulation;  is the general price level, and  stands for the number 
of transactions which take place during a given period. The amount of transactions is 
assumed to depend on the length of payments and expenditure patterns (Dennis, 1981). 
This relation constitutes an identity; however, this identity can be turned into a theory of 
price level by making the following assumptions: 
(i) The velocity   is determined by the structure of the banking system and fixed at least in 
the short run. This means that velocity is independent of the variables within the quantity 
equation. 
(ii) There is a fixed relationship between output (real income) and the number of 
transactions taking place. This relationship therefore enables us to replace the number of 
transactions ()	which take place during a given year with real income (
) on the right 
hand side of the equation. 
(iii) The level of real income (
) is determined by real factors in the labour market –
independent of the quantity of money; Neo-classicists assume income 
 is fixed for the 
purpose of analysing the money market. Thus, the quantity theory will become  = 
, 
and therefore determines the price level as follows: 
 = /
.                                                                                                                  (1.2) 
Similarly, in relative terms the constant growth rate of money supply is derived as follows. 
We assume here that real money supply –real money balances – is equal to real income in 
equilibrium. Let us suppose P, M, and Y grow at some growth rates respectively. Whereby 
1)1( −+= tt MM µ - simply this can indicate that government grows money at some constant 
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growth rate µ ; and 1)1( −+= tt YY υ , the real income grows at some exogenous growth rateυ ; 
finally, the aim is to derive and show that the growth rate of inflation is given as follows:
.υµpi −≈t  
1)1(
)1( )1(
1
1
−+
+ +=
−
−
tP
M Y
t
t υpi
µ
                                                                                                        (1.3) 
Applying the logarithmic operation on (1.3) and using the approximation µµ ≈+ )1ln( and
pipi ≈+ )1ln( , we get: 
υpiµ =−                                                                                                                         (1.4)5 
.υµpi −≈⇒  
There are important observations from the above equations. They show how money 
enters the economy, and illustrate the nature and roles of monetary policy in neoclassical 
economy. First, money enters the system as a commodity used to finance transactions and 
therefore, it plays a passive role to fulfil demand and supply as goods are exchanged in the 
economy. Money is simply a medium of exchange ‘a veil’; that is, it is held for the 
purposes of transactions, to facilitate trades of goods and services (Cagan, 1989). Given 
that the quantity theory assumes that money is controlled by government implies also that 
growth rate µ is determined exogenously; but the arbitrary determination of µ is only 
possible if the monetary authority is ready to violate the principle of lender of last resort to 
the financial sector in the economy. Secondly, the rate of inflation is positively related to 
the growth rate of money supply and negatively related to the growth rate of real income. 
Hence, when money supply grows faster than the growth rate of real income, this will 
generate inflation on the long run. It also implies that government as issuer of currency can 
control inflation by growing money at a nominal target equal to expected growth rate of 
real income. Third, money does not affect output (real income); output is determined by 
real factors such as labour, capital, and productivity (Mankiw & Taylor, 2007). Money 
does not play any feedback role to real variables; this is why it is regarded as neutral both 
in the short and long term in the neoclassical monetary theory. This feature is described in 
the mainstream as the neutrality of money (David, 2008).6 And generally it means that, any 
change in the stock of money will lead to an equal proportional changes in the absolute 
                                                           
5
 In equilibrium the real money balances is equal to real income, thus	 = 
 ⟹ −  = 0.  
6
 If exogenous change in the growth of money produces no effect on real quantities and real prices, this is 
called super-neutrality. In equation A.51 we showed that real income and neutral interest rate evolves 
independently from changes in money supply. 
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price level. In terms of absolute price level, we observe that the price level will not change 
without a prior change in money supply. The role of money in neoclassical economics is to 
determine absolute price level and generate inflation in the long run. Fourth, money is not 
viewed as a financial asset and it does not earn interest, this conclusion is widely contested 
by Keynesians and Post Keynesians (Knoop, 2008).  
Another topic in the neoclassical monetary theory that plays a major role is the 
interest rate. In the saving-investment economic relationship it is proposes that saving is 
positively related to interest rate; while investment is negatively related to interest rate. 
Loan-able funds theory as held by classical theorists postulates that the rate of interest is a 
real phenomenon –determined by real factors in the economy. Neoclassical assumes that 
equilibrium market interest that equates saving and investment interest rate is determined 
by marginal utility whereby the marginal rate of substitutions is equal to marginal rate of 
return to capital. This idea is similar to the view held by Austrian school of thought who 
also argues that people attach greater values on present goods and services than the value 
of future goods and services. It thus relates interest rate to time preference factor as the 
main determinant that influences interest rate independent of money terms.7 Of course, this 
view of separating the interest rate from money factors was challenged later by 
Keynesians, as they argue that interest rate is monetary phenomenon. In contrast to time 
preference, Keynes and followers assume ‘liquidity preferences’ are rooted in people 
preference either to hold money or bonds. For this reason, Keynes treats interest rate as a 
monetary phenomenon while neoclassical assumes that interest rate is determined by time 
preference.  
Modern neoclassical models are introduced with micro-foundation properties and 
money at most assumes a passive role. These models include the dynamic general 
equilibrium in Benassy (2011) - see A.1 in the appendix, and the basic New Keynesian 
models by Bergholt (2012), Gali (2008) and Walsh (2010)8. Although these micro-founded 
models provided some intuitions based on optimizing agents, they however reached the 
same conclusions that money is neutral in the long run, and that it is a passive commodity 
that facilitates transactions of goods and services. In addition, it concludes that real interest 
rate evolves independently from money, and money exogenously determines the path of 
                                                           
7
 See Belke & Polleit (2009) who claim that Austria differs from Neoclassical position in the sense that 
interest rate is not an impetus to saving nor reward for abstaining from current consumption. It is rather a 
time preference whereby ‘people assign greater value’ the present goods (savings) more than future goods 
(investments). 
8
 Walsh (2008) explored the role of money in other classical monetary models e.g. Cash-In-Advanced model 
(CIA), Shopping time model and money-in-the utility function model (MIU). 
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the price level. However, modern neoclassical showed explicitly that in monopolistic 
setting firms have market powers to set prices which remain in force until next opportunity 
to revise the price.  
Neoclassical economics with classical monetary model based on quantity equation 
says less about the transmission channels of monetary policy. The simple conclusion is that 
the rate of growth of the quantity of money determines inflation and, thus a money-growth 
target set by central banks will help to stabilize the inflation in the long run. As suggested 
by the ad-hoc money demand equation (1.2) it clearly shows that there is a direct 
relationship between money and expected inflation – an increase in the quantity of money 
leads to proportion increase in the general price level. What then can the monetary policy 
do in the neoclassical economy? From the relationships illustrated above, we can deduce 
that central bank’s monetary policy influences nominal variables, the path of price level 
and inflation by changing the level of money supply. However, this is possible when a 
stable money-inflation relationship exists. Note here that, monetary policy takes the form 
of adjusting the level of money supply to hit the set monetary target, and it is not about 
adjusting the nominal interest rate target as it is the case in the current new consensus. 
However, both old and modern neoclassic monetary models show that this monetary policy 
cannot affect output in the long run (Belke & Polleit, 2009). Given the conclusion above, 
neoclassical theorists thus recommend that there is no need for government intervention if 
markets are allowed to work their way out. The governmental role should be limited and 
confined to activities that will ensure a free market with no imperfections. If necessary, 
governments should carry out supply-side policies such as education and training to 
improve labour productivity. Regarding monetary policy, the growth of money stock 
should be controlled to maintain price stability and ensure strong and stable long term 
growth of money supply that is consistent with real income (Sorensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 
2005). In all, the monetary theory in neoclassical shows that when central bank controls 
money supply, the rate of inflation is determined from the demand for money whether 
derived in the inter-temporal utility function (such as CIA) or in the classical demand for 
money partial equilibrium.  
1.2.2 Criticisms of the Neo-classical monetary theory 
There are several weaknesses in the monetary theory within neoclassical 
economics. First, the main criticism toward Neoclassical is based on their main assumption 
of optimizing rational representative agents; firm and household. This ‘straight jacket’ 
which runs across all models in neoclassical family neglects important features such as 
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credit friction-constraints, imperfect markets and incomplete markets that embed all real 
economies (see for example Gracia, 2011, pp. 4-5). There is a general recognition that 
agents-based models provide economic and monetary intuitions; however, they fail to stack 
up to facts and data. Next, the neoclassical theory shows that the natural interest rate is 
determined in the market for funds by saving and investment demand; but this equilibrium 
excludes the role of money supply in determining the rate of interest.9 This is contrary to 
the relationship between money and interest rate; because there are many empirical studies 
with clear evidences that money supply affects interest rates. Money supply affects the 
level of interest rates and the level of credit in the economy (Dennis, 1981). Contrary to 
what Neo-classicists claim, (Hansegenn, 2006) shows that investment demand is less 
responsive to interest rates. We do not intend to quarrel with them on this point because 
economists such as (Simpson, 1949) have long asserted that the Neoclassical system needs 
more integration of monetary economics.10 
Second, there are genuine doubts about the reality of the assumption of constant 
income velocity in the quantity theory of money. This is because many studies point to 
evidence that velocity changes over time. Income velocity will remain constant only if 
interest rate remains constant and, the level of nominal income in the quantity theory of 
money does not change. This therefore brings into question the reality of money neutrality 
as claimed by neoclassical theorists at the level of full employment. Furthermore, 
neoclassical monetary theory is criticized for its lack of emphasis on the financial system 
as it does not play significant role at all. It is an undeniable fact that financial system is 
important, because  financial system has the ability to deal with market failure, to create 
money, and to enhance economic growth Mishkin (2007a) and (Dennis, 1981; Knoop, 
2008). Neo-classicists treat money supply as exogenously determined, while there is ample 
evidence that suggests that money supply is endogenously determined (Goodhart, 1989). 
Lastly, monetary policy that follows the manipulation of the quantity of monetary base as 
it was the case in early neoclassical leads to higher inflation and interest rate volatility as 
monetary authority misses the monetary target. In all, Benassy (2007) indicate that 
monetary models in neoclassical produce liquidity and price puzzles and results which are 
at odd with empirical facts. 
                                                           
9
 In addition Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005) reveal that the natural interest rate helps predicts real 
interest rate. This equilibrium interest rate is determined by the forces of productivity, population growth, 
and depreciation and saving rate.  
10
 We highlight here that there are few exceptions, for example (Gillman’s, 2011) recent works incorporate 
banking with uncertainty however, these works are still at an infant stage. 
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1.2.3. Keynesian’s Monetary Theory: Roles of Money and the Nature of Monetary Policy 
Keynesian monetary economics revolves around the liquidity preference theory -
Keynesian demand for money- introduced in the monetary sector (Belke & Polleit, 2009). 
This liquidity preference theory is one of the hallmarks that differentiate Keynesian 
monetary theory from the general family of neo-classical theories. It explains why people 
individually express demands for money; i.e. the motives for money as liquid asset (Lewis 
& Mizen, 2000). In this theory, the demand for money is determined by interactions 
between income and interest rate that is, the price of demand. Thus, Keynesians argue that, 
to influence the demand for money, we should either control directly the price for money 
or indirectly by inducing changes through real income. Theoretically, a change in interest 
rate, other things being equal, affects individual preferences for holding liquid (cash) and 
illiquid assets.  
 Keynesians recognize the importance of the role of money, because it is “first and 
foremost a financial asset” (Lewis & Mizen, 2000). Money does not affect only the 
absolute price and quantity of trade, but it affects also the level of financial intermediation, 
stock prices, and its’ own price -interest rates- (Knoop, 2008). Although there is a clear 
recognition for active roles of money in the money market, Keynesians assume that money 
is exogenous. This is usually demonstrated with the two graphs that depict a downward 
money demand curve and a vertical money supply curve –the later represents the monetary 
policy instrument in the hand of monetary authority to manipulate it at its own wills. The 
Keynesian demand for money is divided into three components, although there should not 
be a sharp divide in the mind of the holder of money (Lewis & Mizen, 2000). These 
reasons are transaction motives; the precautionary motives, and the speculative motives.  
(i) Transaction demand for money11  
The first motive for demand for money is to conduct transactions. This demand 
refers to nominal balances that individuals hold in their pockets or wallets. Transaction 
balances depend on the amount of nominal income, the length of interval between receipts 
and disbursement, and the mechanism of obtaining and delivering cash to individuals 
(Dennis, 1981). We shall stress here that the transaction motive for holding money is 
unconnected with the level of interest rate. It is also positively related to individual 
income; meaning that as income increases, the total number of transactions an individual 
makes increases. This relationship is represented as follows: 
                                                           
11
 Transaction demand for money is identical to the quantity theory discussed under neoclassical theory. 
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kYYLtL == )()(                                                                                                               (1.5) 
where L(t) =demand for transaction balances, k=income balance coefficient, Y=nominal 
income.   
(ii) Precautionary demand for money 
Precautionary demand for money is one of the major innovations by Keynes in the 
money demand theory. Keynes argues that people hold money to meet unforeseen 
(unexpected) expenses such as medical bills, car accidents and any other expenses that 
require immediate payment (Dennis, 1981). Keynes believes that these balances are held 
over and above what he terms the ‘normal’ requirements of planned expenditure. 
Therefore, he lumped together the transaction demand and precautionary demand for 
money. So the demand for transaction balances includes the demand for precaution 
balances. 
(iii) Speculative demand for money  
The third purpose for holding money is the speculative purpose. Keynes regards 
money as an asset like other assets that earns return and has an opportunity cost. Although 
money has a zero rate of return, the opportunity cost of holding money is the interest rate. 
Therefore lending or investing the money in other assets such as bonds can earn the holder 
interest. However, there is a risk associated with any asset, hence the return earning on the 
asset depends on the future interest and the inflation rate. Inflation reduces the purchasing 
power of money; this reduces the speculative demand for money. Therefore in  Keynesian 
economics the demand to hold speculative balance is a decision to liquidate cash or interest 
bearing bonds (Belke & Polleit, 2009). The speculative demand for balances is as follows: 
drRrLsL −== )()(                                                                                                       (1.6) 
where R=autonomous speculative component, d=interest elasticity, r=representative 
interest rate. 
The total demand for money (Md.) therefore combines the demand for transaction 
balances and speculative balances, which varies positively with income and negatively 
with interest rate.  
),( rYLMd =                                                                                                                     (1.7) 
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where, Y is the income and r is the interest rate.  A rise in income leads to more 
transactions thereby requires increase in money supply. While a rise in the interest rate 
increases the opportunity cost of holding money thereby reducing the real demand for 
money balances at the existing level of money supply. 
Interest rate in the liquidity preference theory is different from the natural interest 
rate determined in the general equilibrium under neoclassical theory. Natural rate of 
interest is the interest rate that makes savings equal to investment demand in neoclassical 
economics. Belke and Polleit (2009), and Sorenson and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005) reveal that 
this natural real interest rate is determined by real factors –productivity and real saving 
rate. Hence, in the neoclassical monetary theory real interest rate is real factor 
phenomenon. 
  In contrast, interest rates in Keynesian are determined by two factors: demand and 
supply of money; thus, it is viewed as monetary phenomenon. It equates the demand for 
money and the supply of money in the money markets. This market interest rate can be 
above or below the natural interest rate. Sorenson and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005, p. 445) 
assert that this is short term interest rate, since “the closest substitutes for money are the 
most liquid interest bearing assets with short term to maturity”. The role of the interest rate 
in the Keynesian monetary model is the reward of parting with liquidity. This feature 
makes interest rate a viable tool for government interventions through the monetary 
authority in the financial market to manage the economy in the short term. In addition, 
early Keynesians use money supply sparingly for stabilization purposes while fiscal 
spending is encouraged to induce domestic spending and expansion in investments and 
private consumption. This is because monetary policy through monetary channel is dotted 
with uncertainty and significant lags in monetary policy effects.  
Surprisingly, neoclassical and Keynesian economists take that there is a connection 
between the two views of interest rates. This is asserted by Lewis and Mizen (2000) who 
claim that “whether it’s the rate of interest which is determined in the money market under 
stock conditions or in the bond market under flow condition it is largely a semantic.” 
Keynes disputed the theory of loan-able funds because he had less faith in the market. 
Therefore, he reasoned that when people increase their savings, this reduces consumption 
and further decreases aggregate demand. His conclusions are therefore that investment is a 
function of interest rate as claimed by classicalists which see it as a function of business 
confidence and other economic factors (Dennis, 1981).  
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Monetary policy in early Keynesians takes the ‘quantity-oriented’ view and its 
effects are transmitted indirectly through money markets to households, firms, and finally 
the total economy. It affects the availability of financial intermediary credit as central bank 
adjusts the level of money supply.12 For example, an increase in money supply (exogenous 
supply by central bank) puts downward pressure on market interest rates thereby making 
additional funds available for investments at lower terms. This will further cause demand 
for investments to increase and subsequently, output will expand. Money is not neutral as it 
determines interest rates in the money market which impacts further on the profitability of 
investments. Money affects economic activity in the short term if there is a spare capacity 
in the economy and also as it fulfils its role as medium of exchange and transaction 
purposes as shown in (A.13) in Appendix. Hence, within the liquidity theory, the 
exogenous money supply was the monetary policy instrument that stimulates the economy 
in the short term.  
However, Romer (2006) and Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (2001, p. 219) point out 
that in modern Keynesian theory, money is no more assumed exogenous, but rather 
endogenous. This means that central banks do not explicitly target money supply or use it 
to set off the transmission mechanism in the economy. Money supply figures form part of 
set of financial and economic information that feeds into monetary policy processes. 
Central banks set a nominal interest rate target which is based on the interest rate rule such 
as the Taylor rule. Nowadays central banks adjust money supply through market 
operations to keep interest rate close to the target.  The money market equilibrium 
condition for real balances is now defined as follows: 
 = ( +  , 
),                                                                                                 (1.8) 
whereby M is the money supply, P is the price level, r is the real interest rate,  and   is the rate of inflation and expected inflation. The interest rate rule is implicitly given as 
follows: 
  = (
, ),                                                                                                        (1.9), 
  = ((
, ) +  , 
)                                                                                   (1.10), 
while the nominal money supply endogenously is determined by interest rate rule, 
expected inflation and output. In this arrangement, money supply is less relevant and thus 
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 Bindseil (2004) reveals that the implementation of monetary policy takes a quantity oriented view in the 
Keynesian and monetarism. 
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dumped to the background as information variable. Modern Keynesians emphasize fiscal 
spending or concentrate on stabilizing output fluctuations and the inflation rate in the short 
term through interest rate rule.  
What then are the roles of monetary policy in Keynesian economics? The role of 
monetary policy is primarily to stabilize aggregate demand indirectly through financial 
markets by adjusting the level of liquidity in the money markets or set new interest rate 
target according to interest rate rule. Monetary policy is effective in stimulating the 
economy when unemployment is increasing, or when the economy is overheating. 
However, the effectiveness of monetary policy is doubted by early Keynesians because of 
uncertainty in financial markets.13 For example, banks might refuse to lend (i.e. the new 
available credit) to one-another or to non-financial sectors when risk exposures in the 
economy cannot be ascertained. In addition, some Keynesians believe that monetary policy 
is ineffective if households decide to reduce their spending when they expect that 
government will raise taxes in the future to compensate for today spending. 
 Keynesians view inflation as a cost-push phenomena, meaning excess demand is 
the main cause of inflation in the long run. Monetary policy is therefore useful to muzzle 
demand-inflation to stabilize the economy by inducing a recession in the domestic 
economy. This view is supported by New Keynesian advocacy for interest rate policy to 
manage aggregate demand, thus regard interest rate setting policy as a demand 
management policy. In summary, money supply is exogenous and its role as monetary 
policy instrument in Keynesian is to influence the price of money which is the interest rate; 
this encourages investment indirectly and consequently increases output. However, in the 
Keynesian era, the difficult part was on how to balance the operations of monetary policy 
in order to avoid damages to the economy. As Gottschalk (2005, p. 11) reveals, “the task of 
demand policy is to strike the right balance between sustaining high employment level and 
keeping inflation under control (...) this is because monetary policy operates with lags, and 
trade unions bid for high wages when inflation is rising thereby risking out spiral of wage 
inflation.’ This therefore provides preference for fiscal policy as tool to stimulate the 
economy in Keynesian economy than the monetary policy. 
                                                           
13
 Other reasons that motivate skeptics about effectiveness of monetary policy are: due to precautionary 
measures, households increase money holding in bad times, and become skeptical about central banks ability 
to respond in time to economy shocks.   Gottschalk (2005) reveals that although it was suggested in the early 
Keynesian models that monetary policy is powerful; nevertheless it was used to support fiscal policy in 
stabilizing the economy.  
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Early Keynesian economists argue that the perception that increases in money 
supply will always lead to inflation is flawed (Dennis, 1981). Money supply cannot lead to 
inflation if the economy is operating below full employment capacity. This is because 
excess money supply will find extra demand, which will make the economy move close to 
full employment. Furthermore, we should point out that the impact of monetary expansion 
in Keynesian economics depends on investment elasticity and the stability of the demand 
for money function. The smaller the elasticity of interest rate on investments, the smaller 
the effect passed through to the real economy (Lewis & Mizen, 2000).  
Several criticisms have been put forth against the policy activism of Keynesian 
economics. First, Keynesian activist economic policy can generates and/or prolong 
inflation, unemployment, and instability in the economy.14 For example, monetarist such as 
Schwartz (2009) argues that Keynesian discretionary monetary policy was responsible for 
the great depression in the 1929. And similarly, the discretionary monetary policy is the 
main culprit that caused the 2008-09 financial crises. For example, it is alleged that low 
interest rate that stays for a prolong period creates asset price bubbles from cheap credit in 
the financial markets. These low rates entice businesses and households to take more loans 
which in the long run become unsustainable. In addition, the preference of low interest rate 
policy particularly in developing countries is not always viable because of limited fiscal 
space to adjust. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006) argue that monetary policy in the Keynesian 
economic did not help to lift Japan out of deflation; this shows that it is not effective in 
reviving the economy as it fails to stimulate investments when a country is experiencing 
deflation problem. In developing countries, where the banking sector and financial markets 
are undeveloped, less credit facilities are used, hence the use of monetary policy to manage 
aggregate demand is usually limited. On the contrary, it turns out that the impacts of 
monetary policy are very severe because they are highly concentrated on the few sectors of 
the economy.   
In summary, Keynesian monetary theory recognizes the active role of money in the 
economy. Money affects economic activity in the short run15, the quantity of trade, the 
level of financial intermediation, and its own price that is, interest rate. Romer (2006) 
shows that Keynesians have dropped the use of money supply as a policy instrument 
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 In practice there is no exact formula that states how much liquidity we should inject into or drain out in the 
economy.  
15
 This is possible because prices and nominal wages are sticky in the short run.  
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because money is endogenous. Alternatively, interest rate is set as policy target which is 
maintained through open market operation to keep interest rate close to the policy rate 
target. 
1.2.4 Monetarism 
Cagan (1989) defines Monetarism as a theory associated with the view that the 
quantity theory of money affects economic activity and price level, and that, to control 
inflation, monetary policy must target the growth of money supply. This school of thought 
was spearheaded by the Chicago School of economics and Milton Friedman, acclaimed to 
be the torch bearer was later joined by Anne Schwartz.16 As the name implies Monetarists 
emphasize the role of money and the link between money growth and inflation (De Long, 
2000). The monetary policy transmission mechanism is directly described by money-
inflation in the quantity equation as opposed to indirect link through financial markets 
described earlier in the Keynesian monetary theory. In his early works, Milton Freidman 
(1968), the god-father of monetarism asserts that there were clear evidences that monetary 
policy strongly affects the real variables in the short term. Thus, on this ground the growth 
rate of money formed a target base in order to achieve economic growth in the short term. 
In the early 1950s Friedman led a counter-revolution against Keynesian activism to re-
establish neoclassical economics with some modification. Thus, Cagan (1989), Friedman 
and Laidler (1982) advocated the control of money supply as a policy instrument superior 
to Keynesian fiscal policy for economic management.17 
The theoretical foundation of Monetarism is rooted in the quantity equation 
popularized by Irvin Fisher in 1911 (Cagan, 1989). In the quantity equation, monetarists 
illustrate how monetary policy is linked to inflation as opposed to the Philips curve 
relationship in the Keynesian. We discussed this quantity equation under the neoclassical 
monetary theory’s section. Using the logs (small case letters) and differences ( ∆ ), the 
inflation relationship in the Monetarist theory is given as follows: 
ttt yvmp ∆−∆+∆=∆ .                 ( 0≈∆v )                                                         (1.11) 
This equation shows that the rate of change in the general price level is equal to the 
growth rate of money less the real output growth, holding changes in the velocity constant. 
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 However, DeLong (2000) asserts that it’s Fishers’ In Appreciation and Interest (1896) that propelled the 
intellectual fire that became known as Monetarism; therefore the first Monetarism is Irvin Fishers’ 
Monetarism. 
17
 Gottschalk (2005, p. 12) writes that: ‘the monetarists’ position was sustained by the experience of 
stagflation in the 1970s when the expectation-augment Philips curve empirically fared much better than its 
traditional counterpart.’ He revealed further that the traditional Philips curve was formulated in nominal 
wages while the expectation-augmented Philips curve was formulated in changes of expected real wages. 
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Thus, deducing from the quantity theory, Monetarists claim that there is a consistent 
relationship, although an imprecise one, between the growth rates of money supply and 
that nominal income or money and inflation are tied together (Friedman, Goodhart, & 
Wood, 2003). Monetarist economists believe that inflation is caused by too much money 
chasing few goods or too much liquidity in the economy relative to output produced (Neills 
& Parker, 2004). DeLong (2000, p. 83) purported that “to understand the determination of 
prices [...] look at the stock of money and the quantities in the economy of those assets that 
constitute readily spendable purchasing power.” Thus to control inflation, it is essential to 
restrain the growth of money supply; of course, this understanding by Monetarism led to 
the notion of monetary rules such as the monetary aggregate targeting.  
It is important to note the differences here, that money plays an important larger 
role in monetarism than in Keynesian transmission mechanism. This is clear from the 
implied direct link between money balances and inflation in the equation (1.11) above. On 
the contrast, Keynesian place large role on availability of credit to influence the investment 
growth and economic growth. This emphasis is similar to the position taken by most Post 
Keynesians who claim that it is credit (i.e. inside money) that matters most.18 
Another fundamental that differentiates monetarism from Keynesian is the 
emphasis of real wage as the main determinant of demand and supply of labour. This view 
by monetarists led to a reformulation of Phillips curve in terms of real wage rather than 
nominal wage (Gottschalk (2005). It is reinforced by the assumption that wage contracts 
are set with forward looking nature which points to expectation as a major determinant of 
wage inflation. The core assumptions of Monetarism are quite similar to those of 
Neoclassicism with the exceptions of the effects of money and equilibrium in the labour 
markets (Blinder, 1997). Money supply is not neutral in the short run; it affects output 
through aggregate demand. The labour markets do clear because of imperfections through 
stick prices and wages, and this happens at the natural rate of unemployment. Labour 
wages are sticky; and equilibrium in the labour market is settled at natural rate. This 
natural rate is equal to measured employment plus an unnatural increment as a result of 
disparity between expected inflation and actual inflation (Leeson, 1997). 
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 See Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006). 
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1.2.4.1 Nature, Roles of Money, and Monetary Policy in Monetarism. 
In Monetarism, money supply (a stock) is exogenously determined and fully 
controlled by government.19Monetarists re-evaluate the quantity theory of money presented 
by neoclassical economists; their main argument being that fluctuations in the economy are 
always matched by changes in the money supply or generally in the growth of credit 
money. If money supply grows faster than the growth rate of real income there will be 
inflation. This is why Monetarists are always associated with the statement that “Inflation 
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomena” (Friedman et al., 2003, p. 29).  
Monetarism agrees that money matters for two distinctive reasons: (i) engender 
inflation in the long term; (ii) drives economic activity and fluctuation in the short run. 
Hence it was particularly in their interest to demonstrate that monetary policy is effective 
in influencing economic activity in the short term. In the long term money growth is the 
main source of inflation. While in the short run, because of nominal rigidities in wages and 
prices, money affects real income. This indicates that money is not neutral, because it leads 
to an increase in aggregate demand in the short run, other things being equal. This may 
lead to full employment; however as time goes on people will soon catch up with this 
policy of monetary expansion.20 Therefore, the policy effects on aggregate demand will be 
short lived and the increase in money supply only generates inflation in the long run, and 
any efforts to reduce unemployment below the natural rate of unemployment will result in 
inflation.  
Monetarists hold the view that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is 
complex; this is because there are time lags between a change in money and its ultimate 
effect on price level.21  This suggests that policy makers cannot precisely tell when and to 
what extend their policy actions will affect the real economy. Thus, whatever decision 
taken about money today may affect the future price level, but this will be subjected to a 
series of lag effects. On this basis, some believe that financial markets are competitive, 
many monetarists do not assign much importance to this transmission that emphasises 
credit channel (Gottschalk, 2005). Thus, to avoid policy mistakes advanced by Keynesian 
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 This is supported by the fact of Monetarists’ faith in independent central banks’ ability to control money 
supply. 
20See (Gottschalk, 2005). This argument is enforced by rational expectation, which implies that agents form 
expectations about the behaviors of policy makers.  If government changes its policy, agents may not 
recognize this immediately; they learn the rule eventually and adjust their behaviors accordingly. 
21
 Fender (2012) pointed out that monetary aggregates are available with lag as opposed to interest rate which 
is available instantaneously. As Rittenberg and Tregarthen (2009, p. 412) write: ‘macroeconomic policy 
makers must contend with recognition, implementation, and impact lags.’ 
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activisms, Monetarists argue for monetary policy rules to stabilize aggregate demand 
(Cagan, 1989; Karl, 1968).  
Monetarists advocate for money growth targeting rule as an instrument to reduce 
fluctuations which drive business cycles. Many believe that private sector is inherently 
stable, and this stability can be jeopardized by so called discretionary policy advanced in 
Keynesian economics. To avoid this strategy, central banks should thus grow money 
supply at a constant growth rate and this will produce a moderate growth in inflation, 
without high fluctuations in output and employment (Friedman, 1968). In summary, money 
is exogenous and controlled by monetary authority. Its role is to facilitate the exchanges of 
goods and services in the economy. In addition, monetarists took money supply as the 
monetary policy instrument which has real effects in the short run; however, in the long it 
is considered as the main source of inflation in the economy. Therefore, monetary 
authority should figure out the growth rate of money supply that is consistent with the 
growth rate of real income in order to control inflation. 
1.2.4.2 Criticisms of Monetarism  
As early as the 1970s a barrage of criticisms was hurled against Monetarists for 
their theoretical beliefs. First, Monetarism emphasizes causality from money supply to 
inflation. Economists such as Mishkin (2007a) argue that this direct causal relationship 
between money supply and inflation is not easily predictable.22 Thus, there is no consensus 
view that causation is unidirectional, because there is nothing that prevents the possibility 
of reverse causation (Mishkin, F. S., 2007a; Neills & Parker, 2004). In addition, there is 
challenge on the exact monetary aggregate to be used as a target because money supply 
definitions are always changing to reflects what is being used as money in the financial 
system. 
Second, the assumption of constant velocity in the quantity theory of money has 
severally been challenged on empirical grounds with data from developed and developing 
countries (Mishkin, F. S., 2007a; Neills & Parker, 2004). Therefore, these doubts hanging 
on the validity of this assumption signify a problem of disentangling the effects of income 
velocity on inflation from the effects of money supply.  
Third, Monetarists believe that money supply is exogenous and that central banks 
can firmly control it. However, many economists in the mainstream have discarded it and 
the consensus view is that money supply is endogenously determined (Goodhart, 1989). 
                                                           
22See also Freidman B, (2000). The relationship between money and either income and prices had broken 
down, the alleged cause of this are deregulation, and financial innovations.  
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For instance, Bindseil (2004) reveals that today’s central banker would argue that this 
proposal that is, growth target of money would lead to extreme interest rate volatility and 
would make any systematic control of credit, money, prices, and business activity 
impossible. Romer (2006, p. 227) claims that “central bank follows an interest rate rule” 
and adjust money so that interest rate can follow the rule. Therefore, money is 
endogenously determined by interest rule, inflation expectation and output. Thus the 
monetary policy instrument that central banks can confidently control is the short term 
nominal interest rate rather than money supply.23  Finally, Fender (2012) argues that it is 
difficult to reconcile the function of lenders of last resort with the assumption that central 
bank strictly target monetary aggregate. This is because when there is liquidity shortages 
that threaten financial stability central banks will intervene thereby abandoning the target. 
1.2.5. New Keynesian monetary theory: A new macroeconomic consensus perspective
24
 
During the last century, particularly after the great depression, the field of 
economics was frequently characterized by debates among different schools of thought. 
Different camps were vying for a place of dominance in terms of a superior theory that 
explains the macroeconomics problems prevailing at their time. However, the scene has 
changed such that there seems to be a broader consensus in macroeconomics than ever 
before. Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001, p. 219) point out that:  
in this new consensus ‘discussion of monetary policy is centred on a class of 
policies known as ‘‘Taylor rules,’’ rules that specify the interest rate set by central 
bank as an increasing function of inflation rate or inflation forecast’. 
 These monetary policy rules are commonly analyzed with the New Keynesian 
theory which is based on dynamic general equilibrium consistent stochastic models.  It all 
begins with the desire to base standard macroeconomic models on households’ behaviours 
and their parameters derived from first principles of micro-foundation. Most models that 
gain the consensus allow some forms of rigidities either in wages and prices that results in 
imperfect competition and firm’s market powers in the short run. Households, firms and 
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 Freidman B, (2000) reasons that there was never theoretical basis for knowing which measure of money 
was the right one to target (M1, M2, or M3), and even within countries, empirical evidence on which money 
had the close relationship with income and prices was mixed. 
24
 Our discussion in this section focuses largely on those aspects that enjoy the consensus among monetary 
economists from inside and outside mainstream. Finally, we outline the criticisms against some of theoretical 
aspects propagated in New Keynesian monetary theory. These criticisms include such as alienation of 
money-finance from macroeconomy, and inability to match empirical data to some conclusions of new 
Keynesian models. 
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government all optimize to achieve intertemporal and intratemporal equilibriums.25 Some 
firms are subject constraint so they cannot change the prices of goods and services they sell 
frequently as they would like. Models that start from these the principles enjoy support 
from economists such as Gali (2008), Gordon (2008), De Long (2000), Mankiw (1993), 
Romer (1993), and critisims from some post keynesians such as Sawyer (2009), and 
Fontana and Setterfield (2009). This wide subscription by economists from mainstream 
and some from post Keynesian is possibly explained by the fact that it (New Keynesian) 
embodies elements of several of its predecessors such as Classical, Old Keynesian, 
Monetarists, and Real Business Cycles (Gottschalk, 2005).26 For example, Knoop (2010) 
points out that this strand embraces market failure and price inflexibility, natural 
hypothesis, rational expectation and microeconomic founded assumptions for households 
and firms. In addition, Money is endogenous with the passive role to react to nominal 
interest – a price set and controlled by the central bank. In this consensus the nominal 
interest rate serves as the monetary policy instrument that solves the equilibrium values 
rather than money supply as held before. In a nutshell the basic model set up consists of the 
following features. A representative household’s life time money-in-utility function which 
is maximized subject to budget constraint as follow: 
 !",#,$,%&∑ () *"+,-./0 + 1
 2+,3./4 − #+56.78 9:;&   
s.t. < + + => ≤ /. + >/. +@A + T                                                    (A.27) 
ℒ = %&∑ D(E F<, A,G − H(< + + => −/. −@A − )I:;&  .        (A.28) 
In this basic set up the households consumption level is denoted by	<, labour A , and real 
money balances by   .27 Households hold the following preferences on marginal utility of 
consumption 	EJ > 0  , marginal utility of labour (i.e time devoted to market for 
employment) E# < 0, and real money holding E > 0. Marginal utilities are increasing 
in consumption and real money holding while there is disutility from work. This model is 
solved for first order conditions in the appendix to obtain equilibrium values for 
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 Gottschalk (2005): elucidates inter-temporal optimizing to mean that current choices do not only depend 
on current and past, but also on future conditions.’ See also (Carlin & Soskice, 2006; De Long, 2000; Gordon, 
2008; Rittenberg & Tregarthen, 2009). 
26
 Surprisingly NK also enjoys recommendation in parts by some Post Keynesians.  
27
 Take note, the basic New Keynesian models ignore the endogenous variation of capital. According to 
(Walsh, 2010, p. 330)  because response of capital and investment contribute little to dynamic implied by 
these models’ 
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households and firms, which then used to analyse the role of monetary policy through the 
nominal interest rate and exogenous money supply. It worth noting here that the real 
money balances enter the utility function as a good that provides utility form money 
services rather than the nominal dollar values. Main important outcomes are the 
intertemporal consumption condition which shows households’ preferences over 
consumption between now and the future, and the intratemporal equilibrium which shows 
preference across goods at period M – i.e. households’ marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and money, and leisure and real wage. Meanwhile the firms’ problem is to 
minimize the wage bill given the labour	A available to spend on the production of goods 
and services. In addition, firms solve their decision problem by choosing the right price 
that maximizes their streams of profit given the constraints of revising the optimal price. 
One of the key elements of New Keynesian economics is the monopolistic 
competition; firms are now competitors and set the prices in order to maximize profit (see 
A.34 & A.35 in the appendix). As in the old Keynesian economics, New Keynesian 
assumes that markets do not always clear wages and prices do not promptly adjust to 
respond to demand or supply shocks. These rigidities create avenues for monetary policy to 
have effects in the short run before prices and wages adjust. Thus, New Keynesian 
economics seeks to explain the causes and consequences of market imperfections in the 
labour, product and capital markets based on rational expectation and profit maximization 
behaviours of workers and firms. Some of the factors that inhibit wages and prices to 
adjust promptly are menu costs; price setting behaviours of firms, and long term labour 
contracts such as minimum wage and implicit wage contracts. This monopolistic behaviour 
is generated by private agents -workers and firms as they pursue their self-interests in 
labour and product markets. For example, in the monopolistic competition as assumed in 
the New Keynesians, firms fail to cut the prices for fear of losing their markets to rivals 
even if such cuts are in the interest of the society. This is co-ordination failure on the part 
of firms which will result in nominal rigid or sticky prices. The sluggish adjustment makes 
these shocks to move the economy away from the equilibrium.28  
 Another explanation comes from efficiency wage theory, it claims that 
productivity rises with real wage as firms want to attract and maintain high skilled 
employees. This strategy helps firms to cut costs associated with the training and hiring of 
new workers thus, wages will remain stubbornly sticky because there is no prospect to hire 
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 Gali (2008, p. 6) pointed out that these ‘nominal rigidities makes room for potential welfare-enhancing 
interventions by the monetary authority in order to minimize the existing distortions’. 
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workers at low wage in the imperfect labour market (Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1993). In 
addition, Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993) claim that firms set prices and wages in an 
uncoordinated fashion, facing considerable uncertainties about the consequences of their 
actions. In all, firms set prices and wages as shown in the appendix equation (A.35), and 
these prices remain unchanged for a while and then changed but not all firms change their 
prices at the same time. These factors therefore, justify the assumption of sticky wages and 
prices in the New Keynesian. 
It is natural that ‘intellectual ideas ebb and flows’ as suggested by (Mankiw, 1993, 
p. 3). The rise of New Keynesian monetary theory and its current dominant position in 
modern macroeconomics is attributed to several factors. First, the Lucas critique in the 
1970s caused a fundamental shift in macroeconomic modelling, especially of the 
relationships in the Keynesian system.29 Hence, New Keynesian economics sprang to life 
between the 1970s and the 1990s with the aim of remedying Old Keynesian economics 
with regard to the Lucas critique (Friedman, 1997). Second, Monetarism suffered cracks in 
their wall, when the acclaimed relationship between money growth and inflation broke 
down in the early 1980s (Fontana & Venturino, 2003; Wright & Quadrini, 2009), and it 
was not worth any more pursuing the monetary target that keeps on eluding them. In 
addition, Monetarists based much of their arguments on empirical findings with little 
formal theoretical foundation. Similarly, this was compounded further by the disagreement 
on what is the appropriate measure of money supply to use as the monetary target. Third, 
New Classical theory which started the emphasis of micro-foundations and inter-temporal 
optimizing agents has also failed to deliver as an alternative to monetarism. New classical 
school of thought seeks to re-establish the classical paradigm with new integral approach 
based on dynamic analysis. New classical concludes that anticipated monetary policy does 
not produce any effects, thus any action from central bank will have no real effect on real 
GDP according to rational expectation hypothesis. However, many empirical studies prove 
contrary as Gottschalk (2005) reveals that the influence of New Classical theory declines 
because their empirical evidence has generally been unfavourable.  Hence, New classical 
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 Keynesian analysis is comprised of a system of static equations which ignores dynamic relations among 
variables. It is an ad-hoc of top down modelling approach without micro-foundation which is based on utility 
maximization principles.  On the contrast, Rittenberg & Turner (2009, p. 652) defines New Keynesian 
economics as ‘a body of macroeconomic thought that stresses the stickiness of prices and the need for activist 
stabilization policies through the manipulation of aggregate demand to keep the economy operating close to 
its potential output. It incorporates monetarist ideas about the importance of monetary policy and new 
classical ideas about the importance of aggregate supply, both in the long and in the short run.’  Rittenberg 
and Tragerthen (2010) gave two reasons; first, they argue that New Keynesian emerged because it 
successfully incorporates the relevant components from Monetarists, New Classical and Keynesian theories. 
Secondly, 1980s and 1990s events undermine the confidence placed in monetarism and New Classical 
economics; the two schools of thought prevailing then. 
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stumbled in the sense that people did not predict fiscal and monetary policy of the 1980s in 
the predictable ways suggested by the New Classical theory; this then casts doubts on the 
reliability of the New Classical economics (Wright & Quadrini, 2009). These factors 
exposed the weaknesses in the mainstream theories prevailing at the time. Consequently, 
some economists started to look elsewhere to find explanations for existing economic 
problems such as inflation, recurrent recessions and impacts of business cycles.  
New Keynesian monetary theory is attracting followers and creating converts 
across the economics profession. Thus, in many circles it is generally referred to as the 
New Consensus Macroeconomics (Belke & Polleit, 2009; Rittenberg & Turner, 2009). It is 
generally acknowledged that New Keynesian theory guides macroeconomics policy in 
many central banks in the world today (Arestis, P., 2007a). In addition, it has become the 
basis of quantitative analysis in monetary economics today in institutions like the European 
Central Bank and the Bank of England (Arestis, P., 2007b; Wren-Lewis, 2007). Many 
argue that micro-founded models in the new consensus appeal because they provide the 
tractability of monetary policy effects and transmission channels. Secondly, the common 
uses of representative agents and monopolistic competition make the private agents to set 
the price rather than being determined by Walrasian auctioneer in the predecessor general 
equilibrium models. The dynamic stochastic part allows incorporation of exogenous 
economic shocks which hit the economy at irregular intervals while analysis within 
equilibrium allows researchers to do welfare analysis in a model that take into account all 
markets in a decentralized form, and identify optimum policy that maximize welfare.  
Finally, consensus models have raised the role of nominal variables and recast 
monetary policy from money to interest rates. Prominently, the new Keynesian specific has 
cemented the idea of endogenous money and the controllability of short term interest rate 
by central banks. These features are very important in monetary policy analysis because we 
can deduce from the model which variables respond to monetary and fiscal policies about 
when, why and by how much. There are postulated nominal anchor either inflation target 
or price-level target pursued as the mechanism to achieve stabilization for prices and 
output.30 The main conclusion is that monetary policy that is, manipulation of interest rate 
is not neutral in the short term because wages and prices are sticky. Hence, firms, 
household and central banks are forward-looking; and the nominal interest rate influences 
overall economic activity through expectation output gap and inflation. We point out here 
that some of the doctrines in New Keynesian are contested by economists across the 
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 See Arestis and Sawyer (2002). 
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divide. However, there is a general consensus around the monetary policy instrument, the 
opinion that central banks are ready to provide liquidity at the set target, money is 
endogenous hence money demand relation is redundant, inflation target as means to the 
end but not an end itself, and the realization that there is no trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment. 
1.2.5.1 The Nature, Roles of Money, and Monetary Policy in New Keynesian Economics  
Monetary theory in New Keynesian (NK) economics has many interesting aspects 
and it comes in various shapes of economic models that emphasise representative agents 
such as household, representative firm, government, and external sector. In order to gain 
understanding about the features of the NK monetary theory, we start by analysing the 
three log-linearized macroeconomics equations that form the bedrock of this new 
consensus. In appendix we gave a summary of the main elements that will help us 
understand the monetary policy and its transmission thereof in New Keynesian monetary 
theory. The step by step solutions of the basic New Keynesian model are given in main 
texts such as (Gali, 2008) and Woodford (Woodford, 2001). In these textbook authors 
solved the model in (A.28) and construct the three macroeconomics equations in a 
canonical form. A typical fully solved New Keynesian model contains an expectation-
augmented New Philips Curve, a forward-looking dynamic DIS curve, and an interest rate 
equation describing the policy rule of the central bank (Arestis & Sawyer, 2006; David, 
2008; Gali, 2008; Gottschalk, 2005).31  These standard system of equations in the New 
Keynesian theory do not have any explicit reference to money (Fontana, 2006). That is 
there is no explicit role assigned to money as target in the model to control inflation. As a 
consequence, some economists characterize New Keynesian economics as an economic 
analysis without money. This is particular when the utility function used has real money 
balances separable from consumption. The appearance of money ends with identification 
of money demand equation in (A.33). However, this is not the cashless economy as 
implied in some cases; this is because money is endogenously determined by financial 
institution in response to the demand for credit. Money supply is lurking in the 
background, indicated by Mankiw & Taylor (2007) that money supply is adjusted to 
whatever level is necessary to ensure that equilibrium interest rate hits the target. This 
endogenous feature will be discussed in detail under the post Keynesian monetary theory 
in section 1.3 ahead. 
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 Recently, some non-linear models of New Keynesian have emerged, see example in Gottschalk (2005). 
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In this consensus perspective, the role of money within this model is implicitly 
given and where emphasis is made, its role is to fulfil the function of exchange of goods 
and services as given in the utility function, and further used as day to day tool for central 
banks to hit the interest rate target. New Keynesian models do not explicitly identify the 
liquidity preference/money supply equilibrium (LM) curve, as is done in the Old 
Keynesian models and thus in this theory, the attention on money is very minimal 
(McCallum, 2001). However, this characterisation raises questions about the relevance of 
money in macro models. Does money matter? The obvious answer is that money matters 
and we concur with (David, 2008) who argues that very few macroeconomists would 
attempt to argue that money and monetary phenomena are unimportant and undeserving of 
any attention. This is because when central banks set interest rate than they commit 
themselves to supply money in response to economic factors that threaten the interest rate-
target, this keeps inflation and output gap close to zero. In addition, it is argued that in 
money matters, because bank money is created to finance production and investments 
hence, banks money responds to the demand from private firms and households. 
 The three main character equations are briefly discussed as follows: dynamic DIS- 
Curve which represents aggregate demand in goods market, the New Phillips curve NPKC 
which determines aggregate supply and the model is closed up with reaction function of 
the central bank which shows how central bank reacts to shocks in the economy (Arestis & 
Sawyer, 2006; McCallum, 2001; Meyer, 2001).32   These three equations are stated as 
follows: 
 ! = %(!7.) − N/.(O − % + P)                                                                      (A.42) 
 = (%(7.) + Q!                                                                                              (A.39) 
O =  + P + RS( − ∗) + RU! + V                                                                  (A.46) 
where ! is the output-gap, O is the nominal interest rate,  is the rate of inflation, ∗ is 
the inflation target, P is the equilibrium real rate of interest (that is the rate of interest 
consistent with zero output gap) and tE  refers to expectation held at time t of the variable 
at time t+1.  Equation (A.42) represents the dynamic investment/saving curve (IS) which is 
determined by this period’s expectation output gap and real interest rate. Empirically this 
adjusted by including another past terms of output gaps to reflect the persistence in macro 
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 Mathematical derivation of these equations are given in Appendix A.1 See also Gali (2008), and Walsh 
(2010) and Chadha (2010). 
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data. Equation (A.39) is the new Philips curve determined by current output gap and future 
inflation which captures the forward looking nature in the firms and households. 
Occasionally, additional terms of lagged inflation are included when empirical data are 
used to estimate the New Philips curve. In addition, this Philips curve relates inflation to 
output without suggesting a trade-off as in the old Philips curve. The last equation (A.43) 
is the monetary policy rule; with nominal interest rate determined by expected inflation, 
output gap, and deviation from target and equilibrium interest rate. Generally, monetary 
policy in this new consensus consists of the systematic components – the intercept, 
expected inflation and output gap; and the non-systematic components represented by the 
structural shocks (V). The V	is generally expressed as an AR(1) process. As can be seen 
from equation (A.39) to (A.42) money is absent. However, the presence money can be 
integrated in several ways as shown by Bessany (2007, pp. 242-249)33 and Walsh (2010). 
Commonly, the relationship of money demand from household’s optimal conditions given 
in (A.33) is solved for nominal interest rate. The nominal interest rate is then used to find 
the price level and nominal variables. Central banks follow an exogenous path of supply to 
manage the monetary policy. 
To characterize the economy in this way indicates by default that money supply is 
endogenously determined and this reconciles with the ‘lender of last resort’ function in the 
central bank mandates. It means that given a choice of interest level, the quantity of money 
supply is determined by the private sector demand for money as given by (A.33). It also 
means that banks take the price that is the level of interest rate as given and decide the 
quantity of credit to supply to credit worthy clients. In addition, banks also decide the sizes 
of spreads above the level interest rate charged on the reserves. Many economists, 
especially those that support the ‘new consensus’, agree that these three equations (A.39), 
(A.42) and (A.43) characterise the views of how central banks in modern age operate. 
Howells (2003) argues that central bank operating procedure has always been interest 
rates, rather than some form of control of monetary base. Mankiw & Taylor (2007) and 
Romer (2006) argue that using interest rate rather than money supply is more realistic and 
practical. Thus, money responds to demand conditions within the economy as commercial 
banks readjust their portfolios when the central bank changes the bench mark rate.34   
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 Benassy (2011, pp. 249-251) examined a monetary experiment where monetary authority peg interest rate 
and let the quantity of money adopt endogenously. 
34
 Rochon (2010) purports that ‘banks set the rates of interest leaving money to adjust endogenously through 
banking activities of the banking system.’ 
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What is the role of interest rate monetary policy in the three-equation model? We 
can track the role of monetary policy via the nominal interest rate, which is the prime tool 
for aggregate demand management. In the short run monetary policy is non-neutral due to 
nominal wages and prices stickiness, while in the long run, monetary policy is neutral. A 
positive change in short term nominal interest rate affects consumptions and investments 
and, as a result, determines the output gap. On the transmission mechanism (Fontana, 
2006) claims that central banks, through their policies, influence market rates and affect 
different components of aggregate demand. This takes place because firms respond by 
adjusting their production levels to meet new demand for their products. In the long run 
however, all prices adjust and the economy moves back to its natural equilibrium. Hence, 
this new consensus has firmly established strongly that the short term nominal interest rate 
is a monetary policy instrument controlled by central banks.35 This should be so because 
for a long time, central banks have not been able to control money supply fully as argued 
by (Palley, 2003). 
New Keynesian economists emphasize the role of rational expectation in their 
models as shown in equations (A.39 & A.42 in the appendix). The expected output 
deviation and inflation expectation accommodate the two aggregate relations of the current 
output gap and inflation. This is because from the micro foundation perspective of 
households and firms, decisions depend on their expectation of whether or not monetary 
authorities will stick to the goal of price stability (Dennis, 1981; Wren-Lewis, 2007). 
Secondly, the probability of whether firms will change their prices is influenced largely by 
how average prices change. Managing expectation is vital to the central bank because 
through expectations channel, monetary policy effects are transmitted to the future 
inflation. 
In brief, New Keynesians accept the ‘long run’ view as deduced from neoclassical 
theory indicating that there exists a natural rate of output and a natural rate of 
unemployment and they are determined by aggregate supply in the long run.36 However in 
the short run, they differ in the sense that they believe ‘contracting frictions’ which 
prevents markets from working perfectly (David, 2008). Furthermore, they differ from 
Neoclassical and monetarists in the conclusion that shocks are primarily responsible for 
business cycles. In the choice of monetary policy, New Keynesians favour interest rate 
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 Of course this does not necessarily mean that they can act as they wish, because they are constrained by 
what is happening in the foreign sector, see (Bain & Howells, 2003). 
36
 See Knoop (2010).  
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policy to ensure price stability. However, this consensus does not emphasis the so called 
liquidity effects (liquidity trap) as it was the case in the old Keynesian theory. 
1.2.5.2 Criticisms of New Keynesian Monetary Theory  
Although the consensus seems to enjoy the backing of a wide range of economists 
in the mainstream and surprisingly from some Post Keynesian economists too, it is worth 
mentioning that there are specifics criticisms against the view. First, this new consensus is 
referred to as Keynesian but some economists argue that it does not say much about 
Keynes’ general theory of employment, interest and money. Perhaps, two protagonists of 
this claim are Knoop (2010) and Farmer (2010). Knoop (2010) in his summary about what 
some New Keynesians do not believe in, states that New Keynesians believe that the 
general theory of employment, interest and money is ambiguous, and a big reason for this 
ambiguity is its lack of rigor, especially when it comes to explaining the microeconomic 
foundation of macroeconomic behaviour. As a result, there are no references to the 
Keynes’ General Theory in consensus work, although they make use of macroeconomics 
identities closely similar to the IS-LM framework. Another example is Farmer (2010) who 
claims that there is no unemployment in the NK model, people work as hard as they wish 
to at the market wage. This is contrary to the principles of Keynes which indicate that the 
problem of involuntary unemployment may exist in the labour market. We recognise that 
Gali (2008) works have tried to incorporate the unemployment and the labour market 
however; this work is still at infant stage. Thus, these light views among New Keynesians 
suggest why there are few tenets of the original Keynes in the New Keynesian monetary 
theory. 
Second, (Gordon, 1990) points out that New Keynesian is criticized because it 
provides too many reasons why wages and prices are sticky. For example, Knoop (2010) 
list four major causes of price stickiness, and five causes of wage inflexibility in the New 
Keynesian. Of course, reality is diverse and thus, there are many strands of NK models 
aimed to justify sticky prices and their immediate consequences on the overall economic 
activity.  
Third, Snowdon and Vane (1997), and (Gordon, 1990) assert that the New 
Keynesian approach is weak in terms of empirical testing because it is still in an infant 
stage perhaps, this should not be after two decades of  research in the New Keynesian 
doctrines. For example, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009, p. 242) indicate their 
disagreement around the introduction of shocks and other features of the like in the New 
Keynesian models. They argue that ‘the new shocks are dubiously structural and that the 
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other features are inconsistent with microeconomic evidence. Until these issues are 
resolved [they] conclude that New Keynesian models are not useful for policy analysis.’  
Thus, there are still doubts about the versatility of this theory. Others like Minford & 
Srinivasan (2010) argue that monetary policy rules without a role for money (as frequented 
in NK models) are incomplete and they are not capable of ruling out bubbles. Roger (2010, 
p. 78) reveals that the New Keynesians are ‘quantity theorists’ in Keynes’ clothing. 
Clearly, NK contains the transmission mechanism as in the old Keynesian although with 
explanations based on microeconomics; however, their policy prescriptions are similar to 
what is offered by monetarists. This claim is supported by evidence which shows that NK 
fully embraces the ‘monetarists natural rate hypothesis’ whereby output fluctuate around 
the natural rate and the best that policy makers can do is to minimize the variances of 
output consequently improve welfare of households.37  Fourth, Arestis and Sawyer (2010) 
also claim that new consensus has elevated monetary policy and downgraded other policies 
(fiscal, and income) as inefficient.38 
New consensus models are blamed for the 2007-08 financial crises because these 
models were unable to forecast the looming financial crisis on the horizon. This criticism 
concurs with the claim by Goodhart (1994) who argues that this new consensus model ( i.e. 
system of equations (A.39, A.42 & A.43) is a ‘fair weather’ model in that it works only 
when the economy is faced with stable conditions but cannot function in a high inflation 
environment. Furthermore, this is supported by the fact that many central banks have 
added the stimulus Quantitative Easing (QE), Assets-based-reserves requirement and other 
financial policies in addition to the rule based monetary policy in response to the financial 
crisis. Nominal interest rates during the financial crisis were cut to the floor-zero level, and 
thus left central banks with no other options than to shelve interest rate rule policy in 
favour of QE policy and financial policy in order to achieve both price and financial 
stability. On a similar note, Arestis (2010) criticises the NK for its over-emphasis on  
‘inflation targeting, single-minded focus on excess aggregate demand as a source of 
inflation pressure, and neglect of destabilizing effects from asset prices inflation. Many 
economists today agree that inflation targeting which suppose to promote price stability 
does not guarantee financial stability. Thus, monetary authority should come up with 
another instrument that simultaneous promotes the goal of price and financial stability in 
the financial sector. In addition, French-Davis, Nayar, Ocampo, Spiegel, and Stiglitz 
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 Gottschalk (2005, p. 120) writes that the embrace of the natural rate hypothesis by New Keynesian means 
again that they are coming down on the side of monetarists, since this hypothesis implies that the long run 
aggregate supply curve is vertical.’ 
38
 For argument against fiscal policy see Arestis and Sawyer (2002). 
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(2006) argue that macroeconomic policy should have more instruments and a set of 
objectives, not just fiscal and monetary policy or price stabilization goal. In the last essay 
in this thesis, we discussed and estimate the Spread-Adjusted Taylor Rule (STR) suggested 
as alternative policy instrument that can help central banks to achieve price and financial 
stability while making environment conducive for economic growth. 
1.3. Post Keynesian Monetary Theory  
Under this section, we take a brief overview of the nature, roles of money, and 
monetary policy in macroeconomics as postulated by Post Keynesian economists. Post 
Keynesian monetary theory is one among many theories that defines the body of heterodox 
economics.39 There are two main features that define all Post Keynesian theory, these 
include the principle of effective demand and dynamic historical time (Lavoie, 2009). By 
the former, Post Keynesians imply that the demand excludes extra goods that unemployed 
workers would buy if they were able to get a job; while the latter emphasizes the transition 
from one equilibrium to another and the effect of conditions that prevailed during the 
transition period on the final outcome (Lavoie, 2009). Furthermore, (Lavoie, 2009) 
explains effectively by pointing out that it is this demand that determines the economy both 
in the short and long run of how supply adapts to demand. Other features that differentiate 
Post Keynesians include endogenous money, the emphasis on exogenous interest rate, and 
asset based reserve requirements as a complementary instrument with which to conduct 
monetary policy (Palley, 2003).  In general most prefer the use of government fiscal policy 
to boost spending and investment during economic contraction and for government to 
restrain speculation during booms (Fontana, 2006).  
In Post Keynesian monetary theory, the concept of endogenous money is the 
cornerstone. Adherents believe that endogenous money is the outcome of purposeful 
interaction between economic agents in reserve, credit, and financial markets. According to 
this argument, money supply is determined by the demand for bank credit from the 
households and firms’ financial market to finance production. For example, Bain and 
Howells (2003) reveal that central banks having set the official interest rate […], must 
meet such demand for reserves as is forthcoming. Thus, central banks must fulfil their 
mandates as the ‘lender of last resort’ irrespective of whether the money supply growth 
rate is above the monetary target. In addition post-Keynesian theory assumes that credit 
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 Heterodox economics is shaped by the works of Michael Kaleci (1971), Minsk (1949), and Kaldor (1908). 
In general, many heterodox economists agree with the works of Maynard Keynes especially on the areas of 
unemployment, uncertainty, role of expectation in financial markets, and effective demand. However, the 
analyses in heterodox economics start from microeconomic problems, this is in contrast with macroeconomic 
analysis in Keynesian economics.  
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creates deposits which cause new loans (Bain & Howells, 2003; Lavoie, 2009). This 
assumption is opposed to mainstream assumption that deposit determines the amount credit 
bank are ready to create in the economy. 
Post Keynesians made a barrage of criticisms against several aspects of 
neoclassical economics, and these criticisms had been used constantly to define what they 
stand for. First, PK theory utterly rejects the ‘savings-determine-investments hypothesis as 
postulated by neoclassical economists. In the PK perspective, savings-determine 
investments is against the view that the economy is ‘demand determined’ (Lavoie, 2009). 
Early Keynesian held the view that economy is demand driven, even so post Keynesians 
argue that investment determines savings as against the contrary. Extending this further, 
post-Keynesian individual’s resolve to invest is independent from the savings level in the 
economy. Thus, the proposition savings-determines-investment is at odds with the 
investment-determines-savings which is prevalent in the post Keynesian economics. 
1.3.1 Monetary Theory of Post Keynesian Economics 
Lavoie (2009) reveals that the monetary theory of the Post Keynesians has a long 
tradition that dates back to the 1830s and 1840s. Large part of this theory concentrates on 
the nature of money supply; which was why the endogenous money was developed to 
counter the classical quantity theory of money and the currency theory. Arestis and Sawyer 
(2006) assert that this view about money is now incorporated in the new macroeconomics 
consensus  by economists in the new Keynesian. Although endogenous money seems to 
only take centre stage in mainstream economics now, it has been a long-held theory of 
money.40 We observe that this recognition has made the monetary policy of interest rate 
setting clearly relevant and coherent with practical operations of central banking. 
Money in Post Keynesian theory originates within the economic system when firms 
and households began to borrow from the banks (or repay loans as well). Thus, in this 
process, deposits and bank money are created or destroyed. They are created when banks 
issue new loans and are destroyed when loans are repaid back. In this view, money is more 
than a medium of exchange or a stock as commonly expounded in mainstream economics. 
Money is integrated within the economy and supply arises as a result of the creation of new 
banks’ liabilities within the income generation process (Fontana & Venturino, 2003). Of 
course, this nature is laid bare in the modern economy where money supply expands as 
banks allow for overdrafts or extend lines of credit to finance production or new 
investment projects. 
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Money assumes an active role in the Post Keynesian monetary theory, as opposed 
to the passive role it plays in the neoclassical family. Its role is very central in post 
Keynesian monetary theory; this is because it affects nominal variables both in the short 
and longer term. Money supply is tied to production as it finances the production process 
or the upsurge of speculative purchases in financial markets (Fontana & Venturino, 2003). 
Some argue that money represents the wheels of trade and growth. It goes beyond the so-
called ‘helicopter drops’ as it is labelled in the quantity theory of money and utility models 
such as Cash-In-Advance models (Mankiw & Taylor, 2007). 
However, the nature and roles of endogenous money are divisive issues in Post- 
Keynesian monetary economics. As a result, there are two sprinter-groups that emphasize 
endogenous money in microanalysis of the behaviour of banks in the economy (Ahmad & 
Ahmed, 2006; Dow, 2006; Fontana & Venturino, 2003). The first group holds the view 
that monetary authority fully accommodates the demand for money (cash and credit) from 
banks and the public. This group is widely known as the Accommodationists. The 
Accommodationists claim that the money supply curve is flat because at the prevailing 
interest rate, banks must meet the demand for money from all credit worthy firms and the 
public (Lavoie, 2009). The second group called the Structuralists agrees with the 
endogenous view of money put forth by the Accommodationists, although their emphasis 
extends further than the Accommodationists’. They argue that Accommodationists have 
neglected the structural characteristics of banks and central banks. This will be clarified 
here. Fontana and Venturino (2003) claim that the differences between these two groups 
are centred on three arguments. First, the disagreement is based on the degree of control 
that the central banks exercise over the demand for reserves. They argue that to some 
extent, central banks exert influence on monetary conditions particularly by setting interest 
rates, and in addition, the lender of last resort facility is limited (Arestis, P., 2007b). This 
means there is a limit to its exercising the lender of last resorts function and therefore 
accommodation is not infinitely elastic. Commercial banks diversify their portfolios to 
limit risk exposure to a single market or one single large borrower. The second 
disagreement is based on the meaning and relevance of liquidity preference of commercial 
banks. For instance, if commercial banks have preferences over the different types of 
assets they would like to hold, then it would be very difficult to accommodate new credit 
demand even if it is from credit-worthy agents. The third argument relates to the 
controversy about the liquidity preferences of the non-banking public (wage earners).  
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Understanding how the two views of endogenous money work enriches our 
understanding of the behaviour of central banks in the reserve market, and commercial 
banks in the credit markets, as well as the interaction between banks and wage earners in 
the financial markets. For example, it is clear now that the change in the price of reserves 
sets off the transmission mechanism from reserves market to credit market, and 
subsequently to the rest of the economy. Generally, most economists whether Post- 
Keynesians or otherwise believe that money is non-neutral and it matters in the short term. 
Notwithstanding, there exists a divergent opinion about the influence of money on real 
activity in the long term. This view is supported by David (2008) who reveals that ‘‘very 
few macroeconomists would attempt to argue that money and monetary phenomena are 
unimportant and undeserving of any attention’’. He further asserts that the contentious 
issue among macroeconomists concerns the relative importance of money vis-à-vis other 
factors in determining real as opposed to nominal economic outcomes.  
In all, we see that the differences between Accommodationists and Structuralists 
are based on how each camp view the behaviours of banks in the credit markets (Fontana 
& Venturino, 2003; Lavoie, 2009). Accommodationists assume that during the adjustment 
process of money supply, banks are not affected either by changes in their own liquidity 
ratios or those of their customers. While Structuralists uphold the view that over the 
business cycle, banks change their requirements for credit in both price and non-price 
terms in order to maintain their preferred liquidity positions. The structure of loan 
portfolios will affect the desired level of liquidity each bank would like to hold. 
1.3.1.1. What is the Nature and Role of Monetary Policy in Post Keynesian Monetary 
theory? 
Palley (2003) purported that the literature on the implications of Post-Keynesian 
theory of endogenous money on monetary policy is very thin, as this is still in an infant 
stage. Unlike mainstream economics where the macro analysis about the nature and roles 
of monetary policy is abundant and well-documented; it is simply not the same with Post 
Keynesian economics. Post Keynesian monetary theory has been largely confined to the 
microanalysis of the theory of endogenous money, with fewer details about the 
transmission mechanisms from interest rate and endogenous money to inflation, output and 
employment.  
In spite of the fact that many Post-Keynesians have been occupied with debates 
around endogenous money, the current approach in the new macroeconomic consensus on 
monetary policy has much bearing on the rudiments from Post-Keynesian monetary theory. 
P a g e  | 35 
 
Thus, Palley (2003) claims that, although there are wide theoretical differences stemming 
from various assumptions, the PK recommends interest rate setting monetary policy as is 
the case in the new consensus. The differences are: mainstream economists claim that 
monetary targeting and interest are competing strategies for monetary policy 
implementation. So, it is the contest between money supply and nominal interest rate. 
However, because money demand is allegedly unstable, and there is a weak relationship 
between money supply and inflation therefore, interest rate became the monetary policy 
instrument.41 Post-Keynesian monetary theory recommends the nominal official interest 
rate as the controlling instrument for monetary policy to fight inflation because holding 
down the growth rate of money supply at particular level will generate high interest rates 
volatility. In addition, many argue that money is an IOU and therefore given the price that 
is, the bank rate, the private sector has the ability to create inside money to meet excess 
demand. Hence, interest targeting policy allows money to be demand-determined within 
the financial system while monetary authority sets the price for liquidity. Achieving 
inflation target through interest rate setting policy is the ultimate goal in the mainstreams. 
It is pertinent to mention here that it is not the ultimate target for many post-Keynesians 
who argue that inflation is the secondary objective in order words, the means to the end 
and not the end in itself; even though the ultimate target is full employment (Palley, 2003).  
Furthermore, there are economists within and without who hold the view that 
interest rate fixing is insufficient to achieve stability and full employment. Therefore, some 
post-Keynesians suggest a complementary instrument (such as asset-based-reserve 
requirements) to address systemic problems that emanate from the balance sheets in the 
asset markets. The asset-based-reserves requirement is necessary to address asset related 
problems form the balance sheets of which some do not pose an immediate threat or 
significant shock to inflation; but however, they present an imminent danger to financial 
stability, output and employment. In support of this complementary tool, (Palley, 2003) 
argues that such an instrument is necessary because effective monetary policy should 
attend to both the real economy and the financial markets. This additional policy 
instrument is not really new to the debates about monetary policy strategies because many 
economists have extensively discussed on whether monetary policy should also be 
addressed to asset prices (Capie & Wood, 2006). In the recent past, Taylor (2008) and 
McCulley and Toloui (2008) suggested a spread-adjusted Taylor rule which is the standard 
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monetary policy augmented with spread to achieve price and financial stability 
simultaneously. 
1.4. What is the Interest Rate?  
Throughout our review of monetary theories, we constantly mentioned interest rate 
without any attempts to clarify ‘the interest rate’ we are referring to. In brief, we will 
explain the interest rate before we examine some theoretical and empirical aspects of 
monetary transmission mechanism in details. It is true that money supply plays significant 
roles in the management of the economy; thus, for this reasons our emphasis throughout 
this literature review was placed on the nature and role of money supply, the transition 
from money-growth targeting to interest rate setting monetary policy and how this changed 
the evaluation of the transmission mechanism. From this exercise, we explained why the 
new consensus emphasizes interest rate in monetary policy framework. We find that the 
role of monetary aggregate as a policy instrument has been assigned to nominal interest 
rate nowadays. 
Now, if it is not money supply but interest rates, then which interest rate?  There 
are various kinds of interest rates in financial markets in fact there is one interest rate for 
every asset in the market.  
As Belke & Polleit (2009, p. 187) write: ‘‘there are interest rates for consumers, 
corporate and mortgage loans; interest rates for savings and time deposits, and 
those for government and corporate bonds; there are short and long-term interest 
rates; and there are official interest rates, set by central banks, and interest rates set 
by supply and demand in the market place; there are interest rates in the form of 
spot and forward interest rates, and there are nominal and real interest rates.” 
The general observation under all schools of thought on monetary theory is that all seem to 
agree that there are two kinds of reference interest rates that serve as the bench marks for 
all other market rates. These are: (i) the invisible real interest rate that is, the price of real 
capital as referred to in some quarters; (ii) and the observable nominal interest rate which 
is determined by central banks. The former interest rate is invisible or is not to be 
observed, but it is generally assumed that it depends on real factors such as people’s time 
preference, productivity and population growth, fiscal policy and risk premium, and 
institutional structures of financial market.42 This real interest rate is somehow assumed to 
be equivalent to natural interest rate in the long run. While the later is determined and 
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controlled by the central banks (i.e. nominal repo rate, bank rate or federal fund rate), and 
it influences all other market rates whether short term or long term, the nominal interest 
rate is the price of credit in the money markets. It plays a central role in monetary policy as 
a controllable tool or as target instrument to manage aggregate demand (demand shocks) in 
the short term. Central banks use nominal interest rate to mediate to the market the level of 
interest rate which is assumed to be optimal with the desired level of inflation and output. 
Thus policy instrument influences other market rates (both nominal and real) and other 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation and money supply. 43  Nominal interest rate 
reflects country risk profile, inflation expectation and political risk. Therefore nominal 
interest can be divided into two parts real interest and inflation expectation.44 
Henceforth, the interest rate we are referring to is the nominal rate or the real 
interest rate which is the difference between nominal interest rate and expected inflation.45 
This can be a discount rate, re-purchase rate, federal fund rate, refinance rate, or bank rate 
as referred to by different names in many central banks. In all, interest rate refers to the 
cost of borrowing, opportunity cost of holding cash, a measure of time preference, and the 
reward of parting with money.  
1.5. Importance of Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism 
Lastly, we discuss the theoretical underpinnings of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. Primarily, when the central bank changes monetary policy target, the short 
term market rates react to reflect the change in monetary policy stance. The first reaction is 
observed in the intermediation spreads, asset prices in asset market and the general 
expectation of the public about the future course of inflation in the medium term. Agents in 
the money markets revise their expectations about the future course of inflation, and these 
revisions could either amplify or dampen the effects of monetary policy depending on the 
size of spreads in the financial sector. In the second round effects, the market rates are 
filtered through to domestic demand for goods and services and external demand.  This 
translates to a shift in aggregate demand which affects domestic inflation pressure. 
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 Freidman B, (2000) writes: ‘although the central bank controls only the short term instruments like 
Treasury  bills, the longer-term rates […] move in the same direction as short term because banks and other 
investors are able to substitute among different debt instruments in their asset portfolios. Hence monetary 
policy affects these other rates as well.’ 
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 Wicksel’s 1898 work, Interest and Prices, is regarded by many economists as the earliest contribution on 
this area of macroeconomics. The concept of natural interest rate started with Johan Gustaf Knut Wicksell in 
1898 who alleged that natural interest rate has nothing to do with money as this is determined by real 
phenomena. Belke and Polleit (2009) reveal that the Wicksel’s natural real interest rate is equal to the 
equilibrium interest rate in the neoclassical theory of interest rate. 
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 This is the interest rate which central banks can conveniently set (control) and maintains its’ level by 
continuously supplying reserves through buying or selling to the markets. 
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It is widely accepted that the study of the transmission mechanism is very complex 
and involve some degree of uncertainty as to how monetary policy is transmitted to 
macroeconomic outcomes (Belke & Polleit, 2009). There are a host of factors that obscure 
our understanding of the transmission mechanism, such as variable time lags between the 
point of recognition to implementation and finally to realisation of the impacts; and the 
uncertainty around the model and forecasts used in the modelling (Blinder, 1998; 
Rittenberg & Tregarthen, 2009); and finally, the role of spreads as conduit of monetary 
policy effects. Mahadeva and Sinclair (2002) also add that because economies are always 
evolving, this makes it difficult to accurately analyse the transmission mechanism. As we 
acknowledge the problems mentioned above, we point out that our analysis of these 
transmission channels in the next chapter is not an exhaustive list of transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy but we address those aspects we deemed necessary to 
develop monetary policy framework in Namibia.   
The subject of monetary policy transmission mechanism is now more important 
than before irrespective of which schools of thought you project it from. Thus, both 
empirical and theoretical studies on monetary transmission mechanism are important 
because they help us to answer the questions of when, why and how about the mechanics 
of monetary policy.  
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1.6. What We Have Learned So Far 
In this chapter about monetary theories in the mainstream and Post-Keynesian, we 
gained important lessons that theoretically inform contemporary empirical works on 
modelling monetary policy frameworks. Firstly, early mainstream (excluding the 
Wicksellian era) favoured some form of quantitative instruments such as money supply or 
exchange rate target for monetary policy, while the Post-Keynesian emphasized the use of 
interest rate as the policy instrument to conduct monetary policy. Secondly, this literature 
review shows that the nature and roles of monetary policy have evolved, and the prevailing 
consensus now is that, interest rate-targeting is the monetary policy approach used to 
achieve price stability. Interest rate is generally defined as the price for market liquidity 
(credit) and this price is set and controlled by central banks. Hence, altering the level of 
interest rate begins the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Ho (2010, p. 91) states 
that: 
 “As a signal of policy stance [i.e. interest rate], (…) interest rate should ideally 
provide clarity and good controllability. This explains why so many central banks 
signal with their official rates, which are natural and fully in their control. And to 
the extent that this policy rate, (…) is also a starting point of monetary 
transmission, it should ideally be something economically relevant.’  
It accepted that setting interest rates have benefits of signalling effect in the financial 
markets which argues well for the monetary policy stance and the forward guidance of the 
general public. On this basis, we chose interest rate (i.e. repo rate) to serve us the policy 
variable in our empirical works in this thesis. 
Thirdly, we observe that there are wide theoretical differences why interest rate is 
chosen as a monetary policy instrument in the new macroeconomic consensus; however, in 
this literature review we show that many researchers across the divide equally recommend 
for interest rate-targeting monetary policy approach. For example, mainstream economists 
assert that the money-growth and interest targeting are competing strategies for monetary 
policy implementation, while economists outside the mainstream argue that precise 
systematic control of money supply (i.e. monetary targeting) is practically impossible thus, 
monetary targeting cannot be used as a monetary policy instrument. Further arguments for 
interest rate-targeting are that the money demand relationship is unstable and often it is 
weak; therefore, it is a less reliable predictor of the future inflation.46 In addition, interest 
                                                           
46
 See Crocket (2000), Froyen (2005),  Palley (2003) , De Grauwe and Polan (2005) and McCandless & 
Weber (1995).  
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rate targeting approach helps monetary policy makers to workout pathway from the present 
to the future i.e. reliable forward guidance. In the case of post-Keynesian theorists, many 
reject the use of monetary aggregates as the monetary policy instrument on the basis that 
money supply is endogenous, or simply money is an ‘I Owe You’ created through the 
private sector demand. The view of strictly money growth targeting is difficult to reconcile 
with the ‘lender of last resort’ function in central banking mandates. Thus, interest rate-
targeting framework is practical as it allows money to be demand-determined within the 
financial system while monetary authority sets the price of liquidity.  
As for money, it has disappeared from the scene because it is endogenous, and in 
contemporary times it is rather used as operational tool to keep nominal interest rate close 
to the target. Thus, when monetary policy is discussed today the questions about money are 
left on the background. This review further shows that most economists whether Post-
Keynesians or otherwise believe that money is non-neutral and it matters in the short term. 
However, there are disagreements about the influence of money on real activity in the long 
term. This view is supported by David (2008) and Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993, p. 23) who 
reveals that ‘‘money matters, at least most of the time, although monetary policy may be 
ineffective in some periods (like the great depression).’’ Hence, in the second chapter, we 
examined both the transmission effects of monetary policy shocks and private credit shock 
on output and inflation in Namibia. As in Laidler (2007) we posit that the transmission 
effects of monetary shocks is activated by changes in the repo rate rather than changes in 
the monetary aggregates. 
Fourthly, this literature review shows that new macroeconomic consensus argues 
for an effective monetary policy instrument(s) that should attend to monetary and financial 
stability.47 Some post-Keynesian calls for assets-based requirement in order to improve 
financial stability, while some in the mainstream suggest an independent financial policy 
targeted on credit development or the Spread-adjusted Taylor rule that is aimed to address 
price and financial stability simultaneously. In chapter five of this thesis, we examined the 
merits of an alternative monetary policy strategy which is the spread-adjusted Taylor rule 
suggested by (Taylor, 2008) and (McCulley & Toloui, 2008). 
In all, the following chapters in this thesis: the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy; effects of interest rate spreads in Namibia; and the empirical estimation 
of Spread adjusted policy hinge on the basis that central banks use short term interest rate 
                                                           
47
 For example, see executive summary by Bayoumi, Dell'Ariccia, Habermeier, Mancinci-Griffoli, & 
Valencia (2014, p. 3). 
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as the policy instrument that generates transmission mechanism. Therefore, monetary 
policy is modelled as changes in interest rates rather than increases/decreases of money 
supply at a predetermined growth target. This basis is supported by economists such as 
Romer (2006); (Arestis & Sawyer, 2006; Bain & Howells, 2003; Palley, 2003) who assert 
that interest targeting approach allows central banks to target interest rate and let money to 
adopt endogenously. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A.1 Money in the Dynamic General Equilibrium: Money-in-the-utility-
function (MIU) 
This brief section illustrates how money enters most general equilibrium models in the 
neoclassical monetary economics. It is based on Driscoll (2001) lecture notes however, 
most materials on MIU are closely presented in the same manner and reaches the same 
conclusions.  
The set up here is the MIU with single agent who derives utility from consumption < and 
real balances	 =  . Money balances provides liquidity and transaction services. For 
simplicity, the agent receives income 
 = W(X/.)  and lump-sum transfers 	Y  , the 
money from last period	,+ , and capital, X/.. Z is noted as the discount factor. These 
incomes are allocated either on consumption, new holding of money balances and new 
capital. 
∑ F ++5[G∞;& )(<, )                                                                                                      (A.1) 
Agent maximizes the utility subject to period budget constraints with the H  and H7. 
denoting the Lagrange multipliers for period t and t+1.   
< + X +  = W(X/.) + X/. + ,+ + Y ,                                                            (A.2) 
 = ∑ F ..7\G )(<; )∞;& − H F< + X +  − W(X/.) − X/. − ,+ − YG.     (A.3) 
F.O.C: with respect to <,  , X yields the following Euler equations: 
F ..7\G (<, ) − H = 0                                                                                               (A.4) 
. F ..7\G ) F<,G − ^ + ^5+5+ = 0                                                                          (A.5) 
−H + H7. F1 + W′(X)G = 0                                                                                      (A.6) 
To obtain intertemporal condition we solve for H  and H7. in (A.4) and (A.5) 
( ..7\))J = F ..7\G7.)J5+(1 + )                                                                           (A.6a) 
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 < = .7 `.7\ )"5+                                                                                                              (A.7). 
Intratemporal condition between real balances and consumption is obtained by solving out H  and H7.  from 
. F ..7\G ) F<,G − . F ..7\G )" F<,G + . F ..7\G7. )"5+ = 0                     (A.8). 
By inserting equation (A.7) into (A.8) we can write intratemporal conditions as 
) = (1 − 5+.7 `))" .                                                                                                 (A.8a) 
Driscoll (2001) illustrates the implications of real balances in MUI by adopting the utility 
function of the form in (A.9). Of course many other MUI functions48 with cash-in-advance 
will yield similar results.   
)(<, ) = ("ab)+,-./0                                                                                                    (A.9) 
We insert the expression relation 1 +  = (.7c)5+  in to the FOC and therefore we can write 
the intertemporal and intratemporal conditions as follow: 
( ""5+)/0 = .7 `.7\ (a5+a )d(./0)                                                                                      (A.10) 
 = e(1 + .c)<                                                                                                        (A.11) 
By taking logs of (A.2.10) and (A.2.11) we can obtain equations  
Δ ln(<7.) = `/\0 + d(./0)0 Δln	(7.)                                                                      (A.12) 
ln() = ln(e) − ln(O) + ln	(<)                                                                            (A.13) 
The main economic results from (A.12) and (A.13) are that the former represents the main 
conclusion of neoclassical growth models. It implies that in the long run or at steady state 
the return on capital is equal to the discounting factorM = Z .49 Output is determined by 
capital and other factors of production without money growth. Hence, the MIU in this 
neoclassical with capital, flexible prices and no monopolistic competition obeys the 
                                                           
48
 See Bennasy (2007), and Walsh (2010) 
49
 In the steady state		∆ ln(<7.) = 0,  jk	∆ ln(7.) = 0. 
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general classical dichotomy. The equation (A.13) gives the standard demand for money 
derived from general equilibrium.  In the new consensus 
Appendix A.2 Basic New Keynesian Model: Classical monetary model 
The simple approach in this New Keynesian model which serves a benchmark for new 
consensus macroeconomic models is the emphasis of microeconomic foundation to 
estimate deep parameters jointly. Most new consensus models bear the hallmarks 
monopolistic competition, sticky prices, sticky wages and other rigidity that introduce 
market imperfections in the short run and further result output below potential level. There 
are rational agents: optimizing households and firms, government and the central bank. We 
see price setting by firms as they attempt to maximize profit while households choose 
optimal consumption to maximize their utility. In what follows, we illustrate the basic 
elements that help us to understand the three main equations that form the bedrock of 
modern macroeconomic framework. In this general framework we have forward-looking 
households, firms and monetary policy authority. We start with the classical monetary 
model without money in the utility function. 
I. Households 
The representative households maximizes a lifetime utility, and discounts future 
proportionally by a factor ( given by, 
%&∑ (∞;& )(<, A).                                                                                                       A.12 
Specification )(<, A) = "+,-./0 − #+56.78    consumption level is denoted < , A  is labour 
supply, no real balances N, l > 0  are elasticity of demand for individual goods and 
elasticity of labour supply. < can be thought of as consumption basket of all goods m, and 
this is a continuum of goods represented by the interval [0,1]. The < household 
consumption index is define in the following CES form, 
< = no p(m)[,+[ km.& q [[,+.                                                                                                  A.13 
Household first stage problem is to allocate optimal consumption. Household problems are 
find < at a minimum cost and the optimal amount of  p i.e households must find optimal 
allocation of a given consumption expenditure across individual goods in the consumption 
basket. Given pt(j) of each differentiated good, we derive the cost of one unit of Ct as 
follows: 
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Oj o r.& (m)p(m)km +⋋ t< − no p(m)[,+[ km.& q [[,+u                                                      A.14 
F.O.C 
p(m) = F(v) G/\ <                                                                                                          A.15 
Equation (A.1.4) gives us the demand for good j given total demand for Ct. Intuitively it 
shows that the share of good j depends upon its price relative to the price of other goods 
and the elasticity of demand given by	Z. As	Z → ∞ goods are becoming close substitutes, 
and therefore firms loose the market power. Hence,  Z  indicates the price elasticity of 
demand faced by individual firms. The larger Z  indicates higher degree of more 
competitive market, the smaller Z indicates a higher degree of imperfect competition in the 
economy. Equation (A.13) is a solution to minimization problem above; thus knowing this 
household can know how much to consume for each good and decide <.  
The price index is defined as follows: 
 = no (m)./\.& kmq ++,[ ≡⋋.                                                                                      (A.16) 
From (A.14) we see that ⋋ is the price index appropriate for the consumption bundle in 
(i.e. a minimum cost of a unit cost of aggregate consumption). Household optimal 
allocation of consumption and labour: 
 !",#,${%&∑ (∞;& )(<, A)    
s.t. 
< + => ≤ >/. +@A + Π .                                                                              (A.17) 
ℒ = %&∑ {(∞;& )(<, A) − H(< + => − >/. +@A + Π)}                         (A.18) 
From the Lagrangian we derive the f.o.c and obtain household’s intertemporal decision 
after optimal allocation of goods and services. This will results in the so called 
consumption Euler equations and labour-leisure choice:  
</0 = ((1 + O)%( 5+)<7./0                                                                                        (A.19) 
⇒ < = %(<7.) − N/.(O − % + P).                                                                      (A.20) 
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 <\A8 = }                                                                                                                 (A.21) 
= = c.7c                                                                                                                    (A.22) 
Log-linearization: For conveniences these equations are log-linearized and denote the 
variables with small letter variables.  
Let P = −~j( and O = −~j= , ∆p7. ≡ p7. − p ≡ ~j<7. − ~j< = ~j "5+"  
1 = % 	(,+(5+ ),- 5+) = %/7c/0∆J5+/S5+                                             (A.23) 
Taylor expansion of the Euler equation around the steady state yields: 
1 = %1 + (P − P) + (O − O) − N(∆p7. − ) − (7. − )   
Pp = −O + P + %7. + N%p7.                                                                              (A.24) 
We can write the log-linear zed Euler equation as follows:  
p = %(p7.) − N/.(O − %7. − P)                                                                        (A.25) 
Similarly the linearized labour supply equation is given by: 
~j<M0A8 = ~j}         
N~j< + l~jA = ~j@ − ~j                                                                                         
 − r = Np + lj                                                                                                    (A.26) 
In order to get a money demand equation we need to introduce real balances in the life 
time utility function either as separable or inseparable from consumption. Money enters the 
utility as real because we want to show how the dollar can be exchanged for goods and 
services. We illustrate how to get the money demand before we derive the optimal 
condition for the firm.  
II. Money-in-the Utility function: Basic New Keynesian Model  
In order to generate the demand of money from the first principles as opposed to ad-hoc 
from quantity equation we incorporate the real balances in the basic New Keynesian 
money-in-the utility function. First, the result whether money will have any effects 
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depends also to whether the utility function is separable or non-separable. We start with the 
utility where money is separable from consumption function. 
 !",#,$,%&∑ () *"+,-./0 + 1
 2+,3./4 − #+56.78 9:;&   
s.t. < + + => ≤ /. + >/. +@A + T                                                 (A.27) 
ℒ = %&∑ D(E F<, A,G − H(< + + => −/. −@A − )I:;&        (A.28) 
Since the f.o.c. for consumption, labour and bonds are the same as above here we only 
show the optimal for money holding which gives the money demand equation. 
1 2,3",- = c.7c                                                                                                                 (A.29) 
 = <-(.7cc )+3                                                                                                              (A.30) 
Using the same procedures as in (A.30) we log-linearized money demand as follows:  
~j = ln	<-3(+5 )+3                                                                                                  (A.31) 
⟹ − r = 04 p + .4 ~j F.7cc G  
⟹ − r ≈ 04 p + .4 t~j F.7cc G + .+5 c/(.7c)c (O − O)u  = .4 n~j F.7cc G + ..7cq + 04 p −.4 .(.7c)c O  
 − r ≈ .4 n~j F.7cc G + ..7cq + 04 p − .4 .(.7c) O                                                             (A.32) 
Finally, to find the standard money demand we set  ≡ .4 .(.7c)c and assume all output is 
consumed	 = p. Furthermore we ignore the constant .4 n~j F.7cc G + ..7cq and assume the 
income elasticity of one then the conventional demand for money can be written as 
follows50: 
 − r =  − O                                                                                                        (A.33) 
                                                           
50
 Income elasticity of one implies that N = . 
P a g e  | 48 
 
One deduction from the equation (A.33) is that if changes in money do not affect the 
consumption and interest rate then the there is a proportional relationship between money 
and inflation, hence this equilibrium will hold. Thus, equation (A.33) solves equilibrium 
values of inflation, price level and other nominal variables when monetary policy involves 
the use of money supply. 
III. Firms  
In the New Keynesian setting it is generally assumed that there many firms produce a 
unique good, p(m) with production function linear in labour	A(m): 
p(m) = A(m)                                                                                                           (A.34), 
 - measures aggregate total factor productivity. 
Price setting: firms set prices taking into account the demand function	p(m). They freely 
choose optimal price that maximizes discounted future profit; however, they do not know 
how long before they revise their optimal price. Thus, there is Z as probability of being 
stuck with same price for a given period. To find ∗ the discounted profit subject to the 
demand for p(m) . The optimal price set by all firms in a log-linearized form is given as 
follows51: 
r∗ = (1 − (Z)∑ ((Z)%∞;& p7| + r7.                                                           A.35 
Z is the fraction of firms that kept last period’s price; (1 − Z) is the fraction of price setters 
that changed their prices. Optimal price is a function of current, expected marginal cost and 
aggregate prices – that firms set a price that corresponds to marginal cost given by p7| 
weighted by probability that price remain in place at the horizon Z . Aggregate price 
dynamic is given by  
 = Z(/.)./ + (1 − Z)(r∗)./ ++,                                                                       (A.36) 
⟹ F ,+G./ = FZ/../ + (1 − Z)∗./ ++, .,+G./  
⟹ Π./ = Z + (1 − Z) F ∗,+G./  
                                                           
51
 This p* is obtained from firm maximization of current market value of profits generated while that price 
remain in place. 
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We log-linearize the price  (A.36) around zero inflation –the steady state and that gives 
inflation in period t. 
 = (1 − Z)(r∗ − r/.)                                                                                             (A.37). 
As can be seen (A.37) it is clear that inflation in period (t) comes about when firms adjust 
their prices to a new price that is different from the economy’s average price prevailed in 
the last period.52  Using equation (A.35) will finally help us to arrive at the inflation-
adjustment equation  
 = (%(7.) +⋋p,  ⋋≡ (+,[)(+,[)[ .                                                                     (A.38) 
The marginal cost is replaced by output gap as to the New Keynesian Philips curve as 
dependent on expected inflation and output gap.53  
 = (%(7.) + Q!,  Q ≡⋋ -(+,b)565b+,b .                                                                     (A.39) 
IV. Equilibrium 
 Using equilibrium conditions, abstracting investment and government spendings, the 
goods-market clearing is given by: 
 = p ,                                                                                                                         (A.40) 
Hence, using  = p   and the relationship of the bond price =  to interest rate = =1/(1 + O) we substitute p	 with  in the Consumption Euler equation which finally gives 
us the log-linearized DIS curve:  
 = %(7.) − N/.(O − % + P).                                                                          (A.41) 
Using the concept of output gap ! =  −  , we rewrite the IS curve as follows 
 ! = %(!7.) − N/.(O − % + P).                                                                         (A.42) 
The two equations (A.39) and (A.42) define the forward looking rational expectation 
model that forms part of the bedrock of modern macroeconomics analysis. The last 
component which completes the system represents the monetary authority or government. 
V. Monetary Policy  
                                                           
52
 See (Bergholt, 2012)  
53
 See (Gali, 2008, pp. 45-48) for derivation of how the marginal cost is related to output gap. 
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The monetary policy rule that closes the consensus model is expressed as follows: 
 O = RS + RU! + V,                                                                                              (A.43) 
The monetary policy (A.43) is substituted in the DIS curve (A.42) to solve the model. This 
monetary policy explicitly shows how the monetary authority responds to economic 
conditions while determining the interest rate target which the central bank regards as 
optimal. The first and the second terms represent the systematic components of monetary 
policy while the last term indicates the unsystematic component which the monetary 
authority cannot predict; and further it is generally assumed that  RS > 1  and 0 < RU < 1 . 
VI. The Bedrock  
Finally, we have three main equations in three endogenous variables ! , ,  jk	O. The 
three equations are presented here particularly in the form that can be estimated 
empirically to real environment and fit data. 
! = %(!7.) − N/.(O − % + P).                                                                          (A.44) 
Rational expectation dynamic IS-curve links today’s output gap with real interest rate. This 
helps to illustrate the transmission channel of interest rate setting monetary policy. 
 = (%(7.) + Q!.                                                                                                 (A.45) 
Equation (A.39) represents the expectation-augmented Philips curve which is the inflation-
adjusted equation determined by forward inflation and is proportional to output gap. For 
inflation to be zero, we need to keep output equal to zero in the long run. 
 O =  + P + RS( − ∗) + RU! + V,                                                                    (A.46) 
Lastly, the monetary policy set by central bank is used to close the dynamic IS curve while 
Philips curve determines the output gap and inflation. The main observation from this 
summary is that monetary policy in equation (A.46) is independent of the level of money 
supply, and therefore, money assumes a passive role as derived in (A.33). Equation (A.33) 
shows the level of money supply that central banks should supply to support the monetary 
policy rule. Hence, this strategy supports the view of endogenous process of money supply. 
VII. The role of money and exogenous path of money supply 
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As can be seen from (A.39) to (A.46) equilibrium money is absent. However, the presence 
money can be integrated in several ways as shown by Bessany (2007, pp. 242-249)54 and 
Walsh (2010). First, we postulate the money demand from household’s optimal conditions. 
 − r =  − O                                                                                                        (A.33) 
We start from the tradition that central banks set the money-growth target or adopt a 
monetary target that let money supply grow at a rate to deemed necessary to maintain 
money market equilibrium (see Mankiw, 2012, p. 434). Bergholt (2012) and Walsh (2010) 
use an example of exogenous money supply path is specified as follows: 
Δ = PaΔ/. + a                                                                                                 (A.47) 
whereby a is an exogenous shock. The money demand equation is then useful to solve 
for price level in a Fishers’ inflation equation by inserting the nominal interest rate in the 
following price level equation as follows55: 
O = .  − ( − r)                                                                                               (A.48) 
Using the fisher equation for inflation we can determine the price level as  
r = %{r7.} +  − O                                                                                               (A.49) 
We replace the O in the price level and obtain the following, 
r = %{r7.} +  − .  − ( − r)  
⟹ F ..7G r = %{r7.} +  − .  −                                                                 
⟹ r = F .7G%{r7.} + F ..7G + E                                                                   (A.50) 
Drago () show that E ≡ F ..7G  −  evolves independently from real money balances 
as we see above in the (A.50). Solving (A.50) forward yields  
r =  + ∑ F .7G %{Δ7} + E:;.                                                                      (A.51)  
                                                           
54
 Benassy (2011, pp. 249-251) examined a monetary experiment where monetary authority peg interest rate 
and let the quantity of money adopt endogenously. 
55
 WOℎ	 E MO¡j	1 +  = (1 + O)/(1 + 7.). 
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 E ≡ ∑ F .7G %(E7):;&  evolves independently from the money supply i.e. real and 
interest rate and income are determined by factor outside equation (A.51). From (A.1) we 
see that the exogenous path money supply Δ7	determines the price level. Thus, if it 
possible control money held by some in the mainstream government can follow the 
exogenous path to determine the desired inflation rate in the long run. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. Modelling Monetary Policy in Namibia: A Structural VAR 
estimation in the new consensus macroeconomic framework 
 
“Within the recent decades, economic researchers have made concerted efforts to 
explore in more detail the various channels through which monetary policy actions 
affect the aggregate demand and, ultimately, inflation. In today’s literature, it is 
widely agreed that some of these channels require particular attention. More 
specifically, an interest rate channel, an exchange rate channel, some alternative 
asset price channels and a credit channel are often mentioned” (Gerdesmeier, 2013, 
p. 140). 
2.0. Introduction  
At the onset, it is a common knowledge to claim that each central bank has a clear 
mission and mandates from their respective governments. For example, the mission for the 
Bank of Namibia’s (BoN) states that “in support of economic growth and development, our 
mandate is to promote price stability, efficient payment systems, effective banking 
supervision, reserves management and economic research in order to proactively offer 
relevant financial and fiscal advice to all our stakeholders” (Bank of Namibia, 2010, p. 7).   
While for many central banks there are clearly stated missions and mandates, only 
some (if not a few) have structural view supported by empirical evidence on how monetary 
policy affects economic activity in their respective economies. This lack of empirical 
evidence has affected the development of monetary policy framework in many countries. 
Central bank’s mission and mandates are not enough, they need to be supported by up-to- 
date monetary policy frameworks which describe and explain how monetary policy 
operates within the domestic economy. Monetary policy framework supported by 
empirical evidence on the transmission mechanism is crucially imperative for every central 
bank, as it improves the execution of monetary policy. Empirical evidence about what 
transmission channels that works and how effectives they are will improve the 
transparency of monetary policy. Furthermore, empirical works will help the public to 
understand the process of macroeconomic stabilization.  
King (1994, p. 261) points out that it is not enough to have a clear directional 
objective, but we must also have an ‘understanding of how the instruments of policy affect 
the economy, and ultimately inflation’. In addition, King’s view concurs with Ganley 
(1996, p. 288) who also argues that “monetary authorities need to understand how the 
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effects of a change in official interest rates are passed through the economy.” Thus, in our 
efforts to support the development of the monetary policy framework for the Bank of 
Namibia, we the study the monetary policy transmission mechanism within the new 
consensus view, when money is endogenous.56 Contemporary monetary policy does not 
emphasis money as an active monetary policy instrument but rather it is an information 
variable that should be considered in the monetary policy decisions. Our study aims to 
provide empirical evidences on how structural shocks such as monetary policy, demand 
and private credit shocks affect economic activity in Namibia. This chapter is primarily 
aimed to establish whether or not monetary policy actions of changing the repo rate (i.e. 
the repo rate in Namibia) significantly influence the time path of GDP, inflation, and 
private sector credit in the short run and in the long.  
Namibia operates a fixed exchange rate arrangement whereby the Namibian Dollar 
(N$) is fixed one-to-one with the South African Rand (ZAR) since 1993 after joining the 
Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA).57 The chronological development of the MMA 
started with the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) in 1974, which was transformed into a 
Common Monetary Agreement (CMA) in 1986 and then the MMA when Namibia became 
a member in 1993. Van Zyl (2003) pointed out that the fixed exchange rate arrangement is 
shared by Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa creating a common monetary 
area. All these countries have their central banks and currencies pegged to the ZAR one-to-
one.  The ZAR circulates freely as legal tender in the CMA and all member states have the 
same exchange rate against outside currencies. Some economists considered the 
arrangement in which Namibia operates as the currency board because of regular 
consultations among governors in the CMA. As argued by Hawkins and Masson (2003), 
the decisions to forgo national currencies for regional currencies lead to both political and 
economic stability in the long run. In the case of the CMA, the benefits particularly for 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are to maintain stable exchange rates, lower inflation, 
increase trade export-import volume to and through South Africa, and further maintain 
access to regional and international financial markets through the Johannesburg Stock 
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 Bank of Namibia (BoN) is the central bank of the Republic of Namibia; and it is the sole sponsor of this 
research project. Apart from the above motivations, we also observe that the 2008-2009 financial crisis has 
revived the debate with rigor about the effectiveness of monetary policy in developed and developing 
countries (Knoop, 2008).  
57
 Namibia has been a de facto member of the previous arrangements because it was under South Africa 
administration until March 1990. Although the legal name for this agreement is the Multilateral Monetary 
Agreement by the Act of 1992, we will use CMA as this is the common term used to describe the 
arrangement in the monetary area. Furthermore, the MMA is within the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), with only Botswana not being a member of the MMA. Van Zyl (2003) recalled that SACU started 
long before the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. 
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Exchange (JSE). One striking difference between the CMA and other monetary unions has 
to do with the management and control of monetary policy, the objectives of monetary 
policy and mandates of member states’ central banks. These features are not uniform in the 
CMA. Van Zyl (2003) and Jiang, Iyabo, Kazuko and Leighton (2007) acknowledge that 
the MMA distinguishes its aim which is to advance the economic development of and 
facilitate equitable distribution of benefits to member states while allowing each member 
state to take responsibility for its own monetary policy and control its domestic financial 
institutions. It means there is no single monetary policy for the monetary area. It also 
means that the MMA allows the Bank of Namibia to change the policy interest rate either 
in response to a change in South Africa’s policy rate or exclusively to the domestic 
macroeconomic environment. Thus, with this flexibility in the MMA, we observe that 
monetary policy rates in the rest of the member states deviate from the South African 
monetary policy rate without endangering the currency peg or the multilateral monetary 
agreement in place. Mainstream economists argue that the deviations are not possible in 
the fixed exchange rate peg. This is because countries with a currency peg arrangement 
lose their monetary independence. However, we argue that this view does not entirely 
describe the practicalities in the fixed exchange rate arrangements. For example, we 
observe that for the past two decades the situation in the CMA (particularly in Namibia) 
has been different from what theories describe should prevail in a fixed exchange rate 
economy. On many occasions, Namibia had a lower repo rate than the South African repo 
rate, and this existed without experiencing large capital outflows or facing any imminent 
speculation attacks as occasionally alluded to in the literature.  
Of course, there are some drawbacks in the CMA, as Van Zyl (2003) pointed out in 
an analysis of the MMA in southern Africa. For example, Van Zyl (2003) revealed that the 
MMA arrangement has some drawbacks such as the so-called ‘lack of monetary policy 
discretion’ and the non-formal framework of consultation between central banks in the 
monetary area, and the inherent exposure to volatility through South Africa’s 
mineral-commodities driven economy. On monetary policy discretion, we argue differently 
that while the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) gives the direction of monetary policy 
for the CMA, this is always done in consultation with the other member states. 
Furthermore, it is not true that other member states follow to the letter the instructions from 
the SARB (if there are any) when formulating their monetary policy actions for 
stabilisation. We use the example of the last financial crisis to illustrate how each member 
state reacted to the global financial crisis. For example, the Central Bank of Namibia’s 
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response to the recent global financial crisis was very different from that of the SARB. In 
the case of South Africa, the central bank and government both embarked on large fiscal 
and monetary policy expansions to stimulate the economy and mitigate the effects of 
financial crisis. However, the responses of the Bank of Namibia and the government were 
mild, primarily targeted against unemployment, pervasive inequalities and the lack of 
financial inclusion in Namibia. Of course, one important phenomenon that prevailed before 
the crisis was that Namibia’s repo rate was already lower than South Africa’s repo rate and 
the ratio of international reserves was higher enough to help the central bank through the 
crisis period. Thus, combining these factors with the flexibility to manage domestic 
monetary policy might explain why individual monetary policy matters in the CMA. In 
addition, the credibility to manage foreign reserves to preserve the currency peg in the 
CMA might also explain why monetary policy rates deviate within from the anchor 
country. Hence, the MMA arrangement gives leverage in the short term for the Bank of 
Namibia to deviate from South Africa’s policy rate in order to pursue stabilisation actions 
that are in its own economic interests. In all, the MMA presents the opportunity to central 
banks to use the repo rate to influence economic activity in the short run without waiting 
for South Africa to take similar steps. The main concern for us is whether these 
independent actions of changing the repo rate in Namibia produce significant transmission 
to output and inflation. 
2.1.1 Motivation of the study 
Although there are many empirical works on the transmission mechanism in 
advanced economies; however, in Namibia; a developing country which greatly relies on 
the banking sector as a main source of finance for economic activity, there is little known 
about efficacy of monetary policy. The gap exists because there is lack of documented 
empirical evidence about the monetary policy transmission from nominal interest rate (i.e. 
repo rate) to real economic activity, and the size and strength of individual transmission 
channels such as interest rate and credit channels. As a result of this gap on empirical 
evidences, it is generally observed that some central bankers cannot confidently answer 
questions of when, why, and how much in relation to the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in their respective countries. For example, to what extend does the policy 
of changing the level of repo rate significantly influences real GDP and inflation. In 
addition, other questions the necessity of changing the repo rate in the face of SA’s 
monetary policy direct influence in Namibia. Bayoumi, Dell'Ariccia, Habermeier, 
Mancinci-Griffoli, and Valencia (2014, p. 3) revealed that ‘… there is much we do not 
know about some of the transmission channels’ and therefore we should reconsiders our 
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monetary policy rules. We believe that this study is necessary especially in developing 
countries which of recent have adopted the indirect approach of implementing monetary 
policy, with fewer directives and less direct controls and more uses of indirect instruments 
based on market mechanisms and incentives.58 In addition, even if empirical evidence 
exists, we argue that it is in the central banks’ interest to continually revise the quantitative 
picture of the transmission mechanism over time even if there are past empirical evidence 
on the subject.59  Another motivation for this study is based on cultural and structural 
differences that exist in many countries. On the differences, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993, 
p. 32) reveal that “the impact of monetary policy in developing countries is likely to be 
different from the impacts in United States and other advanced industrial countries.”  Fetai 
and Izet (2010) claim that these differences in transmission mechanisms are generated by 
factors such as the size of the economy, openness, and level of financial development, 
preferences, political and administrative institutions in place. This claim is supported by 
Agenor and Montiel (2007, p. 4) who assert that “transmission channels may vary across 
countries and overtime, depending on the state of financial markets development.” Thus, 
we emphasize that an empirical study about transmission channels and effectiveness of 
monetary policy is highly welcome in Namibia. Specifically, this study is aimed to help the 
revision and redevelopment monetary policy framework currently at the Bank of Namibia. 
This chapter makes the following contributions: it provides empirical evidence on how 
shocks from SA monetary policy and domestic monetary policy affect real economic 
activity; the relative size of credit and interest rate channel and finally, whether the 1998 
East Asian and the global financial crisis 2008-10 have significant long run effects on 
domestic variables. 
2.1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness transmission 
mechanisms generated by changing the level of repo rate in Namibia. We sought any 
statistically significant empirical evidence of monetary policy effects on economic and 
financial activity in Namibia through the Structural Vector Auto Regression (SVAR) 
method.60 Sousa and Zaghini (2007, p. 7) claim that this method allows the modelling of 
recursive and non-recursive structures of the economy with a parsimonious set of variables 
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 See Ho (2010) on the survey about implementing monetary policy in the 2000s . 
59
 See (Knoop, 2008; Mahadeva & Sinclair, 2002; Moschitz, 2004). 
60
 An alternative method is called structural vector error correction model (S-VECM) –this method takes into 
account the presence of cointegration in the vector auto-regression model. This method was not possible for 
our analysis because some of the variables such inflation were reported as growth rates. For example, the 
consumer price index was reconstructed to extend the coverage, and it was also rebased about four times 
since 1990. 
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and it facilitates the interpretation of the contemporaneous correlation among disturbances. 
SVAR method has becomes the main tool of evaluating the effectiveness of monetary 
policy and the transmission channels of monetary policy.  Thus, using SVAR our specific 
objectives are: 
(i) Estimate short run structural impulse response functions (sirf) of real 
economic output, inflation rate, and bank money (private sector credit) to 
the following structural shocks: monetary policy (both domestic and 
foreign), demand shock and private credit shocks.61  
(ii) Estimate and analyze the relative strength of interest rate (repo rate) and 
credit channels in Namibia by analyzing the structural forecast error 
variance decomposition (sfevd) of output. We focused on interest rate and 
credit channels because they are always given distinct elaborations in the 
monetary policy statement issued by the bank of Namibia. This is an 
indication that BoN pays serious attention to the transmission through repo 
rate and private credit channels.  
(iii) Estimate the long run cumulative impulse response functions (cirf) of real 
GDP and inflation to a domestic monetary policy shock. This estimation is 
aimed to establish whether there are significant long run effects of changing 
the level of repo rate on inflation rate in Namibia.  
This study adopts the new consensus monetary policy theoretical framework where 
central bank sets interest rate target and lets money supply adapt endogenously. In chapter 
we provided the theoretical underpinnings for interest rate setting monetary policy, and this 
chapter empirically test the effectiveness of changing interest rate levels in Namibia. This 
chapter contributes to the empirical literature by providing a comprehensive quantitative 
picture about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy for the past two decades in 
Namibia. Furthermore, we provide empirical evident about relative strength of interest rate 
and credit channels in Namibia. 
In the earlier part of the thesis, we reviewed fundamental monetary theories of 
monetary policy in two dimensions - across macroeconomic schools of thought, and the 
historical perspective dimension. The chapter summarised the theoretical foundations for 
the ‘new macroeconomics consensus’ and prevalent interest rate-targeting policy in 
contemporary central banking. In that essay, we learned the evolution of monetary theory 
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 In our structural economic model, we have a shock on SA’s repo rate and Namibia’s repo rate. These two 
shocks are meant to differentiate between domestic and foreign monetary policy effects in Namibia. Further, 
we estimate two separate SVAR models one with Namibia repo rate and another with SA repo rate as the 
policy instrument. 
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and the transition of monetary policy from the money-growth targeting approach in the 
20th century to the contemporary all dominating interest rate-targeting monetary policy in 
the 21st century.62 We conclude that currently, and for diverse reasons, many central banks 
have abandoned money-growth targets and now set interest rate targets as a way to 
implement monetary policy. Central bank’s nominal interest rate is the monetary policy 
instrument and it’s not money supply. When central banks adjust the level of nominal bank 
rate this sets off the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Finally, monetary policy 
effects is evaluated through interest rate shocks rather than money supply shock. 
Therefore, with this understanding in mind we used the repo rate as the monetary policy 
instrument that generates the transmission effects in SVAR model. 
Section one gives the introduction, motivation and objectives of the chapter; section 
2.2 reviews empirical studies on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the 
developed and developing countries. Section 2.3 and 2.4 explain the SVAR methodology 
and the economic model used to examine the transmission mechanism, and the last section 
2.5 presents empirical results starting with graph presentations, structural impulse 
responses, and the conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
62
 On this same topic, (David, 2008, p. 177) asserts that ‘‘central banks view themselves not as determiner of 
the money supply, but as determiner of the nominal interest rate.’’ He further reveals that “given the choice 
of interest rate, the money supply is endogenously determined by the private sector’s demand for money.” 
Similarly, (Agenor & Montiel, 2007) write that ‘the central bank sets the refinance rate and provides 
unlimited access to liquidity at that rate.’ (see also Alvarez, Lucas, & Weber, 2001, p. 219). 
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2.2 Empirical studies on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy  
Empirical works on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy are abundant; 
however, most empirical studies focus on the monetary transmission mechanism in 
advanced economies. In the case of developing countries this topic is less researched as 
argued by Gavin and Kemme (2009). This state of affairs stems from multiple problems 
that prevent smooth analysis of monetary policy in developing countries. First, there is a 
problem of data collection and compilation especially in the real sector of the economy.63 
Mahadeva and Sinclair (2002) point out that monetary analysis of transmission channels 
requires good quality data in order to provide correct policy advices. Therefore, without 
good quality data and comprehensive quantitative analysis monetary policies are based on 
guess works and speculations. Second, research about the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism is complex while the research capacity in developing countries is limited 
because of limited research skills, lack of commitment and shortage of funds from 
governments. Third, the financial systems in developing economies are undeveloped, often 
exist in two tier system formal and informal; and they also tend to have fairly dominant 
public sector activities with the government crowding out private firms. All these factors 
were alleged to inhibit research works on monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
developing countries. As a result, some countries operate monetary policy without a clear 
set of monetary policy framework that stipulate the policy instrument, target and how the 
ultimate objectives will be achieved. Finally, there is apathy toward analysis of monetary 
transmission mechanism from some academics community. Some economists are of the 
view that there is nothing to say any more about monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
However, for central perspective the tasks of advising and revising monetary policy 
framework require up to date information about the how, when and why of the current 
transmission mechanism. We are of the view that monetary policy transmission mechanism 
is a timeless topic, and it remains an important topic as long as the businesses of economic 
stabilization exist.  
Traditionally, empirical works that examine the transmission channels assumed that 
central banks control the money supply (Estreall & Mishkin, 1995). From this perspective, 
money supply was used as the monetary policy instrument that the central banks can adjust 
to stabilize output and inflation in the economy. We argue that this assumption has been 
rendered obsolete and incongruent with modern frameworks of monetary policy. Alvarez 
et.el (2001, p. 219) points out that: 
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 Real sector variables include: GDP, PPI, CPI, GDP Deflator etc. These variables are less frequent in nature; 
thus, there are fewer observations and sometimes gaps for each time series.  
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 ‘‘A consensus has emerged among practitioners that the instrument of monetary 
policy ought to be the short term interest rate, that policy should be focused on the 
control of inflation, and that inflation can be reduced by increasing short-term 
interest rates.’’ 
With the reasons of what we have leaned in chapter one, our position supports the view 
that the central bank sets interest rate as the policy instrument to stabilize the economy.64 
Therefore, in the following review of empirical studies on transmission channels, we did 
not include those studies that investigate the role of the money channel.65 First, we present 
a literature review of empirical studies that evaluate the effectiveness of monetary policy 
shocks through the interest rate channel. Within this section a range of papers on monetary 
transmission mechanism in developed and developing economies are covered. Second, we 
examine the empirical studies that assess the credit channel, with the purpose of knowing 
how credit responds to monetary policy shocks. Finally, we examine the asset price 
channel and exchange rate. The last two channels dominate literature on this topic in the 
past 10 years since the East Asia financial crisis, tech bubble in the US and the global 
meltdown in 2007-08. As we address in the first chapter many policy makers in 
contemporary times want to understand the role of asset prices play in transmission 
mechanism and what role they should play and what weights they should be assigned in 
the monetary policy rule. 
2.2.1 Empirical Studies on Interest Rate Channel 
There are several applied studies that examine whether changes in interest rate 
significantly influences economic activity. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and 
Mojo and Peersman (2003) produce empirical works with evidences, which support that 
monetary policy operates through the interest rate channel. Bernanke & Gertler (1995) 
used the SVAR approach to analyse the effects of monetary policy shocks in the US 
economy. These authors applied a semi-structural VAR and identified the innovation in 
federal funds rate as the exogenous shock (i.e. a monetary policy instrument), and their 
system includes real GDP and GDP deflator as measures of economic activity. Bernanke 
and Gretler’s results show that output declines in response to a positive monetary policy 
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 This view is supported by Post Keynesians such as (Arestis & Sawyer, 2006; Hansegenn, 2006; Palley, 
2003), as well as by mainstream economists such as (Bain & Howells, 2003; Goodhart, 2007; McCallum, 
2001). 
65
 Money supply channels have been argued for by many authors; however, here we present (McCallum, 
2001, p. 157) who purported that the “model without monetary aggregates does not imply that inflation is a 
non monetary phenomenon.” Although the theoretical model seems to suggest misspecification, McCallum 
(2001) asserts that this effect is very minimal in quantitative terms. He therefore concluded his observation 
by claiming that ‘‘policy analysis in a model without money and based on interest rate rule is not 
fundamentally misguided.’’  
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shock. They indicate that the general price index responds after the fourth quarter; this 
seems to show that it lags behind the response in output. These findings confirm the 
operation of the interest rate channel through which monetary policy impacts the real 
economy in the US. On the same topic, Mojon and Peersman (2003) examine the monetary 
transmission process in 10 countries in the Euro area. Using the method of structural VAR, 
they evaluate cross-country differences in the transmission mechanism. Mojon and 
Peersman included variables such as world commodity price index, US GDP and short 
term interest rates.66 The world commodity index and the US GDP group are assumed 
exogenous and they are used to represent world inflation and capture the so-called ‘price 
puzzle i.e after a increase in monetary policy shock inflation goes up rather than going 
down’ associated with the VAR studies (Favero, 2001). Evidence from Mojon and 
Peersman’s study indicates that output and price react to random shocks from the interest 
rate. Firstly, output temporarily falls and reaches a trough around the fourth quarter, and 
thereafter, price levels decline in response to a positive shock in the interest rate. These 
results are compatible with the general outcomes of VAR studies. The stylized facts of the 
effects of contraction of monetary policy shock on output, prices and interest rate are 
aggregate output initial falls, which is represented by a j-shaped response; aggregate prices 
initially rose steadily and starts to decline after the 3-quarter; and interest rates initially 
rose in response to a monetary policy shock (Favero, 2001; Christiano, Eichbaum, and 
Evans 1996). 
Regarding the research on developing countries, we selectively surveyed the 
empirical studies that examine the interest rate channel in economies with a fixed peg (e.g. 
Oman) and flexible exchange rates (India, Uganda, and South Africa).67 In this view, we 
present the work of (Al-Raisi, Pattanaik, & Al Raisi, 2007) in Oman, (Kapur & Patra, 
2010) in India, (Antigi-Ego, 2000) in Uganda and (Smal & de Jager, 2001) in South 
Africa.  
Al-Raisi et al. (2007) investigate the transmission mechanism in Oman, using two 
econometric methods which include the structural New Keynesian model with three 
equations (i.e. Output gap, New Keynesian Phillips curve and monetary policy reaction 
function), and the SVAR approach. The structural equation model and SVAR both produce 
evidence that suggests that changes in interest rates do not influence aggregate demand and 
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 SVAR and semi-SVAR represent the structure of the economy. These can be recursive or non-
recursive depending on the hypothesis being tested. Most SVARs are non-recursive because this 
represents a system of equation with each equation describing a particular structure of the economy.  
67
 Oman has a similar exchange rate policy setting to Namibia. India and South Africa both have monetary 
policy frameworks that follow the rationale of the New Consensus model with no emphasis on money supply. 
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aggregate supply in Oman. They noted that these results are ascribed to the lack of 
responses by market-determined interest rate to interest rate policy in Oman. Al-Raisi et 
al.(2007) argue that the weak transmission mechanism of monetary policy is due to the fact 
that Oman does not have an independent monetary policy. This might be explained by the 
fact that households in Oman respond to monetary policy in the anchor country. In 
addition, Al-Raisi et al. (2007) also discover the evidences of the interest rate  puzzle (or IS 
puzzle) and the ‘Phillips curve puzzle’ which are common occurrences in the analysis of 
transmission mechanism using the SVAR method. Interest rate puzzles turn up in other 
empirical studies about transmission mechanism such as Mojo & Peersman (2003) and 
Westerway (2002). The IS puzzle implies that an increase in real interest rate leads to an 
increase in aggregate demand instead of a decline; while the Phillips curve puzzle denotes 
the empirical finding of a negative relationship between output and inflation (i.e. prices 
increase when monetary policy is tightened). To solve the puzzles, Kim & Roubini (2000) 
and Mojo & Peersman (2003) included the current world oil price index in US dollars in 
the VAR model; while Favero (2001) included the world commodity price index to counter 
the problem of the price puzzle as exhibited by the Phillips curve relation. 
Kapur and Patra (2010) applied the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to 
estimate the structural New Keynesian model in order to examine monetary policy effects 
without any reference to money supply in India.68 They modelled monetary policy within 
the so-called ‘live policy-making environment’ as referred to by (Westerway, 2002). The 
sample period is from 1997:2 to 2009:3 and the variables in the model are: GDP, GDP 
deflator, repo rate by the Reserve Bank of India, US Federal Fund rate and the World index 
on non-fuel commodity prices. Evidence from their model suggests that aggregate demand 
as measured by output gap reacts to monetary policy through the interest rate channel. 
Kapur and Patra (2010) also found that aggregate demand reacts with at least three quarters 
delay; while inflation takes seven quarters to react to a change in the interest rate in India. 
They conclude that monetary policy has an impact on real activity and inflation with 
waning effects in the long run. Kapur and Patra’s study resonates well with our thesis that 
embraces the consensus view which does not emphasize the role of money.   
Antigi-Ego (2000) examines how interest rate compares with monetary base 
targeting as a monetary policy instrument in the Ugandan economy. He constructed a small 
structural VAR model that captures the structural dynamic features representing Uganda’s 
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 GMM is favoured by economists such as Biha, Galles and Jondeau (2004) because it captures the forward 
looking component of monetary policy better than the OLS and VAR methods. The incorporation of forward 
lags makes the estimation to include beliefs about the future conditions of the economy. 
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economy. Antigi-Ego used the model to compare the monetary base and interest rate 
operating procedures for monetary policy with a sample from 1981:1 to 1997:4. The 
SVAR results indicate that the transmission effects from interest rate is rapid compared to 
the effects from base money. He claimed that it takes less than six months for a 1% rise in 
the interest rate to cause an approximately equal fall in inflation. Antigi-Ego reveals that 
base money is slower in Uganda and that transmission effects take a year for a change in 
base money to impact on the interest rate through the money market. Therefore, he argues 
that there is favourable evidence to support a move to an interest rate setting strategy in 
Uganda.  
Smal and de Jager (2001) investigate the monetary transmission mechanism in 
South Africa with the aim of giving a description of how monetary policy has evolved in 
the past two decades. In year 2000, South Africa adopted the Inflation-Targeting in their 
monetary policy framework with the inflation target set in a range of 3-6 percent. Smal and 
de Jager’s macro-econometric model comprises three equations that define aggregate 
demand, aggregate supply and monetary policy rule to represent the reaction function of 
the South Africa Reserve Bank. In their model the repo rate is the monetary policy 
instrument by which the reserve bank influences variables such as money, credit and other 
asset prices. Smal and de Jager’s results indicate that the repo rate has a significant impacts 
on real output and inflation in South Africa. The study further shows that monetary policy 
effects are felt after four to six quarters which thus confirms the existence of the interest 
rate channel in South Africa. 
Brischetto and Voss (1999) examined monetary policy effects in Australia using 
the structural VAR model similar to Kim and Roubini (2000). Their model includes 
variables such as World Oil price index in US dollars, Federal fund rate, domestic output, 
domestic price index, monetary aggregates, domestic policy rate, and exchange rate.69 The 
oil price index is included to capture anticipated inflation, while the Federal fund rate is 
included to control the response of domestic monetary policy to US financial variables. In 
this study Brischetto and Voss used the official cash rate as policy instrument which has 
been an official instrument over the sample period in Australia. Brischetto and Voss (1999, 
p. 1) described the results of monetary policy shocks thus: “it has delayed and gradual 
effects on the price level and small temporary effects on output”. In addition, the results 
are consistent with other empirical works in Australia and other similar economies.  
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 The model by Kim and Roubini (1999) has the following variables: World oil price index in current US 
dollar, Federal Fund rate, domestic output, domestic price level, domestic policy rate, and exchange rate. 
P a g e  | 65 
 
2.2.2 Empirical studies on the credit channel 
Turning to a survey of the literature on the credit channel, Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) and Suzuki (2004) provide comparable methods that evaluate monetary policy 
through the credit channel. In their papers, they illustrated the importance of bank credit in 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Generally, the credit channel emphasizes 
that monetary policy tightening affects the supply of bank credit. The squeezed credit 
supplies therefore constrain business investments, reduce planned production, and 
ultimately total output. Under the broad credit view, economists analyze monetary policy 
effects under the assumption that bank loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes in the 
capital market. Thus, an increase in monetary policy instrument (i.e. a rise in interest rate) 
shifts the loan supply and consequently reduces the amount of credit available to make new 
loans.70  
In this section, we present a review that covers the studies that examine the 
monetary policy effects on firms’ balance sheets as well as those that examine the 
commercial banks lending behaviours in response to monetary policy shocks. These two 
credit views are called balance sheet channel and lending channel.71 Jimenez, Ongena, 
Peydro and Saurina (2011, p. 2301) have revealed that the identification of monetary 
policy effects through the credit channel is a ‘steep challenge’; this is because monetary 
policy tightening affects bank credit in both supply and demand.72 Thus, to overcome this 
problem individual studies devised different techniques; this makes the results from these 
models rarely comparable, but nevertheless very informative. For example, Jimenez et al. 
(2011) used the firms’ loan application to gauge the monetary policy effects on the 
probability that a particular loan is granted. Another avenue that explores the effects of 
monetary policy on output through credit channel is the use of credit rationing models. 
Credit rationing models suggest that there is a threshold level after which monetary policy 
effects become stronger when credit market rigidity surpasses this particular point (Shao, 
2010). However, the weakness of credit rationing models is that the threshold level is 
unknown, and it depends on the sample space in the study; i.e. it changes from sample to 
sample.  
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 Post Keynesians dispute these views because they believe bank credit is independent of amount of deposits 
or reserve at commercial banks (Kriesler & Lavoie, 2007). They argue that credit is demand determined by 
the economic activity. Thus, monetary policy contraction constrains demand (from households and 
businesses) and leads to credit rationing by financial institutions. 
71
 Bernanke and Blinder (1988) formalized the lending channel while the balance sheet channel of monetary 
policy was formalized by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). 
72
  Jimenez et al. (2011) provides full details of empirical strategy followed to overcome the problem of 
identification. 
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Kashyap and Stein (2000, p. 30) examine bank business lending behaviours by 
disaggregating lending from large banks and lending from small banks. These authors 
claim that “it is hard to deny the existence of lending channel of transmission mechanism 
at least in the US” referring to the sample period from 1976 to 1993. Using a GMM Two-
Step method and pooled data from the US financial sector on insured commercial banks, 
the evidence from this study suggests that bank business lending declines when monetary 
policy is tightened giving evidence of a lending channel.73 Kashyap and Stein’s results 
show that total loans and loans from smaller banks respond to monetary policy tightening, 
while loans by large sized banks remain unaffected by monetary policy tightening. Of 
course previous work on the same topic by Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1996) supports the 
line that small bank lending falls substantially in comparison to larger bank lending in 
response to a monetary policy shock. In a similar fashion, Sengonul and Thorbecke (2005) 
examined the effects of monetary policy contraction on banks with weak balance sheets in 
Turkey. Using the Kashyap and Stein methodology, the results indicate that banks with 
weak balance sheets curtail their lending in the wake of new increases in the interest rate. 
Thus, Sengonul and Thorbecke (2005) argue that banks apply this strategy in order to 
rebuild their liquidity positions.  
Suzuki (2004) investigates the evidences on both views of the credit channel in the 
Japanese economy. Suzuki’s structural VAR model includes the following variables: 
output, consumer price index, monetary aggregates and overnight call rate for interest rate 
(proxy for a Japanese central bank instrument), base money, and quantity of loan 
outstanding, loan price, exchange rate, and US federal interest rate. Suzuki finds evidence 
that monetary policy tightening in Japan affects the real economy by shifting the supply 
schedule of bank loans. However, he also indicates that it is difficult to tell whether this 
contraction in bank loans is a result of the leftward shift in supply of loans or the leftward 
shift in the demand schedule of loans. 
Shabbir (2008) examines the monetary transmission channels in two pacific 
countries: Fiji and Papa New Guinea (PNG). He applies the structural VAR model to 
investigate the monetary and credit channels, and analyzes the forecast error 
decomposition to compare the relative strength of monetary channel and credit channel in 
the two countries.74 The model has six variables (i.e. central bank reserves, bank deposits, 
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 The GMM 2-Step method is given in detail by (Kashyap & Stein, 2000) in their paper. 
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 Shabbir’s (2008) results have added another dimension (relative strength) to the analysis of transmission 
channels which is rarely emphasized in other studies that investigate the monetary transmission mechanism. 
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bank loans, effective exchange rate, consumer price index and total output) that he utilises 
to capture the economic structures of these two Pacific Islands. The results suggest that 
there is evidence to support the monetary channel, as reserves and deposits accounts for 
large variation in output in Fiji. The credit and exchange rate channels did not account for 
a significant role in output variation in Fiji. In the case of PNG the result is reversed, credit 
channel plays a significant role as it accounts for a large variation in output. These results 
seem to react to changes in credit conditions within the PNG economy. Shabbir (2008) 
further claims that such evidences are in line with the stylized facts for the bank lending 
channel. The common understanding about credit lending channel is that it is more 
pronounced in less developed countries than in countries with established financial market. 
This is because; the financial sector in less developed countries rarely offers alternatives to 
firms apart from bank’s finance. Shabbir further reveals that there is lack of developed 
financial market in the Fiji as compared to PNG which, according to him, could be a result 
of the difference in transmission channel between the two countries.  
Jimenez et al. (2011) analyzed the impacts of monetary policy on the supply of 
bank credit in Spain. Using a cross-sectional micro-firm-level data and accounting for 
time-varying firm heterogeneity in demand for loans, their study specifically focused on 
loan applications in Spain.75 The main findings by Jimenez et al., (2011) suggest that 
monetary policy reduces loan granting by banks and this is worsened when compounded 
by bad economic conditions. They argued that the chances that the loan application is 
granted are negatively affected by higher short-term interest rate and/or low GDP growth. 
Jimenez et al., (2011) further indicate that loan supply declines and this is especially 
observed among banks with weak balance sheets. An added unique feature in this study is 
that it has investigated the possibility of firms switching to other banks when faced with 
loan supply restrictions. Jimenez et al., (2011, p. 2) assert that ‘firms cannot offset the 
resultant credit restriction by applying to other banks’. This is because substitution for 
credit denied elsewhere is difficult during cramped economic conditions. Furthermore, the 
probability of a second round application being rejected varies directly with deterioration 
of economic conditions. 
In an alternative method, Sellon & Morris (1995) examined the hypothesis that 
monetary policy tightening affects bank business lending in the US. This study explores 
                                                                                                                                                                                
He argued that variance decomposition results are robust because different orderings of variables did not 
change the results with any significance. 
75
 The use of loan applications to examine the reaction of loan supply to monetary policy is necessitated by 
the steep challenge of identifying the demand and supply of loans schedules (Jimenez et.al, 2010). 
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the debates as to whether bank business lending plays a role in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Using the Effective Federal funds targeting as a measure for monetary policy, 
they determined the so-called ‘policy window periods’ when Federal monetary policy was 
tightened. Gordon and Morris (1995) identified four examples of ‘window periods’ over 
the sample period from 1976 to 1994. They asserted that over this period the US Federal 
monetary policy was occasionally tight. This is shown by the sustained reduction of the 
bank reserves which were reduced by the US Federal Reserve with the aim of raising the 
Federal Funds rate. Gordon and Morris (1995) find that bank business lending in each 
window period rises and there is no evidence of decline until the Federal Reserve begins to 
reverse the policy. Furthermore, results show that bank business lending lags behind 
economic activity. All in all, during the policy windows, there was no evidence that 
monetary policy tightening constrained bank business lending; however, they pointed out 
that this result does not indicate that credit channel is unimportant or that none existed. 
2.2.4 Asset Prices Channels: stock prices, real estate and exchange rates 
In this section we discussed two important transmission channels called asset prices 
and exchange rate channels. In the last decade, the macroeconomic implications of asset 
prices have received a lot of attention from academia, central banks and governments. For 
example, significant research efforts have been made to understand the roles of equity 
prices, house prices and other real estate prices in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy and macroeconomic stabilization at large. The concerns about these prices are both 
about whether monetary policy reinforces asset price inflation or asset prices development 
encourages less active monetary policy stabilization. As a result macroeconomists have 
suggested that monetary policy should respond systematically to asset prices and exchange 
rate developments. It means that changes in asset prices and exchange rates should be 
considered as part of the reaction function for central banks. Monetary policy expansion 
(i.e. decrease in the repo rate) affects the short-term money market rates and subsequently 
long term rates. 76  These money market rate adjustments lower investment returns on 
domestic investment thus causing an outflow of financial capital and exchange rate 
depreciation. In addition, this expansions change banks and building society lending house 
prices and equity withdrawal. Asset prices such as stock prices and real estate prices lose 
their value affecting the economic activity as a whole.  
Of course, we found that the area of emphasis in the transmission mechanism of 
asset prices has different focuses across countries. In the developed world, the focus has 
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 See also (Mishkin, 1996) and (Goodhart & Hofmann, 2007). 
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been on the effects of house prices on household wealth, consumption and finally the 
economy at large. Meanwhile, exchange rate prices have dominated the research focus in 
transition economies and the emerging markets. Despite these different emphases, many 
economists agree that asset prices and exchange channels play a very important role in the 
transmission mechanism. Although financial markets are thin and the financial depth is 
shallow in transition and developing countries such Namibia, we find that there is still a 
significant role of asset prices and exchange rate channel. Thus we cannot ignore the 
importance of the asset price exchange rate channel in these economies. Montiel and Prisha 
(2012) showed that the limitation of exploring asset price channel effectively lies in the 
fact that there is a lack of quality empirical data particularly in developing countries. 
2.2.4.1 Stock and Real estate prices channels 
 Firstly, it is empirically shown that monetary policy effects on stock prices have 
significant influence on investments, firm balance sheets and household wealth and 
liquidity. The immediate important reference in this topic is the schematic diagrams by 
Mishkin (1996), which illustrate how various transmission channels work in most 
advanced economies. Some exemplary works on the topic are Montiel and Prisha (2012), 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2007), and Benarnke and Kiyotaki (1998). Benarnke and Kiyotaki 
(1999) showed that there is a strong link between asset prices and monetary policy with 
empirical evidence supporting the assumption that a strong sustained growth in asset prices 
may lead to more borrowing by households and firms. This evidence shows that asset price 
provides valuable information to determine monetary policy. Nastansky & Strohe (2010) 
empirically examined the transmission channel of monetary policy through asset prices 
(i.e. stock and property prices) on aggregate consumption and investments. Using a co-
integration procedure Nastansky & Strohe (2010) find that there are significant wealth 
effects on consumption and investment effects from stock and property prices in 
Germany. 77  These authors proposed that central banks should aim to understand the 
transmission mechanism through stock and property prices; however, these prices should 
not become explicit targets of monetary policy but rather serve as information variables in 
setting the targets of monetary policy.  
Fundamentally, the major strength of wealth effect and investment effect channels 
depends firstly on whether household mortgages are on variable interest rates; and second, 
whether the changes in the policy rate are seen as permanent or temporary. Permanent 
change in the policy rates influences future expectations and consumption spending by 
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households, which ultimately affect aggregate demand as a whole in the long run. 
Goodhart & Hofmann (2007) examined the predictive power of asset prices on output gap 
and CPI inflation in the G7 countries. From the identified VAR they find that asset prices 
significantly affect output gap but the response of inflation was generally insignificant. 
They argued that this might be explained by the forward-looking nature in stock price 
movements. Monetary policy affects the financial health of firms through debts repayment, 
firms’ investments and their ability to borrow from the financial markets. This relationship 
is suggested by the Tobin-q theory of investment, which says that investment activity is 
determined by the ratio of market value to cost of acquiring it. Therefore, when monetary 
policy expansion results in the increase of stock prices this will lower repayment cost 
liability of households and non-financial firms. Many firms use the improvements in the 
net worth and overall balance sheets to borrow from stock markets. The transmission 
channels, through stock prices, lower capital cost, stimulate investments and subsequently 
increase output. However, other increases in asset prices lead to asset price speculation, 
moral hazards and herding in the financial markets. For example, firms with lower net 
worth have less collateral, which may increase the problem of moral hazard by taking 
riskier investments, which make them unable to pay back in the long run. Bofinger (2001) 
argued that monetary policy rates have a strong direct and important effect on firms’ 
balance sheets by reducing or increasing firms’ profits and this has final implications for 
overall investments and firms’ demand for labour. Finally, the asset price channel also 
works through balance sheets as property prices affect financial institutions’ willingness to 
lend. This channel is similar to the credit channel discussed in the last section. For 
example, (Gerlach & Peng, 2005) examined the relationship between residential properties 
and property prices using a vector error correction model (VECM). Gerlach and Peng 
(2005) find that there is a unidirectional causal relationship flowing from property prices to 
bank lending. This evidence is consistent with (Goodhart & Hofmann, 2007) who find that 
real property prices for residential and commercial properties have strong and persistent 
positive effects on bank lending, and further help to explain the long run relationship 
between real GDP and real interest rate in the 16 industrialized countries. 
2.2.4.2 Exchange rate channel 
Exchange rates have an important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy effects. The exchange rate channel comes into play when changes in interest rates 
impact through capital and current accounts, therefore causing appreciation or depreciation 
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of real exchange rates.78 In a flexible exchange rate economy, monetary policy effects on 
exchange rate are transmitted through the following channels. Firstly, a high interest rate 
means a stronger currency which leads to the decline in net export demand and lower 
output. Meanwhile, the low interest rates weaken domestic currency, which results in 
depreciation of exchange rates and increases in export of domestically-produced goods and 
services as they become competitive to foreign goods. In the schematic view, (Mishkin, F. 
S., 2007b) schematic diagrams describe the exchange rate channel as follows: expansion of 
monetary policy leads to depreciation of domestic interest rates which make the domestic 
denominated bonds lose attraction for the foreign investors. This reaction locks in the 
depreciation of domestic currency, which stimulates net exports and increases total income 
in the economy.  
Empirical evidence of the exchange rate channel is diverse in the literature. Montiel 
and Prisha (2012), Mishkin (2007b), Fetai and Izet (2010) and many other economists 
argue that the exchange rate channel plays a significant and important role in the 
transmission mechanism of countries in the transition and emerging markets. Fetai and Izet 
(2010) examined the effects of exchange rate on real GDP and prices in Macedonia. Using 
a SVAR method they find that changes in money stocks and exchange rate do not show 
significant effects on real GDP. However, exchange rate shock effects are rather 
significantly observed on the price level in Macedonia. Arratibel & Michaelis (2014) 
examined the impact of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks in Poland. Using a 
time-varying VAR method they found significant time-varying effects from exchange rate 
shock on output and consumer prices. Specifically, consumer prices are more responsive to 
exchange rate than the response from other macroeconomic variables. Other works on 
exchange rate include (Kim & Roubini, 2000) who investigated the transmission 
mechanism in a group of small developing countries. They find that the exchange rate 
channel plays an influential role in transmitting effects from monetary policy to output and 
prices. In the case, Ghana, Abradu-Otoo, Amoah, and Bawumia (2003) used a structural 
vector error correction model to examine monetary policy effect through the exchange rate 
channel. Using a system of seven variables they found strong evidence that the exchange 
rate channel is the main medium through which monetary policy effects are transmitted to 
output and inflation.  
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 Although governments and central banks in advanced countries care about exchange, many have rarely 
made these as a focus variable in the monetary policy framework. This is explained by the fact that exchange 
rates are volatile, explosive and fluctuative. Thus many have either left it completely to the market or pegged 
it to strong currency so as to achieve stability through a nominal anchor. 
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However, in a fixed exchange rate economy monetary policy effects are transmitted 
through import prices of goods and services from the anchor country. The effects of 
domestic monetary policy on exchange rates are curtailed by the exchange rate peg. 
Another route through which exchange rate effects are transmitted is the future expectation 
of future exchange rate changes in the anchor country. This happens when nominal interest 
rate affects the long-term rate thereby changing expectations regarding the future exchange 
rates.  
In summation, in this review of empirical studies about the transmission effects of 
monetary policy, we have observed the following lessons. First, there is a genuine interest 
from central banks and applied economists to understand the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy; specifically, how fast and to what extent a change in the central bank’s 
interest rate influences the dynamic path of inflation and output. Second, we learnt that it is 
a daunting task to examine monetary transmission channels, and it requires good 
innovative ideas to set up a truly representative model. This observation supports the claim 
by King (1994, p. 263) who attests that the qualitative aspect of the transmission 
mechanism is ‘at least relatively uncontroversial, but turning this qualitative into 
quantitative is a different story’. Under this review, we observed diverse approaches, and 
the new consensus model with three equations and the Bernanke and Mihov (1995), and 
Kim and Roubin (2000) structural VAR approach dominates. As Fetai and Izet (2010) 
pointed out, SVAR has been used to establish the several channels through which 
monetary policy effects are transmitted to the economy. We also noted that there is a 
general recognition that there are potential problems when examining monetary policy 
issues using the S(VAR) method. Some of the problems encountered include the treatment 
of lag effects, the size shocks and accounting for anticipated effects of monetary policy.79 
The New Consensus model is the three structural dynamic equations with the IS-curve that 
represents aggregate demand; Phillips curve represents aggregate supply, and the monetary 
policy rule in most cases in the form of the Taylor rule (Arestis & Sawyer, 2006; Meyer, 
2001). This structural dynamic model appeals to economists today because it illustrates 
how modern central banks conduct monetary policy. Goodhart (2001), Westerways (2002), 
and Kapur and Patra (2010) argue that this model recognizes that money supply is 
endogenous, and as such there is nothing new we can learn from money, which is not 
provided by the cost of money. Third, we have also noted that the forecast errors of 
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 See, Norrbin (2000) who discussed the issues about designing the empirical test of the effects of monetary 
policy. 
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decomposition (as obtained through structural VAR) can be used as an avenue to ascertain 
the relative strength of different transmission channels in the economy.  
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2.3. Methodology: Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) 
The method that is commonly used to analyse the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in contemporary times is the SVAR method. SVAR has significantly 
impacted and enhanced macroeconomic research, and thus research analyses of the effects 
of monetary policy in the last decade have been enormous.80 Bernanke & Mihove (1995), 
Sims (1980) and Watson and Stock (2001) are some of the works which showed that 
S(VAR) methods can be used to summarize macroeconomic time series to make forecasts, 
and provide valuable policy advice for economic decisions. Vector auto regression (VAR) 
from which SVAR is a component is well known for its remarkable contribution to the 
field of macro-econometrics in contemporary times. The main contributions lie in its 
ability to answer important questions about the dynamic interactions conditional upon the 
future path of variables of interest such as monetary policy rate or tax rate. Through VAR, 
macro-econometricians have been able to investigate the effects of monetary policy on real 
GDP and inflation, and the relative strength of individual channels of monetary policy. 
First, structural VAR provides avenues through which econometricians are able to pin 
down the effects of monetary policy shocks and trace their expected impact on various 
macroeconomic variables (Bjornland & Jacobensen, 2010). Through this method we can 
recover the true structure of the economy and macro-economy behaviours of time series 
from the national account data. SVAR has become one of the main tools for testing and 
evaluating the effectiveness of economic policies over time. It is, therefore, well accepted 
by many as one of the means to empirically test theoretical models with real data. Finally, 
it is argued that SVAR avoids incredible restrictions in single equations and strict 
restrictions in DSGE models. In all, this method helps to test formal theories and helps to 
learn more about the dynamics of the macroeconomics over time. 
2.3.1 S(VARs) Descriptions 
SVAR is defined as a system of k-equations and k-variables of stationary linear 
relation, where current variables are explained by contemporaneous terms, their own lags 
and the lags of ¢ − 1 remaining variables (Stock and Watson, 2001). A general formal 
SVAR appears in the following format:  
£
 = ¤R +Ψ@ + £.∗
/. + £¦∗
/¦ +⋯+ £∗¨
/¨ + >                                      (2.1)81 
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 Christopher Sims won the Nobel Prize in Economics (2011) for his works on VAR and for its usefulness in 
diagnosis of dynamic economic behaviours through impulse response functions and variance decomposition. 
Most questions about dynamic behaviour, interactions and the effects of monetary policy shock on variables 
such as GDP and inflation are answered through SVAR analysis. 
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 See Appendix B.2.4 for more detail on SVAR representation.  
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The matrix A with ¢ × ¢ dimensions is called an invertible matrix of contemporaneous 
coefficient relations on tY ; and tY is column vector ¢ × 1  of endogenous variables. 
Generally, contains non-policy macroeconomic variables and policy variables assumed 
under of policy makers. In addition, £∗  (for i=1, 2…p) are matrices of structural 
coefficients on the lagged variables in the model. The entries in these matrices represent 
the dynamic properties of the system while the interaction of variables is represented by 
cross-variables coefficients. R	is ¢ × 1 vector that contains all deterministic terms e.g. a 
linear trend, seasonal and other user specified dummies to capture the structural breaks, 
and intercept. While @  is a vector of exogenous variables.    is a ¢ × 1  vector of 
structural shocks normally distributed with mean zero and its variance-covariance matrix
I=Ω . The matrix > is ¢ × ¢ –dimensional matrix that specifies which variables are to 
what extend directly affected by structural shocks. This matrix >  is usually set as a 
diagonal matrix. 
One immediate problem with the SVAR method is that it cannot be estimated as it 
is in (2.1) using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. This is because the main 
standard assumptions about the system in	are that the variables in 	are stationary, and 
the variance-covariance p¡V(c, c) ≠ 0  are violated in the basic VAR and SVAR 
models. SVAR in its primitive system violates the OLS assumption of no relation between 
structural shocks  and independent variables in matrix A. Thus, using OLS to estimate 
the matrix A will produce inconsistent parameter estimates and incorrect impulse response 
functions. Circumventing this problem requires that we exclude some contemporaneous 
effects by restricting them to zeros; in this way the system will fulfil the assumption of no 
correlation and become identified. Explicitly, in order to overcome this problem, 
econometricians have devised procedures to recover the true structural parameters for the 
underlying structural VAR model from the standard reduced form VAR model – (see 
Enders, 2010, pp. 325-338).  
A short run SVAR without R and Ψ then can be written as follows:  
£ F1 − £.() − £¦(¦) − ⋯− £¨(¨)G 
 = £E = >                                               (2.2) 
And its standard form reduced form is given as follows: 

 = £.∗
/. + £¦∗
/¦ +⋯+ £∗¨
/¨ + £/.>                                                             (2.3) 

 = £/.∗ 
/. +⋯+ £∗¨
/¨ + E                                                                                  (2.4)  
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Whereby £/c∗ = £&/.£/c  
Enders (2010) points out that the departure point to analyse SVAR is to estimate 
the compact reduced form model, which mimics the predictable movements of variables 
within the system82 (see Robinson & Robinson, (1997). From the reduced form VAR we 
obtain the residuals E . Using equation (2.3), we do linear mapping of residuals E  into 
the 	£/.> , hence this can be used to identify the structural shocks by imposing 
identification restrictions on matrices £ and/or B.  Procedurally, we want to express the 
non-orthogonal E from the VAR(p) reduced form model as a linear combination of 
orthogonal structural shocks () in order to obtain the innovation model: 
 E = £/.> or simply £E = >.                                                                              (2.5) 
Equation (2.5) gives the general class of innovation model defined as above in (2.1). The 
structural shocks are identified by placing identifying restrictions on the contemporaneous 
matrix A and the matrix B. tu denotes VAR residual vector of dimension	¢ × 1, normally 
independently distributed with full variance-covariance matrix uΣ . It is commonly 
acknowledged that the reduced form in (2.4) does not tell us anything about the structure of 
the economy. Thus, it is necessary to show the mapping of the structural representation in 
(2.1) into the residuals from the reduced form equation. Equations (2.4) and (2.5) show 
how the non-orthogonal observable residuals are related to the unobservable structural 
innovations – that is, expressed as a linear combination of structural shocks. Further, the 
relation between the variance-covariance matrices of E and  is derived as follows: 
%(EE) = £/.>%()>£/. = Σ¬                                                                              (2.6).     
A crucial factor in working with SVAR is that without imposing some identifying 
restrictions, the system of equations remains unidentifiable – there are no unique solutions 
for the coefficients in the system.83 Pfaff (2008) shows that there are three common short 
run identifications of SVAR models, which are all distinguished by the types of restrictions 
placed on them. SVAR A-model: sets matrix B to	­×. The minimum restriction that must 
be imposed for exact identification is (/.)¦ .	 SVAR B-Model: sets matrix A to ­× and 
the minimum restriction that must be imposed for exact identification is the same as in 
SVAR model A type. SVAR AB-model: places the restrictions on both A and B matrices. 
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 See also Robinson & Robinson (1997). 
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 This means that given the values of R , £¨, and Σ¬	in the reduced form (2.5) it is not possible to uniquely 
solve structural parameters of the SVAR in (2.3) without placing some identifying restrictions on matrix A0. 
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The number of restrictions for exact identification on this model is given by	¢¦ + ¢(¢ −1)/2. In this study we applied the SVAR A-model and AB-model procedures for structural 
VAR to extract these structural parameters. The meaning of these sets of identifications in 
a form of zero restrictions is discussed explicitly in Section 2.4 where we set out the 
structural economic representation of the model.  
2.3.1 SVAR: Impulse Response Functions and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
We mentioned in Section 2.3 that the aim of SVAR is to test formally the theories 
that form a general structure of the vector auto-regression, and to learn about the historical 
dynamic behaviours of the economy. However, Enders (2010) pointed out that individual 
coefficients from VARs or SVARs are of little use in themselves. Hence, we considered 
two main important outputs of SVAR: the structural impulse response functions (SIRF) 
and the structural forecast error variance decompositions (SFEVD). Many macro-
econometricians agree that these two outputs give a better picture in a palatable manner. 
The former helps us to show the dynamic response of current and future values of each 
variable to a one unit change in the current value of one structural shock while assuming 
that other shocks are equal to zero. The second is the forecast error variance decomposition 
that provides the relative importance of each structural shock in influencing endogenous 
variables in the SVAR. Using the VAR in (2.3) the impulse response functions are derived 
as follows:  
Let us take L as the lag operator, and£() = ∑ £cc¨;. c; then (2.3) can be transformed into 
a structural vector moving average (SMA) as follows:  
£& − £()
 = >                                                                                                        (2.7) 
⇒ 
 = £& − £()/.> ; Let¤ = £& − £()/.   

 = ¤& + ¤./. +⋯+ ¤¯/¯                                                                                  (2.8) 

 = ∑ ¤¯/¯:¯;&                                                                                                               (2.9) 
The SMA 
 is based on an infinite moving average of the structural innovation  in (2.9). 
The (i,j)-th element in matrices Ds stands for the dynamic multipliers - the expected partial 
impacts of a random change in j-th variable in the system at time t, on the i-th variable 
within the system at time t+s. In simple terms the matrices Ds constitute marginal effects 
of the innovations in the system on yt+s. This is expressed as follows: 
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It is very important to emphasize here that as s increases we will observe the dynamic path 
of variable i-th in response to innovation in variable j. Hence, the structural impulse 
responses are the plots of kcv(¯)°¤¯ vs. for i,j=1,2. Generally, these expected partial impacts 
are only meaningful when all other shocks at time s are set equal to zero (Favero, 2001). 
This is naturally true in terms of interactions between foreign variables and domestic 
variables of a small country; however, it is false for the interaction between domestic 
variables. To overcome this problem, we place restrictions on some of the variables in the 
system so that the interactions we allow for are justified by economic theory. 
 Another output that is of interest from the SVAR for our analysis is called the 
variance of decomposition. This analysis explains the variation in all variables within the 
system. Under this analysis, we want to find out what portion of the total variance of yt is 
attributed to the random shock in the j-th shock. This analysis helps us to assess the 
relative importance (strength) of each variable in the system. Thus, this result will give us 
the quantitative picture about the relative strengths of interest-rate and credit channels. 
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2.4. Namibian Economic Structure, Economic Model and Identifications  
The structural representation model we would like to build in this study aims to 
reflect how the central bank views the dynamics of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in Namibia. Many central banks nowadays emphasise a forward looking 
monetary policy, i.e. altering the economic lever appropriately in order to keep inflation 
close to the target in the future. This economic lever differs from country to country 
depending on the monetary and fiscal arrangements in place. For instance, some central 
banks explicitly target exchange rates, credit growth and international reserves or any 
combination of these indicators. 
First, the overall aim here is to examine the dynamic interactions of endogenous 
variables in the short run SVAR. Specifically, the objectives are to explain economic 
theory behind the identification restrictions in the structural VAR in equation (2.12). This 
non-recursive SVAR will be used to produce the structural impulse response functions of 
real GDP, the inflation rate, and credit growth to a surprise contraction monetary shock in 
the repo rate. Money in this model enters as bank money in the form of private sector 
credit which is endogenously created. Thus, we concentrate on monetary policy actions of 
changing the controllable interest rate as the policy instrument to stabilize monetary 
condition.84 Second, analysis focused on the structural impulse response functions from the 
short run demand and credit structural shocks. We use this to compare the relative strength 
of credit shock to domestic monetary policy shock. Monetary policy operates directly or 
indirectly through other domestic long term interest rates to influence aggregate demand 
components, particularly consumption and investment. Monetary policy also operates 
through the balance sheet channel thereby affecting financial fundamentals of firms. The 
role of spreads as conduit of monetary policy effects is discussed in the next two chapters. 
Finally, we examined the long run effects of monetary policy shock on output and 
inflation. The long run results are given by cumulative impulse response functions (cirf). 
This result is used to shed light about the effectiveness of the policy of changing the repo 
rate on reducing inflation in the long run. 
Most empirical works that analyse the monetary transmission mechanism in the last 
two decades are based on the New Consensus macroeconomic view which emphasises 
three crucial aggregate economic relationships.85 These relationships are examined either 
                                                           
84
 Evidently, we hold the view that monetary policy operates through changes in the short term interest rate 
thus, influencing commercial banks to adjust portfolios. We do not emphasize the money supply because this 
is replaced by the rule in setting interest rate (Cameron & Safaei, 2003; Duguay, 1994). 
85
 See (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008; Carlin and Soskice, 2006; and Sinclair, 2002). 
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as structural models as is the case in Al Raisi et al., (2007), Westerways (2002), Kapur and 
Patra (2002), Liu and Zhang (2010) or as a system of equations in the form of structural 
VAR as is the case in Afandi (2005); Brischetto and Voss (1999); Kim and Roubini 
(1999); and Suzuki (2008). In some studies, for the sake of economic representation, 
economists add other relevant macroeconomic variables such as foreign reserves, domestic 
private sector credit, and foreign variables to capture the shocks from the rest of the world.  
Experience has shown that no single model can capture the full effects of the 
shocks on the whole economy. Therefore, the SVAR model should be deemed as truly 
representative of the economic structure in question. It is important to ensure that the 
model includes all relevant variables that determine optimal equilibrium in the economy. 
For example, at a country level the structural economic model should at least include 
output and price level indicators for the demand and supply sides, and the exchange rate or 
foreign interest rate equations for the foreign sector to take into account the effects of 
external shocks. Other important indicators to enter the system of equation are such oil 
price index or world commodity price index. For our study the SVAR model we have three 
blocks the foreign sector, non-policy and policy blocks. In the foreign or external we have 
commodity price index and foreign interest rate which influences each other 
contemporaneously but deemed exogenous to the domestic variables. The non-policy 
variables block we placed quarterly real GDP, consumer price index and private sector 
credit, and in the last block there is the repo rate that responds to all information up to 
period M but only affect some non-policy variables from period M + 1. For our study the 
SVAR model we have in mind is consist of the following variables:  
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  ≈ OOk(0, ΣÄ) , £c;.…´	  are coefficient matrixes of lagged variables while A is a 
contemporaneous coefficient matrix and B is variance-covariance matrix.86 
 ∆pO ∆»kr, ∆, Oj¼~ ∆rp and 	∆j are the growth rates of South Africa’s 
Commodity Price Index, SA’s repo rate, Namibia’s quarterly real GDP, private sector 
credit and domestic repo rate.87 Inflt is the rate of inflation derived from the logarithm of 
Namibia Consumer Price Index (NCPI). ∆ and ∆j are respectively changes in South 
Africa’s and Namibia’s monetary policy rates (commonly known as Repo rates). All time 
series, except the short term interest rates, are quarterly series seasonally-adjusted; while  Jac, ` ¯, ÁÂ¨, ÆÃ, ¨ J` and ` Ãare serial uncorrelated stochastic structural shocks with 
the mean zero and variance-covariance equal to Ʃ. For example, "Æ is commodity price 
shock, ` ¯ foreign policy rate shock, ÁÂ¨ is an aggregate demand shock, ÆÃ cost push 
shock, ¨ J` credit shock and ` Ã	is the domestic monetary policy shock.  
The vector R  contains all deterministic terms. Specifically, we employed three 
dummies to capture important structural breaks: the first, for the period 1998Q1-1999Q4 
represents the East Asian financial crisis; the second, for the period 2009Q1-2010Q4 
represents the Global financial crisis, and the third, for the period 2003Q1-2004Q1 a spill 
over effects from the recession in the US. Our sample period extends from 1991:Q1 to 
2012:Q3 a total of 87 quarterly observations.88  
2.4.1 Description of the Structural Economic Representation 
We briefly provide the economic theory support for this structural system 
representation as the economic model adequately to evaluate the monetary policy effects in 
Namibia. The first row captures the influence of mineral commodities in the domestic 
economy. We used South Africa (SA) commodity price index cmit in the model to capture 
the effects from external shocks on the Namibian economy which are generated by outside 
forces, for example the price of diamond, uranium and copper. These three minerals 
account for more than 20% of total output of Namibia. In addition, this represents the trade 
link in term of raw commodities export between Namibia and South African. Thus, the 
∆cmit equation will help to account for shocks that hit quarterly real GDP but are not 
attributed to innovations in Namibia’s monetary policy. In SVAR, the Commodity Price 
                                                           
86
 Equation (2.11) in compact form is given by: £
 = R + ∑ £cc¨;. 
/¨ + > with p-lags set equal to three. 
87
 Since these variables after first differences in logs they can be interpreted as growth rates. Furthermore, we 
only write out the AB-model for the first estimation, while subsequent models as stated in a vector form. The 
techniques for imposing restrictions are the same. 
88
 The sample starts from 1991:Q1 nine months after Namibia’s independence and four months the 
establishment of The Bank of Namibia in July 1990. 
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Index is exogenously determined in relation to domestic variables. This means that its 
variation is determined by its innovations, which reflect sudden changes in commodity 
demand in South Africa or elsewhere and monetary policy shock in SA.  
The second row represents the influence of the changes in foreign interest rate 
which in this case is represented by South Africa’s repurchase rate (repo) as reported at the 
beginning of the this chapter. Namibia has maintained a fixed exchange rate peg with 
South Africa since the early 1990s. In theory, this bilateral arrangement makes it 
imperative that any change in South Africa’s repo rate will be followed by a similar action 
in Namibia. In practice this has not always been the case as will be shown and explained 
later in this section. We assume that ∆ enters the model but it is only affected 
contemporaneously by ∆pOand its own lags.89  
  The third row represents the aggregate demand function which is the standard IS 
curve. Current output reacts to changes in South Africa’s monetary policy and commodity 
prices; it depends further on its own lags and that of other variables. Interest rate lags in 
this equation indicate the direct effects of short term interest rate on aggregate demand 
which represents the so-called interest rate channel. It also captures the persistence of ‘long 
and variable lags’ associated with the monetary policy rate (Blinder, 1998). The New 
Keynesian economic theory suggests that there is an inverse relationship between 
aggregate demand and real interest rate. In addition, we include the commodity price index 
to capture the relative importance of commodity influencing the real economic activity in 
Namibia. This is expected to have a positive impact on real GDP. For example, a surge in 
the unit price of diamond or uranium gives mining companies incentives to reduce their 
inventories, and it therefore raises the volume of sales. Namibia is a mineral exporting 
country. This feature makes her subject to large swings in the prices of diamonds and 
uranium. The lags of real GDP in this equation represent the adjustment process as the 
economy moves towards equilibrium, while the lags of private credit show the adjustment 
from commercial banks that react only after monetary policy decisions. Practically, 
commercial banks do not immediately adjust their prime lending rates to reflect changes in 
official rates. The decision to adjust prime lending rates comes after banks have re-adjusted 
their portfolios; hence whatever happens to the current rates is only relevant to the GDP in 
the next period. 
                                                           
89
 Furthermore, CMIt and RSAt are included to help the so called price puzzle observed in several studies on 
the topic (Favero, 2001; Westerway, 2002). 
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The equation in the fourth row represents the supply side of the economy. Inflation 
is determined by current output deviation and commodity inflation. The lags for inflation 
in this equation represent persistence and stickiness of domestic prices. Although current 
monetary policy emphasises the forward looking rule in setting monetary policy, in this 
model we have not included any expectation variable. This is based on the fact that the 
Bank of Namibia does not produce any inflation forecast, nor does it conduct surveys to 
generate inflation expectation variable. Thus, because of this gap, we assume that the best 
public guess for the next period of inflation is the last period of inflation. This is reflected 
by some form of backward looking inflationary process as captured by the lags. 
The equation in the fifth row represents the total credit extended to the private 
sector. Domestic private sector credit is assumed to respond to contemporaneous changes 
in the repo rate in SA and monetary policy rate in Namibia. Theoretically the relation 
between prime lending rate and bank rate is directly proportional especially when financial 
sector is assumed efficient. In addition, we assumed that private credit responds to 
monetary policy in SA because three out of six commercial banks in Namibia are 
subsidiaries from SA. Thus, by this link, these commercial banks change the market rates 
even when the move in repo only happens in SA because their parent companies exert 
influence on their branches in Namibia. We further assume that private credit is also 
positively affected by current economic activity.  
From the Post Keynesian perspective, the private credit equation illustrates the 
abilities of banks to create money which is driven by aggregate demand from creditworthy 
clients at prevailing costs of credit that is, market interest rates. This means that the credit 
variable represents our assumption of bank money in the system which is determined by 
demand in the economy.90 This variable also serves as a broad measure for the credit 
channel through its responses to monetary policy shocks. Depending on whether the 
shocks are generated by aggregate demand or monetary policy, commercial banks will 
naturally accommodate these shocks by setting their terms of credit.91   
The sixth row represents the central bank reaction function. We assume that the 
Bank of Namibia’s monetary policy reacts to contemporaneous conditions in inflation, 
credit growth and to changes in South Africa’s monetary policy stance. According to the 
current working document for the monetary policy framework, ‘‘the main policy tool that 
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 Post Keynesians argue that it is credit that matters for the level of economic activity, see (French-Davis, 
Nayar, Ocampo, Spiegel, & Stiglitz, 2006). 
91
 Commercial banks are quantity takers and price setters for spreads in the financial system. 
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the Bank of Namibia uses to influence monetary conditions in the country is the Repo rate, 
which is kept close to the South African Reserve Bank’s repo rate. The Repo rate is the 
interest rate at which commercial banks borrow money from the Bank of Namibia, and 
this, in turn, affects other interest rates in the economy. Changes to the Repo rate usually 
take into account not only the SARB’s decision about its repo rate, but also domestic 
economic conditions, international economic conditions, and future prospects’’ (Bank of 
Namibia, 2008, p. 8).  
Thus, in this SVAR, monetary policy shocks are identified as the changes in the repo rate. 
Furthermore, we assume that BoN reacts to credit conditions in the domestic economy to 
improve domestic demand and promote economic growth.92 In the fashion of a Taylor rule, 
central bank reacts to inflation rise from output and inflation gaps.93 We note here that 
there are arguments against the claim of assuming a Taylor rule in fixed exchange rate 
regimes like Namibia (Al Raise et al., 2001). The general belief is that fixed exchange rate 
regimes do not have monetary policy independence and as a result they respond to and/or 
follow interest rate in the anchor country. However on many occasions BoN has chosen 
not to respond when the South African Reserve Bank changes its monetary policy stance. 
These occasional non-responses by the BoN are contrary to the doctrine of fixed peg in 
exchange rate theory. Many proponents argue that when a country fixes its currency to 
another country, it entirely looses ‘monetary independence’. In practise, this is not entirely 
true as shown by the economic arrangement between Namibia and South Africa. This is 
because monetary independence is not only a function of the exchange rate, but also 
depends on other forms of capital arrangements that exist between the two countries. These 
may include capital control in the form of ownership of foreign investments in the 
domestic economy, and the degree of substitutability of financial assets between the two 
economies. When these arrangements are in place they can give some comparative 
advantages that allow fixed peg regimes to deviate from the level of interest rate in the 
anchor country. For example, in Namibia where capital controls exist between Namibia 
and South Africa, the BoN has on several occasions deviated from the repo rate in South 
Africa. The evidence is given by the interest rate differential graph below in Figure 2.1. In 
this figure we see that since 1998 to 2005 and 2007 to 2009, BoN has been able to 
                                                           
92
 This is based on our analysis of various monetary policy statements issued by the Bank of Namibia for the 
last ten years. Records show that there is always a section dedicated to the development of credit extended to 
the private sector. 
93
 Gottschalk (2005, p. 137) reveals that Taylor rule is important because ‘it is consistent with optimal policy 
in Keynesian models’, and it helps central bank ‘to shape the expectations thereby making monetary policy 
effective.’ 
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maintain the repo rate below SA’s policy rate. The deviations of Namibia’s repo from SA’s 
repo, as shown by the graph indicate some form of freedom for BoN to pursue independent 
monetary policy, albeit perhaps for sometimes. Hence, in our view the question is not 
whether a fixed peg regime can deviate -because it can; but, it is about how far it can 
deviate, and for how for long it can deviate from the level of interest rate prevailing in the 
anchor country.  
 
2.4.2 Identification Conditions: Short Run SVARs 
How many variables should the SVAR model contain before it can be deemed as 
representative of the economy in question? Naturally, it depends on the purpose and 
question it meant to answer. However, some constraints such as data unavailability on 
important variables and the sample size will obviously affect the size of the SVAR model 
to be estimated. There have been many papers on the same topic, which applied SVAR and 
serve as the basis and yardstick in this area.94 Some economists consider a system with 
seven variables large enough for economic analysis; however, with advances such as the 
Bayesian VAR (BVAR) method the issue of how large the system should be has become a 
minor issue. Our structural models estimated in this chapter are limited to six variables or 
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 See (Bernanke & Mihove, 1995; Brischetto & Voss, 1999; Kim & Roubini, 2000), and Sims (1991). 
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fewer because of limited observations available on most important macroeconomics 
variables in Namibia. 
In identifying the SVARs, there are common ways to impose restrictions and 
estimate the SVAR model. On condition that the A and B are non-singular matrices, the 
identifying restrictions are placed on A, B or on both AB matrices. In our study, we use the 
AB-model while the A-model identification is set up and used as one of the robustness 
checks. This model imposes enough restrictions both on A0 and B matrices in (2.11). The 
matrix B is a diagonal structure, while the A0 companion matrix has a recursive or non-
recursive structure as the identification is set up. After imposing the restrictions we write 
out the full structure of the identified structural VAR as follows: use the equation (2.5), 
which relates the structural shocks to residuals. 
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                                                   (2.12) 
In this non-recursive SVAR or the so called ‘AB–model’, for a system to be exactly 
identified, it only needs 2¢¦ − ¢(¢ + 1)/2  exclusion restrictions on both A0 and B 
matrixes. Since ¢ = 6 and B is a diagonal matrix, then it means the B-matrix requires ¢¦ − ¢ or 30 exclusion restrictions and the remaining 21 restrictions are imposed on the A0 
matrix. Next, as tu are linearly related to structural shocks, the task is to impose enough 
restrictions so that they will enable us to separate the systematic component from structural 
shocks, which are unobservable from the structural shocks. Commodity price inflation and 
foreign interest rate block represents the external sector influence on the domestic 
economy with representing foreign monetary policy shock. The third, fourth and fifth rows 
represent non-policy variables block which aimed to capture the demand and credit shocks; 
and the sixth row captures the policy reaction function.  
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         (2.13). 
This SVAR model is over identified because the numbers of exclusion restrictions exceed 
the 21 exclusion restrictions required for exact identification in A0. The validity of these 
over-identifying restrictions will be tested using the log-likelihood test. This log-likelihood 
test indicates whether the over identification restrictions are supported by the data. In 
addition, it is required that A0 and B matrices are square and non-singular matrices. This 
implies that both A0 and B must first satisfy these conditions so that we are able to estimate 
the coefficients in A0 and B.  
Our second, identification is the recursive identification. In the recursive 
identification we use a recursive order of the variables in the VAR system. This is whereby 
we restrict matrix A0 to a lower triangular matrix with zero above the diagonal line. 
Generally, the emphasis is the order in which variables enter the system with low 
frequency placed above the high frequency variable. Recursive identification requires that 
enough restrictions are place on A for exact identification. 
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Finally, this section concludes estimation of short run SVAR with structural 
representation of three domestic variables –(see the equations (B.1) and (B.2) in the 
appendix B). This analysis aims to examine whether there is any significant difference in 
the impulse response functions obtained from the system with foreign variables. The 
results from the three-variable model and recursive identification will form part of the 
robustness checks. It helps to form a robustness check for our results in this estimation.  
2.4.2 Identification Conditions: Long Run SVARs 
We evaluate the long run effects of monetary policy shock, demand and supply 
shocks on output. Many economists in the new consensus macroeconomics generally agree 
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that economic theory tells much more about the long run than the short run effects. For 
example, the new Keynesian monetary theory argues that monetary policy effects have 
significant effects on economic activity in the short run; however, in the long run monetary 
policy effects only matter for the consumers’ price inflation.95 Real output in the long run 
is largely affected by supply and technology shocks. In the case of demand shocks do not 
real output in the long run. From the long run SVAR model we derive the cumulative 
structural impulse response functions (CSIRF) with the identifying restriction given in 
equation (2.17) below. Our economic model to estimate long run structural impulse 
responses is given by the following identifications. We limit the system to three variables, 
excluding foreign variables and private credit for the reason that these factors are not 
directly considered as long-term objectives for central banks. In addition, this helps to 
maintain our focus on interaction between the demand and monetary policy shocks only. 
Consider a reduced form ignoring the deterministic component for the sake of space, we 
write as follows: 

 = £()
 + E                                                                                                          (2.14) 
This model can be expressed in a moving average as follows: 

 = (­ − £())/.E ,  

 = (­ − £())/.£/.>                                                                                              (2.15) 
The variance covariance of the structural errors is the identity (i.e. VCV=I), so that 
structural shocks are uncorrelated and have unit variances; and further we defined £/. =< . The matrix C represents the cumulative effects from (M	M¡	∞) of a shock hitting in 
period M.  
YÊ = AÌ/.BeÊ = CeÊ                                                                                                       (2.16)96 
YÊ = Ð1 c.¦ 00 1 00 c´¦ 1Ò *
eÊÓÔÕeÊÖ×eÊØ 9                                                                                                       (2.17) 
The main focus in the long run SVAR model is the matrix C in equation (2.16). 
This is a sum of infinite orders of vector moving average from Wold decomposition. Using 
a three based endogenous variables method we assumed that the structural monetary policy 
                                                           
95
 Blanchard and Quah (1989)  showed that demand side has no long run effects on real gross national 
product. See also Enders (Enders, 2010, p. 338). 
96
 If VCV=I, then Bet=et. 
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and demand shocks do not have significant long run effects on output, hence effects set to 
zero. Meanwhile, the supply shock in the third low is assumed to have long run effects on 
real quarterly GDP. Monetary policy shock is set to have cumulative effects on inflation in 
the long run. 
Having set the SVAR system and adequately identified it, we now proceed to 
estimate the structural impulse response functions for quarterly real GDP, inflation rate and 
bank money to unanticipated shock monetary policy shocks, credit and demand shock.  
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2.5 Empirical Results: Data Presentation & Results 
  This section starts with graphs, summaries and diagnostics test results. In Section 
2.5.2 we present the structural impulses response functions (SIRF) from the short and long 
run SVAR models. We discussed the SIRF to the SA and domestic monetary policy shock, 
followed by credit and demand shocks. In section 2.5.3 we present the structural forecast 
error variance decomposition (SFEVD) and the results from robustness checks. Section 
2.5.4 presents cumulative impulse response function results from the long run SVAR 
model. Finally, Section 2.5.4 gives the conclusion, implications, and limitations of the 
results. 
2.5.1 Data Presentations 
The descriptions of these variables have been given in Section 2.3 under the 
description of the economic model given in equation (2.12) and the definitions are given in 
the Appendix. Figure 2-2 below gives the graphical presentation of variables in log level, 
while Figure 2-3 gives the changes in log, which represent growth rates. All variables are 
stationary after the first difference as shown in Figure 2-3 and this is confirmed by ADF 
test results in Table B.2-1 in the Appendix.  
This study used two different time series for the quarterly GDP variable. These are 
labelled as QGDP and RTGDP in Figures 2-3 and 2.4. Figure B.2-6 in appendix shows the 
log level and changes of the RTGDP series, which represents the quarterly real GDP data 
reported by NSA in the national accounts publications. The QGDP in Figure 2-3 represents 
the quarterly real GDP series, which was obtained after transforming the annual GDP data 
into quarterly data through the Denton method97. The growth rate for QGDP was used in 
the estimation of SVAR and the impulse response functions. We find that the quarterly 
GDP data reported by NSA (i.e. RTGDP) is highly erratic and it produced nonsensical and 
inconsistent results in our estimations. Hence, we transformed the annual real GDP at 
constant price into quarterly real GDP. The weakness of the quarterly RTGDP reported by 
NSA may be attributed to the fact that Namibia quarterly GDP at constant prices is 
produced from sub-sample surveys and then benchmarked to the annual data. Thus, it is 
possible that this benchmarking method might have distorted the real behaviors captured 
by individual sectors that respond to monetary policy actions. 
 
                                                           
97
 See Baum & Hristakeva on the link below on how to transform variables from low frequency to high 
frequency and vice-versa. http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s422501.htm 
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Figure 2-2 Log level Namibian macroeconomic time series, 1991:Q1-2012:Q3 
 
Figure 2-3 Changes in log Namibian macroeconomic time series, 1991:Q1-2012:Q3 
 
Table B.2-4 shows the pair wise correlation between variables used to estimate the 
SVAR AB-models. It shows that the pair wise correlations between most macroeconomic 
variables are statistically significant. These correlations show that there is a significant 
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positive relation between private sector credit, output and consumer price level; and there 
is a significant negative relationship between policy rates, output, private credit and 
consumer price level. Table B.2-1 in the Appendix presents the results from the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. The results show that all time series in the SVAR AB-
model (2.12) are stationary after the first difference at 5% significance level; that is, we 
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 5% significance level.  
The pre-estimation diagnostic test results are given in Tables B.2-2 and B.2-3 in the 
Appendix. First, the AIC and FPE statistics indicate the optimal lag length of r = 3. At 
this lag length the Lagrange-multiplier test shows that the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation is not rejected. Other models that exclude the foreign variables indicate 
five lags as an appropriate lag length. Similarly, Figure B.2-6 shows the graph plots 
eigenvalues from the reduced form VAR. All eigenvalues lie within the unit circle which 
means the VAR from which this SVAR AB-model is derived satisfies the stability 
conditions. In all, these statistics show that the system is stationary and stable.  
Table B. 2-2 presents the Granger causality test which shows the results that are 
consistent with the assumptions about restrictions used in the SVAR AB-model in (2.12). 
For example, we assumed that some domestic variables are non-Granger-causal to foreign 
variables. The results in Table B.2-2 show that the non-Granger causality null hypothesis is 
not rejected while the null hypothesis that foreign variables are non-Granger-causal to the 
domestic variables is rejected too. Finally, the log-likelihood test of identifying 
restrictions: χ(4)=6.362,  p = 0.17 shows that the linear restrictions in the SVAR AB-model 
are supported by the data. 
2.5.1 Short Run Structural Impulse Response Functions: SVAR-AB Model 
Figure 2-4 (a) to (e) shows the panel of the simulated structural impulse response 
functions (SIRF) for QGDP growth, inflation, credit growth rate, commodity price 
inflation and changes in the policy rates, to a one standard deviation in domestic monetary 
policy and SA’s monetary policy shocks. The dark line in-between represents the point 
estimates of SIRF within the two bands that show a 95% confident level.  
2.5.1.1 Effects of monetary policy shocks: domestic & SA’s repo rate shocks 
Figure 2-4 Structural impulse response functions of (a) QGDP, (b) Inflation, (c) private 
credit growth rate, (d) commodity price inflation, and (e) changes in the repo rates to 
domestic and SA’s monetary policy shocks. 
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(a) Structural impulse responses of Quarterly real GDP to monetary policy shocks 
 
We start with the structural impulse response functions to a shock in Namibia’s 
repo rate. Figure 2-4(a) presents the SIRF, which shows how domestic and SA’s monetary 
policy shock in Namibia affects the quarterly real GDP growth rate in the short term. A 
positive shock in Namibia’s repo rate (NA, repo) causes significant contractions of more 
than 1.5% in quarterly real GDP with the significant effects lasting up to the fourth quarter, 
before real GDP returns to the initial level. SA’s monetary policy (SA, Repo) produces 
positive effects at impact followed by a negative significant effect from the second quarter. 
Although monetary policy from SA produces a negative response in output, the SIRF 
shows that output response is less severe as compared to the response to domestic 
monetary policy shock. In addition, the responses to the monetary policy shocks last for 
less than six quarters before QGDP growth rate returns to the initial levels. Further, these 
SIRFs show volatile movements even after adjusting the lag length in the VAR from four 
to two quarters. Monetary policy tightening leads to a significant fall in quarterly GDP; 
thus, it confirms the empirical evidence of interest rate channel in Namibia. This result is 
consistent with the stylized facts about the theory of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. According to Favero (2001, p. 22) “aggregate output initially falls, with a j-
shaped response and a long-run zero effect of monetary policy impulse”. Further, we found 
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that the impulse response function of real GDP to domestic monetary policy shock is 
significant even when we reduce the SVAR to domestic variables only.  
Further probing of these results seems to suggest that economic agents in Namibia 
respond rapidly to changes in the country’s monetary policy. This quick adjustment may be 
attributed to the fact that when South Africa’s Reserve Bank (SARB) changes its monetary 
policy stance, this propels high expectations in Namibia with anticipation that domestic 
monetary authority will respond by adjusting the repo rate upward too. In other words, a 
change in monetary policy in South Africa serves as a signal indicator to Namibian 
households and businesses that a similar action is on the way in Namibia. Consequently, 
many households and businesses scale down their borrowing and activity in anticipation of 
high borrowing costs. The slow response to SA’s monetary policy is practically explained 
by the fact that it takes time for the effects to trickle down to Namibia through imports 
prices and interest rate spreads. 
(b) Structural impulse responses of inflation to monetary policy shocks 
 
Domestic monetary policy shock produces a significance negative response on 
inflation. Inflation declines by more 0.3% before for it returns to the initial level. 
Meanwhile the SIRF on the right shows inflation response to SA’s monetary policy shock. 
This impulse response shows first a rise in inflation before a decline from the third and 
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fourth quarters. This positive response to monetary policy has been observed in the 
literature and is often called price-puzzle - see (Afandi, 2005; Favero, 2001). A positive 
surprise shock to monetary policy is followed by an immediate increase in the rate of 
inflation. Inflation increases in the first two quarters, followed by a fast decline in the next 
three quarters before it converges toward the initial level. In relation to the price-puzzle, 
although it is deemed unusual in the mainstream literature from a post-Keynesian 
perspective, this is not an unexpected result. Some post-Keynesians argue that if firms are 
able to pass on costs immediately to consumers then a rise in the general price level is 
expected in response to unanticipated shock in the cost of money. In the case of Namibia, 
this increase in the general price level in response to a monetary policy shock can be 
attributed to import prices from South Africa through the fixed peg. This is whereby 
exporters in SA revise their price on goods that forms parts of Namibian imports. This 
might put pressure on inflation before monetary policy effects trickle down to Namibia. 
However, we argue that import inflation is subject to how fast the prices are revised in 
South Africa so that a significant impact is imported into Namibia’s inflation. Furthermore, 
although the initial responses of inflation present a puzzle, the subsequent movements in 
the rate of inflation follow a downward path as predicted by the theory. As a whole, the 
results show that output and inflation decline to reflect the responses to a tight domestic 
monetary policy in the short term, while in the long run, both variables tend towards their 
initial levels to demonstrate the evidence of zero effects. We examine the results from the 
long run SVAR in Section 2.6. This will show whether there is a long run negative impact 
on inflation and output. 
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(c) Structural impulse responses of private credit growth to monetary policy shocks 
 
Next, the variable of interest in this study was to test how bank money i.e. private 
sector credit responds to a monetary policy shock and the relative strength of credit shock 
compared to interest rate channel through the SFEVD. Generally, bank credit is assumed to 
be inversely related to interest rate – meaning that as the cost of credit increases, the 
demand for credit falls. The structural impulse responses in Figure 2-4(c) above show that 
private sector credit declines by more than 1% in response to a positive shock in Namibia’s 
repo rate. Although these SIRFs are only significant for two quarters, the dynamic path of 
the SIRF, as shown by the point-base estimate in-between the confidence bands, shows 
that credit growth declines as from the first quarter to the fourth quarter before it converges 
to its initial level within six quarters. This evidence shows to some extent the support for 
the credit channel through the bank lending channel to the private sector in Namibia. 
Surprisingly, monetary policy effects from SA’s policy on private credit are quite large as 
compared to effects from domestic repo rate. This might be explained by the financial link 
between financial institutions in Namibia and SA. This result also illustrates that the 
growth rate of bank money is determined by the price of liquidity. However, it is not yet 
clear as to whether the decline in total lending is because the supply of loans shifts to the 
left or because the demand for loans from firms and households reduced and shifted 
leftwards. 
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(d)Structural impulse responses of commodity price inflation to monetary policy shocks 
 
 
Figure 2-4 (d) shows the SIRFs of commodity price inflation in response to 
Namibia and SA’s monetary policy shocks. In our identifications restrictions for the AB-
model we assumed that domestic variables do not significantly influence commodity 
growth and foreign interest rate. This SIRF in Figure 2-4(d) shows that Namibia’s repo rate 
shock does not produce significant effects on commodity price inflation. Although there 
seems to be positive effects on commodity this is accompanied by large uncertainty around 
the impulse response function and the response is statistically insignificant throughout the 
sample horizon. Meanwhile the response to SA monetary policy shock is highly 
statistically significant until the third quarter. SA’s monetary policy shock (SA repo) 
produces a statistically significant negative impulse response of more than 2.0% from 
commodity price inflation. This therefore indicates that the growth in commodity prices at 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is influenced by monetary policy actions in SA.  
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(e) Structural impulse responses of monetary policy rates to monetary shocks 
 
Finally, Figure 2-4(e) shows the impulse response for Namibia & SA’s repo rates to 
domestic and foreign monetary policy shocks. Namibia repo rate responds positively to the 
monetary policy shock from itself and SA’s monetary policy. Again, these structural 
impulse responses are consistent with a prior expectation. Firstly, there is a positive 
response on the domestic policy rate to itself and the SA’s monetary policy shock. This is 
reasonable since the central bank tries to maintain the same level of policy rate to anchor 
future inflation expectations of the fixed exchange rate mechanism. This manifestation 
shows why the interest rate provides clarity of monetary policy stance and good 
controllability, which is lacking in the money-growth targeting approach. Meanwhile, the 
structural response for SA’s repo rate shows that the domestic monetary policy shocks do 
not significantly affect the changes in the level of SA’s policy rate. This is in agreement 
with the results from the Granger-causality test, which shows that domestic variables do 
not have (contemporaneous and immediate) predictive information of foreign variables.  
Taken together, these structural impulse response functions show that the interest 
channel through domestic repo rate (i.e. policy rate) to real output is statistically 
significant; secondly, domestic monetary policy clearly produced large and fast 
contractions in real quarterly GDP as compare to the effects from SA’s monetary policy 
shock. In addition, domestic monetary policy produces negative response inflation in the 
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short run. SA’s policy rate produced a somewhat positive response at impact in the first 
quarter after initial impact. Third, we find that domestic monetary policy shocks do not 
produce significant responses in foreign variables in the system. In all, this empirical 
evidence therefore supports the hypothesis that the policy of changing the repo rate in 
Namibia does have significant effects on output and inflation in the short run. It therefore 
provides the evidence of an effective interest rate channel in the short run. However, it also 
shows that although SA’s monetary policy effects are visible in Namibia particularly on 
private credit development; our empirical results suggest lesser impacts compared to 
significant effects from the domestic monetary policy shocks. This evidence argues against 
the idea that BoN does not need to change the level interest rate independently from SA 
because such changes are not necessary and they do not significantly differ from the 
changes in the foreign interest rate in the anchor country. 
2.5.1.2 Structural impulse responses to aggregate demand shock 
Figure B.2-1 (in Appendix B) shows the SIRF for inflation, commodity price 
inflation and credit shock to one standard deviation shock in output in the short run. 
Firstly, there is a significant positive impact on inflation from demand shock. This is 
consistent with the fact that in the short run aggregate demand will lead to inflation as the 
supply factor will take time to respond to meet new demand. However, demand shock 
reduces commodity price inflation and credit growth in the short run. In addition, the 
impulse response of SA’s repo rate is statistically insignificant. Meanwhile the impact of 
demand shock on the domestic policy rate, although insignificant, remains constant up to 
the first quarter and thereafter increases from the second quarter before it starts to decline 
to the initial level in the fourth quarter. 
2.5.1.3 Structural impulse responses to private credit shock 
Figure B.2-2 shows the sirfs for quarterly real GPD, inflation and private credit to one-
standard deviation shock in private sector credit. Private credit shock produced a 
statistically significant contraction in the domestic repo rate at impact; however, this is 
followed by a sharp rise in the repo rate in the first quarter maybe as a response by the 
central bank to reduce credit growth. Credit shock leads to a considerable increase in the 
rate of inflation and the effects persist until the third quarter. Private credit induces a 
positive significant impact on real quarterly GDP of more than 1.5% in the second quarter 
after the initial impacts. As expected, private credit shock does not significantly influence 
the commodity price inflation in the model. These impulses show that after taking into 
account the systematic component of anticipated credit effects, the private credit shock has 
significant effects on output and inflation, which last for less than three quarters after 
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initial impacts. This evidence seem to suggests that inside money does matter in the short 
term for real economic activity and inflation. In the following section we examined the 
SFEVD to analyse the relative strength of individual shocks on real GDP, inflation and 
private credit growth. 
2.6 Structural Forecast Errors Variance Decomposition (SFEVD) Analysis 
Our results in the last section point to the empirical evidence of an effective 
monetary transmission mechanism through interest rate and credit channel in Namibia. In 
this section we analyse the relative importance of monetary policy and credit structural 
shocks at different horizons. For the sake of space we discussed the SFEVD for domestic 
repo rate and credit shocks. From the monetary policy statement issued by BoN it is clear 
that these two channels are always closely monitored for the effectiveness of monetary 
policy actions. The rest of the results for SFEVD attributed to other shocks are given in the 
Appendix. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give the SFEVD, which describe the variation attributed to 
domestic monetary policy (` Ã ) and credit (¨ J ) shocks in equation (2.12). Structural 
forecast error variance decomposition analysis displays proportions at each point in time as 
caused by the shock in the variable itself and the variation attributed to others structural 
shocks in the system. The SFEVD statistic lays bare relevant information about the relative 
importance of each unanticipated shock as they affect all endogenous variables in the 
structural model. Hence, we use results from this exercise to compare the relative strength 
of individual channels of the transmission mechanism in Namibia. This approach allows us 
to establish the proportions of the variation in output, which is accounted for by credit and 
monetary policy shocks at different horizons.  
In Table 2.1 the first column gives the horizon from period 0 to the eighth quarter. 
Columns two to six give the SFEVD for commodity price inflation, changes in SA policy 
rate, QGDP, inflation, private credit growth and changes in domestic repo rate. At each 
step SFEVD statistics indicate the percentage attributed to monetary policy shock (` Ã)	as 
in Table 2.1 and credit shock (¨ J) in Table 2.2. Our main focus is the SFEVD for QGDP, 
which represents the percentage of variation accounted for by monetary policy shock.98 In 
column three, the result shows that domestic monetary policy shock accounts for about 
5.0% in the second quarter, 7.0% in the fourth quarter, and 8.0% in the seventh quarter 
after the initial impact. Meanwhile, column four shows that there is a significant influence 
of domestic monetary policy shock on inflation. Monetary policy shocks account for more 
                                                           
98
 The discussion about the SFEVD for CMI and SA repo is not of much interest because they do not form 
part of the objective and their impulse response functions to domestic monetary shock are not statistically 
significant.  
P a g e  | 101 
 
than 11.0% of variation in the rate of inflation in the second and fourth quarter after initial 
impacts. In column six, SFEVD shows that 34.9% of variation in domestic policy rate 
shock is attributed to itself in the second quarter and less than 20.0% from five to eight 
quarters ahead. In other results not reported here we observed, SA’s monetary policy shock 
accounts for more than 2.0% in SFEVD for QGDP over the same horizon. Similarly, Table 
2.2 credit shock accounts for less than 1.8% of the variation in QGDP. This evidence 
indicates that the interest rate channel through Namibia’s repo rate is relatively stronger 
than the credit channel. This is because the result for SFEVD from the short run SVAR 
AB-model shows that domestic monetary policy shock (i.e. repo) accounts for more 
variations in quarterly GDP and inflation in Namibia. 
Table 2.1 SFEVD, which describe the variation attributed to domestic monetary policy 
(` Ã) shock  
 
Note:  (1)∆pO, (1) ∆, (3)	∆»kr, (4) Oj¼~, (5) ∆rp and (6) 	∆j -i.e. (1) sfevd shows 
variation in ∆pO  attributed to a shock in Namibia repo rate shock from 0 to 8th quarter. 
Table 2.2 SFEVD, which describe the variation attributed to private credit (¨ J) shock 
 
Note:  (1)∆pO, (1) ∆, (3)	∆»kr, (4) Oj¼~, (5) ∆rp and (6) 	∆j -i.e. (1) sfevd shows 
variation in ∆pO  attributed to a shock in private credit (¨ J) shock from 0 to 8th quarter. 
Finally, we compare the structural fraction of mean squared errors SFMSE due to monetary 
shocks as derived from the short run SVAR. Figure 2-5 show the structural fractions of mean 
squared errors due to domestic and SA monetary policy shocks. These results show that significant 
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large fractions in the variation of output are attributed to domestic monetary policy while foreign 
monetary policy shock only accounts for less than 5% over four quarters. Thus, changing the level 
of domestic repo rate will result in more significant effects on real economic activity as compared 
to transmission effects from SA monetary policy rate. 
Figure 2-5. Structural Fraction of Mean Squared Errors (SFMSE) due to monetary policy 
shocks ∆j and ∆.  
 
In all, this evidence from SFEVD and SFMSE show that domestic monetary policy 
shock repo rate produced consistent significant results regarding monetary policy effects in 
Namibia. Both structural impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decomposition show that repo rate shocks have negative impacts on output, inflation and 
private credit. Although SA’s monetary policy shocks have significant effects in Namibia 
the empirical evidence obtained is small relative to effects generated by domestic monetary 
policy shock.  
2.5.3 Robustness Checks 
In order to assess the internal validity of our results, we carried out the following 
three robustness checks. We made three main alternative estimations to the short run 
SVAR model in (2.12). We estimate the SVAR model with A-model identification 
restrictions. The main aim of this alternative estimate is to check whether our identification 
restrictions have shaped the pattern of behaviours portrayed by the structural impulse 
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response functions. In the second alternative estimation, we estimated the SVAR AB-
model excluding the foreign variables commodity price inflation and SA’s repo rate. We 
reduced the economic model by trimming the structural representation in (2.12) to three 
domestic variables: quarterly GDP, inflation and the repo rate. Finally, we present the 
trimmed model with SA’s policy as the policy instrument. This alteration is necessary to 
assess the view that Namibia’s policy rate is redundant; therefore, we need to model the 
transmission mechanism only with SA policy rate as the policy instrument.  
In the first alternative specification, we start with exact identification of the three 
variables SVAR-AB model: QGDP, inflation and domestic monetary policy rate. This 
makes a lower triangular identification of the type AB-model. Figure B.2-3 present results 
from this alternative specification, which shows that all SIRFS are statistically significant 
with evidence of negative impact on inflation while QGDP remains volatile after the 
second quarter. The impulse responses show that monetary shock produces similar 
responses on output, inflation and repo rate. Meanwhile, demand shocks produce 
significant positive responses on inflation and the repo rate (i.e. the monetary policy rate). 
These structural impulse responses are consistent with results from six variable short run 
SVARs, therefore the size and order of the system do not significantly influence the 
responses from QGDP, inflation and policy rate.  
Our second robustness check involved trimming the three variables in the SVAR by 
excluding the commodity price inflation and private credit, and replacing Namibia’s repo 
rate with SA monetary policy rate. This robustness is aimed to test SA monetary policy 
effects in the model without monetary policy rate. Impulse responses from this alternative 
specification show that SA’s monetary policy shock barely produced any statistically 
significant impulse response functions in quarterly real GDP and inflation. These results 
show that whether we exclude commodity price inflation and private credit the impacts 
from SA monetary policy shock are smaller compared to domestic monetary policy shock. 
Finally, although we used five lags in the structural estimation instead of the three lags 
suggested by the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), this switch from four to two lags has 
not considerably changed the statistical significance of the impulse response functions. 
Impulse responses to SA’s monetary policy are the same as in the six variables SVAR in 
equation (2.12). These findings thus indicate that the results from the SVAR models used 
are robust. Therefore, these results reflect the efficacy and transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in Namibia. Finally, these empirical evidences are consistent with stylized 
facts as found in many studies both from developed and developing countries. In the new 
P a g e  | 104 
 
consensus, an increase in monetary policy shock should always lead to a rise in policy rate, 
lower prices, and reduce real output. 
2.6. Long Run SVAR Results 
Finally, we examined whether the dynamic relationship among variables in 
Namibia display long run behaviours and dynamic responses as observed in the literature. 
Many studies find that monetary policy shocks affect the price levels in the long run while 
effects on other variables die out after the fourth quarter. Literature shows that there are 
significant effects on economic activity from supply shock while demand shocks are 
statistically insignificant in the long run.  Figure B.2-5 shows the long run cumulative 
impulse response functions to monetary policy shock in Namibia, followed by demand 
shocks and supply shocks. Firstly, monetary policy causes a significant decline in GDP up 
to the fourth quarter and then it returns to the initial level. This implied response is similar 
to what we have obtained in the short run. This result is the same as in the short run and it 
shows that there is no long run lasting monetary policy effect on QGDP, while there is a 
significant long run impact on the rate of inflation. Inflation level remains below the initial 
level even in the seventh quarter after the initial shock has taken place. This shows that 
domestic monetary policy shock i.e. the policy of changing the level of repo rate in 
Namibia has a long run effect on the consumers’ price inflation. Furthermore, figure B.2-5 
presents the rest of the cumulative impulse response functions showing that the monetary 
policy shock does not produce significant effects on most variables in the long run in line 
with economic theory. In the long run monetary policy stabilizes inflation that is achieving 
the goal of price stability. In the case of SA’s monetary policy shock the results are similar 
with the exception that monetary policy increases or raises inflation in Namibia 
permanently at a high level.99   
The next figure presents the long run structural impulse response function to the 
demand shocks (GDP). Demand shocks have permanent effects in the long run on itself 
and negative long run effects on credit growth. For policy rate increases in response to 
demand shocks however these cumulative impulse response functions (CIRF) are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
 
                                                           
99
 These results are the same even when SA’s repo rate is used in the SVAR alone as an exogenous monetary 
policy function in Namibia. See the discussion on the robustness check for the short run exercise. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
Starting with the literature review, we assert that many studies indicated that the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism is a very important topic and its relevance is 
timeless (Gerdesmeier, 2013, p. 140). This study estimates the efficacy of monetary policy 
and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Namibia. We applied the 
methodology of structural vector auto-regression with short run and long run 
identifications restrictions based on the new macroeconomic consensus. This consensus 
argues that a country’s economy can be analysed on the basis of three fundamental 
equations: aggregate demand, price developments and the monetary policy instrument that 
is used to manage demand and supply. Hence, we designed SVAR with endogenous 
variables representing foreign sector and policy variable blocks. The SVAR approach is 
highly useful in policy evaluation because it has the following unique advantages.  
Firstly, this method produces structural impulse functions, which depict the 
expected time paths of variables in response to a structural shock; for example, monetary 
policy, and demand and supply shocks. In addition, SVAR provides the structural forecast 
error variance decomposition aid to explain the relative importance of each structural 
shock in the economic model under study. Thus, using this method, we have established 
the following results concerning the effects of monetary policy and credit shocks in 
Namibia.  
First, the results show that monetary policy through repo rate is effective in 
stabilizing real economic activity in the short run and consumers’ price inflation in the long 
run in Namibia. The structural impulse response functions obtained show that the impacts 
of monetary policy shocks are statistically significant, more than 2.0% contraction in 
quarterly real GDP, 4.0% inflation and 0.3% private credit fall in response to one-standard 
deviation shock in the repo rate in the short run. Second, our empirical results show that 
Namibia’s monetary policy shock induces more direct negative impact on output, inflation 
and private credit than foreign monetary policy shock. This evidence is therefore contrary 
to the argument that monetary policy in Namibia is subordinate to monetary policy in the 
anchor country. Based on the sample data used in this study we assert that there is little 
evidence to suggest that SA’s monetary policy accounts for more variation in output than 
domestic monetary policy.  
Thirdly, the results show that monetary policy contraction improves price stability 
in Namibia in the short run. Although there is large uncertainty around the impulse 
response to monetary policy shock in the long run, we find that the domestic monetary 
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policy shock significantly affects the inflation path as the impulse response remains below 
the initial level from the first quarter until the eighth quarter before it returns to the initial 
level. Meanwhile, SA’s monetary policy shocks seem to generate the so-called price-
puzzle, which contributes to the inflation rate in Namibia. In the first two quarters, we find 
that the response for inflation rate displays the so called price-puzzle response which 
means that the general price level rises instead of falling up to the third quarter in response 
to a positive shock in monetary policy. Qualitatively, this implies that a positive monetary 
policy shock on average increases the borrowing cost which is passed on to the consumer 
before the effects are transmitted to the overall aggregate demand. However, this response 
declines as from the fourth quarter, which shows that inflation stabilizes after a decline 
after a year in Namibia. 
Furthermore, our results show that private credit negatively responds to monetary 
policy shocks. In the short run aggregate demand significantly increases when shocked by 
one-standard deviation shock from private sector credit. This evidence reinforces the 
assumption that bank money is endogenous and credit significantly influences economic 
growth in the short run.  
Structural error variance decomposition analysis reveals that a large share of 
fluctuations in the quarterly GDP growth rate and changes in the repo rate in Namibia is 
mainly attributed to innovations to domestic monetary policy shock, while variation 
attributed to SA’s monetary policy accounts for less than 5.0% in the third quarter. 
Therefore, the results show that the direct transmission mechanism from domestic interest 
is relatively stronger as compared to the mechanism from credit and SA’s monetary policy 
shocks. Thus, this empirical evidence shows that the policy of changing the level of repo 
rate in Namibia is effective in stabilizing output and inflation. 
In addition, this result implies that the interest rate channel is relatively stronger 
than the credit channel in Namibia. This result holds even when compared with the 
variation attributed to monetary policy shock in SA’s repo rate. There are several 
implications that follow from these results. First, the size of fluctuations in QGDP and 
inflation attributed to domestic monetary policy rate illustrate the importance of domestic 
monetary policy actions in the process of macroeconomics stabilization in Namibia. 
Although there is a fixed exchange rate arrangement, domestic monetary policy should 
proactively respond to important economic factors without waiting for similar action to 
happen first in the SA. Secondly, these results show that Namibia’s repo rate is a good and 
effective instrument to regulate monetary and financial factors in the short run in order to 
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achieve long run monetary stability. Thus, such an instrument should be clear in the 
monetary policy framework to enhance monetary policy communication to the public at 
large.  
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Appendix B 
Appendix B.1 Definitions and Data Sources  
Data used in this thesis are obtained from various sources. These are Bank of Namibia 
Quarterly bulletins, Central Bureau of Statistics in the Namibia Statistic Agency (NSA), 
South African Reserve Bank Data Base, and International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
published by International Monetary Fund (IMF). The sample period is the period 1991:Q1 
to 2012Q4.  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant price 2004=100 base year: These are 
seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP, time series taken from the National Planning 
Commission/ Central Bureau of Statistics of Namibia. 
Namibia Consumer Price Index (NCPI) with December 2001=100 as the base year. NCPI 
covers both rural and urban households living in Namibia; prices are collected from more 
than 650 retailers in 8 localities.   
Namibia Inflation Rate (infl). Quarterly Inflation rate is derived from NCPI and expressed 
annually as follows: infl = 400*[log (NCPI) – log(NCPI(t-1))]. 
Repurchase Rate (repo) (rnt): This is the official rate charged by the Bank of Namibia on 
advances on specific collateral to commercial banks. The Repo rate is the cost of credit to 
the banking sector and therefore eventually affects the cost of credit to the general public. 
This is sourced directly from the Bank of Namibia. 
Repurchase Rate (rst) (South Africa): SA’s central bank defines repurchase rate as the ‘rate 
at which the private (sector) banks borrow Rand from the SA Reserve Bank’. This rate was 
formally called the bank rate until February 1998 and repurchase rate thereafter. It is 
directly sourced from the database as SA reserve bank. 
Commodity Price Index (CMI): This is a South African commodity index that includes 
mineral commodity exports traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This series is 
sourced from the International Financial Statistics/IMF database. 
Private sector credit (pcr): This time series reflects the amount of credit extended to the 
domestic private sector. The data are obtained from the Bank of Namibia.  
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Appendix B.2 Pre-estimation Tests: Summary statistics and diagnostic tests 
Table B.2-1 Augmented-Dickey-Fuller and Philip-Perron Tests for Unit root. 
 ADF Test (Obs. =86) Max. lag PP Test (Obs. =86) 
Series Level (p-
value) 
1st Diff. (p-values) 4 Level (p-
value) 
1stDiff. 
(p-value) 
CMI 0.62 0.00 4 0.59 0.00 
Infl 0.01 0.00 4 0.00 0.00 
Priv.Cr 0.15 0.21 4 0.26 0.00 
QRGDP 0.86 0.15 4 0.83 0.00 
Nam Repo 0.68 0.00 4 0.79 0.00 
SA Repo 0.57 0.00 4 0.73 0.00 
 
Table B.2-2 Granger-Causality test results. H0: variable (k) along the column is non-causal 
for variable (x), H1: Variable (k) is Granger cause for variable (x). P-values are given in the 
table. 
Var. (x) CMI (k=1) SA Repo QRGDP NCPI Priv. 
Credit 
Nam 
Repo 
CMI - 0.02 0.39 0.00 0.71 0.01 
SA Repo 0.02 - 0.32 0.00 0.46 0.00 
QRGDP 0.00 0.11 - 0.12 0.04 0.01 
NCPI 0.68 0.27 0.89 - 0.00 0.27 
Priv. Credit 0.02 0.05 0.51 0.00 - 0.00 
Nam Repo  0.48 0.49 0.01 0.12 0.61 - 
Notes: The p-values less that 5% are shown in bold face -this means that we reject the null hypothesis. 
Table B 2-3 Selection criteria: AIC, HQIC, SBIC 
 
                                                                               
     6    1140.98  47.128   36  0.101  6.7e-18  -22.9746  -20.3244  -16.3644   
     5    1117.42  68.409*  36  0.001  4.0e-18  -23.2855   -21.065  -17.7473   
     4    1083.21  68.914   36  0.001  3.4e-18  -23.3304  -21.5397  -18.8641   
     3    1048.76   104.7   36  0.000  3.0e-18* -23.3689*  -22.008  -19.9746   
     2     996.41  75.688   36  0.000  4.4e-18  -22.9602  -22.0291  -20.6378   
     1    958.566  170.76   36  0.000  4.5e-18  -22.9141  -22.4128* -21.6636*  
     0    873.185                      1.5e-17  -21.6796   -21.608   -21.501   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  8 - 87                              Number of obs      =        80
   Selection-order criteria
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Table B.2-4 Pair Wise Correlations at log-levels, sample 1991Q1-2013:Q3 
 
*show significance at 0.05 percent significance level. 
Table B.2-5 Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation 
 
Figure B.2-6 Stability condition test with eigenevalues plot in the unit circle 
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                   lcmi  lsarepo      lp2    lqgdp   rtgdp1     lpc2    lrepo
. pwcorr lcmi lsarepo lp2 lqgdp rtgdp1 lpc2 lrepo, sig star(5)
   H0: no autocorrelation at lag order
                                          
      3      44.9802    36     0.14493    
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Appendix B.3 Structural impulse response functions (sirf) for demand and credit shocks in 
SVAR AB-model equation.  
Figure B.2-1 Structural Impulse Response Functions for inflation, private credit, repo rate, 
SA repo, commodity price inflation and growth rate of QGDP to a one-standard deviation 
on the demand shock. 
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Figure B.2-2 Structural impulse response functions for commodity price inflation, QGDP, 
domestic repo, SA repo, inflation, and private credit to a one-standard deviation of private 
credit structural shock. 
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Figure B.2-3 AB-model 3-variables for robustness checks: Sirfs for QGDP, inflation 
and repo rate to a one-standard deviation in domestic monetary policy shock. 
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Figure B.2-4 AB-model 3-variables for robustness check Sirfs for QGDP, inflation and 
repo rate to the SA monetary policy shock. 
 
 
 
Figure B.2-5 Long-run cumulative impulse response functions for QGDP, inflation and 
repo rate to a one-standard deviation in domestic monetary policy shock. 
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Figure B.2-6 Quarterly GDP and growth rate reported by the Namibia Statistics Agency 
(NSA) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Understanding Interest Rate Spreads (IRS): An investigation of 
macroeconomic and financial determinants of Interest Rate Spreads 
in Namibia 
 
“When spreads ‘‘blow out” (as market professionals put it), borrowing becomes 
prohibitively expensive, credit dries up, and economies are brought to their knees. Huge 
spreads often connote few transactions –markets are drying up” (Blinder, 2013, p. 241).  
 
3.1 Introduction  
Interest rates spreads are primary features of every bank-based and market-based 
financial system. They are the conduits through which monetary and financial policies are 
transmitted to the economy. Generally, under the influence of central bank’s policy and 
financial institutions’ market powers, interest rate spreads when properly aligned, they can 
improve economic and productive efficiency which enhances welfare gains for households 
and businesses. However, interest rate spreads are double-edged swords. This is because 
persistently large interest rate spreads impede the very basic aims of monetary and 
financial policies which they suppose to serve in the first place. In crises times, large 
spreads amplify the effects of credit crunch and economic crises thereby increasing the 
magnitudes of business cycles.  
Most often, higher and disequilibrium interest rate spreads indicate inefficient and 
uncompetitive financial systems which are a cause of concern in developing countries.100 
As a result, interest rate spreads have become a major central issue that dominates public 
debates in developing countries. Many researchers and policymakers are interested to find 
out causes and consequences of large spreads on economic development. In fact, (Taylor, 
2008) has suggested that current monetary policy should be augmented with the spread to 
address financial instability. Blinder (2013, p. 242) argues that spreads and their 
consequences were not understood until the recent financial crisis which shows that ‘it is 
all [i.e. all relevant information needed to discern the impending dangers in the financial 
system] in the spreads’. Spreads are important because they determine the actual costs of 
                                                           
100
 For example, Fuentes and Basch (2000) and Birchwood (2004) assert that interest rate spread impede 
savings and investments decisions. Beck and Hesse (2009) reveal that although large spreads have been 
expected after liberalization, their persistently high levels have been a major concern for policy-makers in 
developing countries. 
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borrowing. In Namibia, large interest rate spreads have been a cause of concern and a 
controversial issue. Specifically, the central bank and general public have expressed 
enormous interest particularly to understand the (i) main determinants of interest rate 
spreads; (ii) the dynamic behaviours of interest rate spreads; and (iii) the consequential 
effects of large changes in interest rate spreads on households and business credits. It is 
high time we address these concerns about interest spreads while both parties are interested 
to find out what can be done to reduce the large size of interest rate spreads. In this chapter 
we examine the underlying macro and financial fundamentals that seem to explain changes 
in interest rate spreads.101 In the working paper (Kamati, 2013) examined the dynamic 
behaviours and consequential effects of changes in the spreads. 
In the literature review, we established that there are many different definitions of 
interest rate spreads; and the selection of what are major spreads is subjective. Despite this 
caveat, spreads show significant links between the base rate in the hand of monetary 
authority and different market rates. The base rate we can think of is the central bank 
policy rate or government treasuries – risk-free rate. One important interest rate spread is 
given by the difference between the benchmark rate (often referred to as the repo rate) and 
the prime rate (the price at which most banks will lend to each other and to other prime 
institutions in the domestic economy). In this study, we call this difference the based 
spread.102 This is the base spread on which other interest rate spreads in the financial 
markets anchor. Another spread is given by the difference between average lending rates 
and average deposit rates. This difference, for the sake of identification is called the retail 
spread. Finally, we have the risk premium spread which is the difference between prime 
lending rate and the short term risk-free rate (three-month T-bills). There are many interest 
rates in the financial sector; similarly there are also many definitions of interest rate 
spreads. For example, Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) identify six definitions of interest 
rate spreads in their study on interest rate spreads in Argentina. In this study we limit our 
                                                           
101
 Banerjere (2001) argues that the problem is not that there is a difference between lending and deposit rates 
i.e. spread exists; but it is about the size of the spread which is a major concern in many financial systems. 
Generally, interest rate spreads must exist because intermediation is very costly; banks borrow on short term 
and lend on long term thus, exposing themselves to interest rate and credit risks and maturity mismatch. 
102
 For convenience purposes and easy identification when analyzing the dynamic behavior of interest rate 
spreads, we have attached short names on various spreads. We called the base spread in the sense that it is a 
bench mark (with the bank rate as a virtually riskless base rate) for other spreads in the economy, while we 
used the expression retail spread because it primarily covers differences of prices in the banking sector (for 
exapmle see Hall & Liebermen, 2010, pp. 808-809). Curdia and Woodford (2010) used the term credit spread 
instead of interest rate spread while other definition of spreads includes: risk premium, yield spread, and the 
retail bank’s spread. Blinder (2013, p. 238) assumed risk free rate as the base rate, therefore the margins over 
Treasury Bills will form the base spreads.  
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investigation to the base spread, retail spread, and risk premium because they are most 
recognizable and relevant in Namibia. 
3.1.1 Objectives of the study 
In this study, we first investigate the unit root process and structural breaks in the base 
and retail spreads; secondly, we investigate macroeconomic and financial factors that 
determine changes in the interest rate spreads in Namibia. Under these objectives, we use 
two definitions of interest rate spread - base spread and retail spread - to identify empirical 
factors that significantly explain interest rate spreads in Namibia. 103  What are the 
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals that explain the changes in level of spreads in 
Namibia? Is there a significant relationship between ex ante base spread, retail spread and 
the macroeconomic fundamentals achieved in the country? We find the following 
empirical results concerning unit roots with structural breaks and the determinants of 
spreads. 
Firstly, descriptive statistics show that on average the unconditional mean of spreads 
was statistically different from zero over the sample period. Secondly, the unit root test 
with endogenous breaks shows that the base spread, retail spread and risk premium have 
unit root process with structural breaks. The most common significant endogenous 
structural breaks were identified in the months 1998M06 and 1998M08. These structural 
breaks represent the structural changes caused by the 1997/98 East Asia financial crisis 
shocks on equity and commodities through South Africa to Namibia. For a commodity 
exporting country, the financial crisis had significant impact through commodity and 
equity prices that fell by more than 40% in Asia. Further, our unit root test results show 
that the order of integration in spreads is not influenced by the presence of endogenous 
structural breaks in the data. Thirdly, empirical results show that underlying fundamentals 
such as inflation, unconditional inflation volatility, changes in bank rate, perceived risk as 
measured by changes in the risk premium, economic growth, interest differential and South 
Africa’s spread are some of the statistically significant macro and financial factors that 
explain changes in interest rate spreads in Namibia. However, our measure for financial 
instability did not perform well as this was statistically insignificant. Whether we use 
changes in the retail spread or changes in base spread, empirical results indicate that 
                                                           
103
 Owing to unavailability of data on many important bank specific variables and fewer observations on 
micro level data, this analysis is based to a large extent on macroeconomic time series data. Although we 
made efforts to use the Bank scope database, we found that the annual observations available span a period of 
five years. Results from these observations are given as indicative on the appendix. 
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macroeconomics and financial fundamentals play significant roles in the determination of 
interest rate spreads in Namibia.  
3.1.2 Motivation and Contributions of the Study  
It is worth noting that the issue of higher interest spreads is not only confined to 
Namibia, but is also a contentious subject in many countries, including both emerging and 
developing economies. Folawewo & Tennant (2008) and Crowley (2007) view that higher 
interest rate spreads are a major problem in Sub-Saharan Africa countries, Beck and Hesse 
(2009) identify particularly Uganda. Brock and Rojares-Suarez (2000) also analyze 
determinants of spreads in Latin America, Birchwood (2004), and Craigwell and Moore 
(2001) investigated it in the Caribbean and Pacific nations.  It seems that issue of interest 
rate spreads only catches the attention during crises time in advanced economies (see De 
Grauwe & Ji, 2013, p. 1). The situation is different when it comes to developing and 
emerging economies. It is clear from empirical studies that the problem of interest rate 
spreads generally become particularly more noticeable immediately after financial sector 
liberalization. Thus, not surprisingly, within the first ten years of independence, this 
sensitive topic has also generated a heated debate about the roles of financial 
intermediaries in Namibia. Some headlines that appeared in the print media about interest 
rate spreads are as follows:  
(1) “Bank rate showdown looms: Bank of Namibia (BoN) Governor Tom 
Alweendo  has given commercial banks until year-end to reduce the interest 
rate spreads, or the difference between the central bank’s repo rate and banks’ 
prime lending rates, to  375 basis points” (Duddy, 2009); (2) “Rates war heats 
up: with only 12 days left to the Bank of Namibia deadline for the narrower 
interest rate spread of 425 basis points, the central bank and the commercial 
banks remain at odds about the controversial demand” (Duddy, 2009).104  
Apart from these quotes, at other occasions, the Bank of Namibia (BoN) has expressed its 
main concerns about the magnitude of the spread between the repo rate and prime lending 
rate of commercial banks. The Central bank asserts that the size of base spread and many 
others are unjustifiable (see the Annex in the Appendix C.2).105  
                                                           
104
 
http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php?archive_id=55015&page_type=archive_story_detail&page=3581 
105
 (i) For example, Paul Hartman the deputy govern of the Bank of Namibia argues that ‘‘The bank (BoN) 
views it as undesirable that the differential [5.00 percent] between the bank rate (10.25 percent) and the 
prime rate of commercial banks (15.25 percent) remains substantial, despite the fact that the bank rate is 50 
basis points lower than that of the South Africa repo rate.’’ The Namibian, 01 February 2008. (ii) Rates drop 
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On the one hand we have central bank, businesses and households expressing 
concerns that interest rate spreads have negative effects on spending decisions. On the 
other hand, we have retail banks which seem adamant to defend their position that the size 
of interest spreads between bank rate and prime lending rate are justified. Thus, their 
independence as private institutions that is, individual rights to independently set prices 
according to market conditions is threatened by undue influences from the Central bank 
interventions. Some proponents that support large spreads argue that they are better than 
thin margins which make the financial system susceptible to collapse in the face of 
financial crisis. Therefore, it is desirable that interest rate spreads are large enough to 
sustain financial institutions when times are hard and profit margins are squeezed for a 
long period of time. Large spreads will also help financial institutions to sufficiently cover 
business costs such as staff, management, and infrastructure for payment services as well 
as financial intermediation costs. Furthermore, free marketers argue that higher interest 
rate spreads are therefore a reflection of high costs of doing business in Namibia.  
This study and the next chapter are motivated by the quest to find empirical 
evidence about any significant economic relationship between large changes in spreads and 
fundamentals realized in the country over the past two decades. These empirical evidences 
contribute immensely to the redevelopment and revision of Namibia’s financial charter and 
the monetary policy framework. These documents guide the execution of monetary policy 
by the Bank of Namibia and the financial charter of the ministry of finance in Namibia.  As 
in other mixed economies, the mode of implementing monetary policy in Namibia does not 
permit the central bank to give direct instructions to retail banks on how they should price 
their financial products and services. This feature as in any market economy is left to 
financial intermediaries to make their own decisions as they view the demand and supply 
of funds in the financial markets. However, it is now recognized that this arrangement has 
some drawback because it leaves limited options for policymakers to influence interest 
spreads into a desired level (see also Hall & Liebermen, 2010, p. 808).106  
Secondly, in our view, some empirical evidences about the significant roles 
fundamentals in spreads and the behaviours of interest rate spreads are essential for 
                                                                                                                                                                                
at ‘own peril’ BoN warned. Duddy (2009), reported that according to FNB CEO Vekuii Rukoro, ‘The 
financial impact of the Bank of Namibia’s push to narrow the gap between the repo and the prime lending 
rates to 425 basis points by month-end and 375 basis points by next October, will be ‘‘profound, and very 
profound’’, and he added that ‘the Namibian economy will be hit profoundly too,’’. The Namibian, 21 
October 2009. See also the Annex 1.1 in the appendix. 
106
 Hall and Liebermen (2010) discussed the challenges of using the conventional tools (e.g. federal fund rate) 
to correct interest rate spreads in the US. 
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designing the monetary policy that takes into the importance of spreads. These evidences 
are necessary to guide the central bank and other financial regulators in addressing the 
problem of large interest rate spreads in the financial sector. For example, in the past 
decade, the Bank of Namibia has been persuading all banks to narrow their spreads in 
order to ease the burden of repaying debts by businesses and households. However, these 
persuasions were not based on any empirical research showing that the size of interest rate 
spread is unjustifiable and thus, poses a threat to overall welfare (see the directive from 
BoN on the Appendix C.3.3). Additionally, despite the importance of this topic we are not 
aware of any comprehensive empirical study so far that examines the causes of spreads and 
effects of changes in interest spreads in Namibia. The lack of empirical evidence as to what 
significantly explains interest rate spreads, and how interest spreads affect businesses and 
households is obstructing the efforts to device appropriate policies that could help address 
the problem of large interest rate spreads. Thus, we hope this study will help policy makers 
to make well-informed decisions about this central issue in Namibia’s financial sector.   
In order to fill this gap, we document the empirical evidence about the bank-
specific and macroeconomic determinants that significantly explain changes in spreads in 
Namibia. This empirical chapter is followed by the last chapter that examine how spreads 
can be integrated in the current monetary policy framework. However, we do not expect to 
answer all questions related to the issue of interest rate spreads in Namibia. Thus, we hope 
this study will serve as a starting point for constructive debates and will provide the 
necessary foundation for further studies related to this topic. It is a fact that interest rate 
spread is a complex topic and touches many technical areas of financial intermediaries 
which require independent studies. Hence, we admit that some factors can only be fully 
examined at micro level as they are either too ‘bank’ specific or too ‘geographical’ 
specific. We point out here that while this was one of the main goals, to have complete 
analyses both at macro and micro levels; we were not able to extend to the micro level 
because of our inability to get enough bank level data. Even at the macro level, some 
variables do not have enough observations. 
Finally, this study aims to complement the current Namibia Financial Strategy 
2011-2021 (NFSS).107 This strategy aims ‘to develop a more resilient competitive and 
dynamic financial system with best practices in order for the sector to realize its full 
potential in respect to the growth of the economy’. The key areas of focus in the NFSS 
which relate to our study are: to increase financial markets deepening and development as 
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 Namibia Financial Sector Strategy 2011-2021 is available at: https://www.bon.com.na 
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well as financial inclusion. Financial inclusion aims to raise the standard of consumer 
financial literacy and improve access to financial services and products.  
3.1.3 Organization of the study 
Following this introductory section, this study is structured into three sections. 
Section 3.2 discuses the literature review about the roles of banks and models of interest 
rate spreads and empirical studies of determinants of interest rate spreads. Section 3.3 
starts with methods, descriptive statistics and unit root test with structural breaks and 
regression results, and finally, conclusion and policy implications.  
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3.2. Literature Review: Roles of financial intermediaries, and interest 
spread models  
As a matter of fact, interest rate spreads are a basic feature of financial 
intermediation. The movements of these spreads affect the supply and demand of financial 
intermediation services in the financial sector.  This is because, as part of their main 
activity, banks accept deposits as liabilities and issue loans; hence a difference between the 
lending and the deposit rate or any other rate is bound to occur in the market economy. 
Intermediation allows banks to borrow from surplus units and lend to deficit units at a 
higher premium. Thus, it is logical that interest rate spreads should make provision for the 
cost of originating loans, risks of extending credit and returns for the owner’s capital and 
costs for other financial services rendered. Therefore, to understand the subject of interest 
rate spreads better, we need to examine some theoretical underpinnings for supply and 
demand of financial intermediation. To start with, we explained the main roles of banks; 
this is followed by a review of theoretical and empirical models about financial 
intermediation. We derive theoretical lessons that will help us to explain factors that 
determine intermediation spread in theory and to illustrate how this can be applied from the 
context of industrial organization theory. As there is no specific theory or generally agreed 
framework to model interest rate spreads, this review is aimed to help us formulate the 
econometric method that we will use to estimate and analyze fundamentals that explain  
interest rate spreads in Namibia. 
3.2.1 Roles of Financial Intermediaries in the financial system 
Traditionally, banks exist to facilitate allocation of resources from surplus units to 
deficit units. Banks, as financial firms, play a critical role in the economy as they provide 
liquidity and payment services. The main fundamental roles of banks are listed as follows: 
to provide liquidity and payment services; to transform deposits into assets; to manage 
risks; to process information and to monitor borrowers. According to (Machiraju, 2008) 
banks exist to provide packages of financial services which individuals cannot offer. 
Individuals find it very costly to search out, produce and monitor financial products and 
services.108 These costs include searching, transaction and contracting, and evaluation and 
monitoring costs. Therefore, banks exist to offer these essential financial services at more 
competitive costs than households would.  
Liquidity and payment services: One of the most important processes of financial 
intermediation is to provide liquidity and payment services in the financial system. Banks 
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collect deposits and other short term funds from surplus units and channel them to deficit 
units in the economy. Irrespective of the level of development of financial markets in the 
country, banks provide both funding liquidity and market liquidity. For example, in 
developing countries, banks deal with the public at large as lenders and depositors or vice-
versa, providing banking services such as salary payments for government employees, and 
making contract payments to firms. These roles are amplified by the absence of deep 
financial markets in many developing countries. The role of payments by banks is also 
reinforced by people’s preference to exchange goods for money rather than goods for 
goods, as was the case in the barter system. Hence, financial intermediaries’ existence 
enables the smooth running of the economy. Banks provide saving facilities which help 
consumers to smoothen their consumption over time, while allowing businesses to access 
trade credit for imports and exports, see (Strahan, 2010).  
Maturity Transformation: Another important role of banks in the economy is the 
process of maturity transformation. Banks collect a pool of deposits from households and 
firms, and short term funds from money markets and transform them into large securities 
with long term maturity. This intermediation role creates a link in the economy through 
banks, as various economic agents such as households and firms- become lenders or 
borrowers of funds from banks.  
However, the process of maturity transformation attracts and exposes financial 
intermediaries to a myriad of risks in the longer term. These risks are systemic, political or 
economical in their origin.109 The immediate role of financial intermediaries is to minimize 
risks by maintaining competitive interest rate spreads on main financial products and 
services. It is for these reasons that the average banks’ margin should implicitly reflects the 
fixed and variable costs of services provided and the return to equity capital, and the 
provisions to generate internal capital through returned earnings.110 
Risk Management: As mentioned above, another role of the bank is to manage risks 
which they assume when they accept public deposits and further invest it in illiquid assets. 
Financial intermediation exposes banks to myriad risks such as: maturity mismatch risk, 
interest rate risk, default risk, liquidity risk, and credit risk and other exogenous risk. Banks 
are well endowed with the technology to manage large assets and liabilities and the risks 
                                                           
109
 For example, a decline in government revenues can generate a systemic problem in the form of liquidity 
problem in the economy. When there is a liquidity problem, some banks will be unable to meet their 
commitments in the short term. Liquidity problem is particularly a major problem in financial markets that 
are dominated by government bonds. This liquidity problem may trigger panic among the public and result in 
what is called a bank run. 
110
 See Ennew, Watkins, and Wright (1995) and Eyler (2010). 
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that come along with them. Through the technology, many banks are well placed to 
mitigate these risks as opposed to individuals who are exposed to the risks associated with 
direct lending. Thus, banks allow interest rate spreads to freely adjust to account for risks 
associated with liabilities and direct lending. 
Monitoring and Information Processing: Banks also act as delegated monitors and 
information processors on behalf of borrowers and lenders. The role of monitoring and 
information gathering is made possible by the special ‘borrower-lenders’ relationship 
which is peculiar to banks. Banks aim to establish a relationship with their customers 
through which they can collect information. The probability of a long relationship over 
time puts banks in a better position to accumulate information about households and firms. 
As more information is collected, this can be used to evaluate any application from 
households or firms, which results in an economy of scale for the banks.  
3.2.2 Theoretical models of interest rate spreads 
In this section we briefly point out some of the theoretical and empirical models 
used to investigate determinants of and consequences of changes in interest rate spreads in 
the literature. We discussed the model’s specifications and their applications to interest rate 
problem. We left out mathematical derivations of these models which are not necessary for 
this chapter. Firstly, we start with Woodford and Curdia (2009) who describe the 
relationships between the macroeconomics and financial intermediation. They introduced 
financial frictions in the form of credit spread within a new-Keynesian model. This 
illustrates how changes in the credit spread affect the supply of financial intermediation 
given the level of income, interest rate and the perceived riskiness of borrowers in the 
economy. As Groth (2012, p. 1)  puts it, “the essence of the ‘story in the Woodford paper’ 
is an account of the determination of and the consequences of changes in the wedge” that 
is, credit spread between deposits and lending rates. Woodford’s model contains all 
necessary equilibria; however, here we start with the equilibrium of financial 
intermediation which specifically gives the implicit function of credit spread.  
In this model, there is supply and demand of new loans with supply upward sloping 
and demand downward sloping. Supply of new loans in the short run is constrained by 
rising marginal cost because some input are fixed for example, human capital. The supply 
also increases with the size of credit spread (interest rate spread) as it is more profitable for 
financial intermediaries to provide credit when the spread is large. Woodford and Curdia 
assert that given the size of credit spread ω , the supply of financial intermediation 
increases with income and decreases with the perceived riskiness of borrowers. This will 
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allow banks to carry out their role of intermediation in the economy. Let loans supply be
);,( σωYLs  , demand for new loans ),( ωYLd , the credit spread is denoted byω  and σ  
represents the perceived riskiness of supplying loans to borrowers and Y is gross national 
income. In equilibrium, supply and demand for new loans are equal.  
),();,( ωσω YLYL ds =                                                                                           (3.1) 
The credit spread ω  can be written as an implicit function of Y and σ, 
),( σωω Y= .                                                                                                        (3.2) 
Overtime, the total changes in ω  can be shown by taking the total differential of (3.1) with 
respect to Y, ω andσ   on both sides which results in the following equations111: 
ωσω ωσω dLdYLdLdLdYL ddYsssY +=++                                                                               (3.3) 
1)}(){( −−−−= dsssYdY LLdLdYLLd ωωσ σω                                                                             (3.4) 
Suppose we let 1))(( −−−= dssYdY LLLL ωωα  and 1)( −−= dss LLL ωωσβ  then (3.4) becomes  
σβαω ddYd −= .                                                                                                            (3.5) 
The equation (3.5) suggests that the total change in interest rate spread ω  is ambiguously 
related to changes in income, and unambiguously related to the perceived riskiness of 
supplying loans to the ultimate borrowers.112 The model therefore offers some lights on 
what should contain the set of determinants of interest rate spread. Some of these are real 
income growth and the risk premium or risk perceptions. 
Classens et al. (2006) in their effort to identify determinants of interest rate spread 
in Brazil used the following linear model.  This is specified as follows: 
c −  = e + ( + ¡Mℎ¼ pM¡ + E                                                                            (3.6) 
Whereby r is the base interest rate and the ri is the lending rate for bank i while other 
factors include variables that are deemed to influence interest rate spreads and u is the 
stochastic term. This simple linear model above is nothing else than the rearrangement and 
modification of the first order conditions derived from the Monti-Klein model of a 
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 See more about the IS-LM model with financial intermediation in Groth (2012, pp. 5-12).  
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 The partial effects of ∆Y are ambiguous because the term α in (3.5) can take any signs depending on the 
difference of partial derivatives inside the parentheses. 
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monopolistic bank. These first order conditions give the usual Lerner index which shows  
the price of a loan (ri) minus the costs of deposit (r) which include the marginal cost of an 
additional loan all equal to inversely related elasticity.113 This reflects the market power of 
the firm (bank) as it shows the price distortion between price of a loan and the marginal 
cost. Young (1996) clearly points out that the spread resulting from these conditions is the 
same as the product price in industrial theory using loans as output of the firm.114 Thus, 
interest rate spread of bank i is determined by α, which can be regarded as the industry 
marginal cost of raising an additional loan, r which is the level of base interest rate (policy 
rate) and other factors represent the macroeconomic and financial factors that explain 
variation of interest rate spreads in the banking sector.115 For simplicity, α is a constant 
term which represents firm’s average marginal cost rate if we assume that all firms have 
the same level of technology. The general challenge of the Monti-Klein model is that it is 
based on the much criticized theory of industrial organization (IO) of the firm. Although 
IO theory offers some of intuitions about financial intermediation, it has been proven that 
banking firms are very different from industrial firms. For example, when we apply IO 
theory to study financial intermediation, one has to contend with issue of firm’s 
classifications that is, deciding whether banks should be classified and examined as 
monopolistic, oligopolistic or perfectly competitive, and the challenge of costs allocation 
when there are non-financial institutions (e.g. the post office saving bank) that also provide 
intermediation service. Furthermore, banks are different because the banking business is a 
confidence business while this is not necessarily the case to the same extent for industrial 
firms.   
Another important point about Classens et al. (2006) model is that, the model over-
emphasizes the level interest rate above other variables. This might be because the first 
order conditions from the profit maximizing monopolistic bank clearly gives the interest 
rate as one of the explanatory factors of the interest rate spread.  Although the level of the 
interest rate plays a significant role in the determination of interest rate spreads, many 
researchers have shown that this alone cannot fully explain why the interest rate spread is 
much higher in some countries such as Brazil, the Caribbean community and sub-Saharan 
Africa. In addition, it is exposed in the literature that competition in banking goes beyond 
price and therefore there are many fundamentals that extensively influence the wedge 
                                                           
113
 Lerner Index = `/aJ(ß)` = . , mc=marginal cost and  is the price elasticity of demand. 
114
 Young (1996) used a theoretical model to analyze how bank behaviors affect total lending to household 
and business. The results from the theoretical model illustrate that higher costs, tighter external lending 
control, balance sheet control, and less competition can reduce lending through the interest rate.  
115
 Rochet and Xavier (2008, pp. 8-10) gave derivations about the Monti-Klein model.   
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between return on deposits and prime lending rates. Furthermore, in the recent financial 
crisis 2007/08, it has been shown that although most interest rates were close to zero, a 
dramatic spike in the spread reinforced and prolonged the effects of the credit crunch. 
Gertler, Hubbard, and Kashyap (1991) use a linear model to examine the 
relationship between interest rate spreads and investment fluctuations. They started from 
the premise that the interest rate spread reflects ‘the payoffs’ or ‘default risk’ in the 
economy. Hence, the problem of identifying the determinants of the interest rate spread is 
about identifying these factors that shift the ‘payoffs’ or ‘default risks’ in the economy. 
They implicitly specified the interest rate spread equation as follows: Spread = f (GNP, 
investment, other factors). The model combines both micro level and macroeconomic 
factors which are assumed to shift default risks and payoffs. The theoretical result shows 
that the current changes in interest rate spread are partially explained by financial variables 
through business cycles. Additionally, the empirical result of Gertler, Hubbard, & Kashyap 
(1991) shows that a shock such as an immediate rise in wealth increases capital and 
consequentially lowers the interest rate spread. 
3.2.2.1 Interest rate spreads the likelihood function 
What interest rate spreads are, and how to effectively model them, are some of the 
challenges that have been recognised by many authors on this topic.116  For example, 
Birchwood (2004) and Brock and Franken (2002) acknowledged this problem and all 
expressed dissatisfaction at the lack of an agreed general framework in the literature on 
how to model interest rate spreads. We find that empirical analyses based on the theory of 
the firm had skewed micro level analysis while neglecting the role of macro and financial 
fundamentals in interest rate spreads. For example, the Marshal-Lerner condition equation 
emphasised the microeconomic factors without accounting for the contribution of 
macroeconomic fundamentals realised. Another common definition used to model interest 
rate spreads covers the interest earned and interest rate paid accounting identity – this is 
called net interest rate. Net interest rate spread is the difference between interest earned 
on loans, securities and other interest-earning assets and the interest paid on deposits and 
other interest-bearing liabilities. We disagree with the use of accounting identity on the 
following grounds. Firstly, because it is an identity, therefore it implies that the identity 
conditions must hold at any time irrespective of whatever is happening.117 Thus, modelling 
this as an equation without formulating the assumptions that turns the identity into a 
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 It has been recognised that both ex ante and ex post definitions of interest rate spreads have their 
weaknesses. 
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 Identity is an equation that is true no matter what number is plugged in for the unknown variable. 
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stochastic equation is methodologically wrong. Secondly, the interest rate earnings minus 
interest rate income identity emphasises the balance sheet variables more than relating it to 
other factors that do not feature directly in the balance sheets of financial firms. Thus, it is 
very difficult to relate variables that do not directly link firm balance sheets to this 
accounting identity. Taking into account all these challenges we decided to use the implicit 
formulation by Woodford and Curdia (2009) and the linear model used by Classens et al. 
(2006) to come up with the likelihood function of how to model interest rate spreads. As in 
Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Classens et al. (2006) we proposed that interest rate 
spreads is a function of the average cost of originating the loan, the price of credit from 
central bank, perceived risk, income, and other macroeconomic and financial fundamental 
realised in the country under study. This relation should also include structural dummies to 
take into account structural changes and transitions from one regime to another over 
sample period. We expressed this economic relation as follows:  
∆(c − ) =p¡jM jM + ∆Ojp¡ + ∆rpOVk	O¢ + ∆( p¡&¼Oj jpO ~	¼Ejk jM ~) +OjMM	kO¼¼jMO ~ + MEpME ~	kEO + ¡	M                                                                                             
(3.8). 
In order to take into account the unit root process and endogenous structural breaks 
manifested in some of the spread variables we will start from the first difference with pulse 
dummy variables. It is important that we highlight some of the challenges usually 
encountered in estimating a single equation such as this and how we propose to overcome 
them. The first immediate challenge relates to uncertainty around the true functional form 
of interest rate spreads. This refers to whether the true relationship between changes in the 
spreads and the determinants should be treated as a linear or non-linear relationship. 
Similarly, since the dependent variable is a time series the functional form should take into 
account the dynamic structure of the dependent variable and the length of memory in the 
average spreads; that is, the lag length to address autocorrelation. The next challenge 
concerns how to deal with regime shifts and the unit root process with structural breaks as 
has been observed in some of the interest rate spreads in Namibia. Lastly, we need to 
determine the list of covariates to include in the model while avoiding over fitting.  
Firstly, the issue of linear or non-linear functional form can be handled very well 
by using a Generalised Method of moments while other tests such as the reset test can be 
used to check the adequacy of the model. Holly and Turner (2012, p. 21) pointed out that 
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‘the main advantage of GMM estimator is that we don’t have to write down a conventional 
regression relationship. Instead we can specify an implicit relationship between variables.’ 
In addition, this allows techniques to minimise the problem of multicollinearity through 
instruments while bearing in mind that the model is less restrictive on the data generating 
process. However, we must highlight other methods that are adequate in analysing the 
problem of interest rate spreads. These methods include the Stepwise least squares method, 
the smooth transition auto-regressive (STAR) model and the logistic smoothed transition 
model (LSTAR). STAR and LSTAR methods estimate simultaneously estimate the linear 
and non-linear part of the dependent variable with the ability to identify whether the non-
linear part is statistically significant. In addition, the STAR model accounts for structural 
breaks and the transition function, and whether the transition is governed by logistic or 
exponential functions from one regime to another. However, STAR models do fail when 
both linear and non-linear parts exhibit the unit root process with structural breaks. This 
seems to be the case with the interest rate spreads in Namibia whereby even after 
identifying and including the endogenous structural break in the dependent variables (i.e. 
spreads) these still do not pass the unit root test with structural breaks. This implies that 
augmenting the process with structural breaks does not make the time series variable 
stationary. Thus, we differenced the variables involved in the regression and used the 
impulse dummy rather than the level shift dummy.118  
Further we adjust the single equation to account for the timing effects and the 
memory of the dependent variable. It is therefore essential to append some macroeconomic 
fundamentals to lags the in the list of independent variables. The long memory in the 
dependent variable will require the use of the Auto-regression Integrated Moving Average 
model with exogenous variables (ARIMAX). However, the ARIMAX model is limited to 
how many exogenous variables should enter because too many with their lags make it very 
difficult to establish which should be in or out even with a Granger causality test. In the 
case of GMM and related estimators this task is simplified by omitted variables and 
redundant variable tests to avoid over fitting the model. After establishing that there is no 
serial correlation, insignificant independent variables can be assessed jointly and 
individually in regard to whether they are redundant in the final regression. Finally, we 
used two unconditional inflation and interest rate volatilities measures, which summarise 
the factor effects of macroeconomic and financial instability on interest rate spreads. Other 
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 Another alternative method for regime shifts is the stepwise regression method. Although this method 
may partially address the problem of regime shift, it is argued that it is too subjective and the outcomes are 
either over fitted regressions with less optimum results. 
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factors such as the changes in income, interest rate, financial depth and perceived risk are 
theoretically suggested by Woodford and Curdia (2009) and Groth (2012, p. 1) as factors 
that contribute to the variation of interest rate spreads.    
In all, we aimed to overcome the quandary about modelling spreads as we opt for 
the Generalised Method of Moments to investigate the factors that seem to explain interest 
rate spreads in Namibia. GMM requires less information about the exact mathematical 
relations of the problem that needs to be examined. Therefore, in a situation whereby we 
have less information about the likelihood functions (that is, an explicit linear or non-linear 
function that describes interest rate spreads), the GMM approach is an appropriate tool to 
estimate the partially specified economic models and the results from a single equation can 
be examined for consistency when results from two closely related estimators OLS and 
TSLS are estimated alongside.119 
3.2.2.2 OLS, TSLS and GMM estimators 
This section gives a brief discussion about the econometric methods we used to 
estimate the coefficients of the two dynamic models. There are many excellent materials 
which offer more details about how the OLS, TSLS and GMM estimators are derived.120 
These three methods are closely related and somehow produced results that are closely 
comparable.121 Here, we only highlight some important aspects that are necessary for the 
interpretation of our results. We start the discussion with OLS, TSLS and GMM 
estimators, followed by essential requirement for instrument variables and weights, and the 
motivation for the robust-standard errors from heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent covariance (HAC). This is also known as the Newy-West standard errors.  
The general representation of OLS is as follows: 
à = á′( + ,                                                                                                   (3.9) 
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 See further support for GMM in Hansen (2010) and Heij, De Boer, Franses, Kloek and Van Dijk (2004).  
120
 See for example, Green (2003) chapter 3 & 18, Hayashi () chapter 3 &7..  
121
 For example, GMM usually have large standard errors as compared to OLS and 2SLS. Secondly, it is 
possible that some coefficient estimates that are significant under OLS and TSLS can become insignificant in 
GMM. However, it is recommended that one pays attention to the following observations. When the 
estimated coefficient switches signs or explodes in size and/or significance, these observations signal that 
there might be problem with the estimated result. Our main drive is to use OLS and TSLS are benchmarks 
for GMM results.  
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 Using the assumption of no correlation and multicollinearity .i.e. (i) 0ˆ =εX and (ii)
kXrank =)( , the OLS estimator is derived as follows: 
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                                                                 (3.11) 
The regression results from OLS estimator are consistent as long as the fundamental 
assumption for consistency is fulfilled i.e. .0][ =εXE For many regression results, this is 
not always the case, and thus an alternative estimator that is robust to the problem of 
endogeneity is necessary. Generally, the violation of ordinary least squares assumptions is 
occurs because the error term is related to regressors, or because the presence of 
heteroscedasticity all lead to an inconsistent and bias OLS estimator. In the presences of 
problem the OLS results are inefficient and valid inferences should be drawn taking into 
account the biasedness in the estimator. The problem of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation can be addressed through HAC-robust standard errors; and the endogeneity 
problem requires a different estimator that produces consistent and efficient point 
estimates.  
The first port of call to solve the problem of endogeneity is the so-called Instrument 
Variables methods (IV). Instruments variable methods provide consistent estimators under 
the strict condition that they exist and correlate with regressors in the model.  For this 
analysis we have used two IV estimators: Two Stage Least Square and Generalized 
Method of Moments estimators. Our choice is based on the fact that that these estimators 
are closely comparable to OLS estimator. 
TSLS or IV method is aimed at removing the dependency between endogenous 
explanatory variables and the error term. This endogeneity problem violates the OLS 
assumption of no correlation between explanatory variables and the error term. As a result, 
OLS coefficient estimates are inconsistent that is, the estimated parameters are not close to 
the true values of the regression even when the sample size increases. TSLS is applied to 
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isolate that part of X which is not dependent on the error in order to obtain consistent 
estimates. TSLS estimator is given by  
yXXXsls ˆ)ˆ(ˆ 12 −′=β                                                                                                (3.12) 
The difference between TSLS and OLS is that  Xˆ  is new matrix of regressors which is 
obtained by first stage regression of X on Z to obtain the fitted values of Xˆ . The matrix Z 
dim (z) is called the instrument variables set which helps to solve the classical problem of 
endogeneity in the least squares regression results.  The required conditions are that Z 
should satisfy: (i) orthogonality/validity conditions 0][ =εZE ; and, (ii) Relevance/rank 
condition i.e. ][ XZE ′  has a full rank. TSLS provides a most efficient estimator when the 
errors are independent and homoskedastic. Although TSLS estimates are consistent in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, the standard errors are inconsistent when these strict 
conditions are not fulfilled, thus pose a problem in making valid inferences. This problem 
can be addressed through heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard 
errors. As Hansen (2010) argue this solution is only possible if we know the exact form of 
heteroscedasticity, which we usually do not know. The GMM estimator deals with these 
problems.    
The GMM approach begins from the fact that some regressors in X are correlated 
with errors. In other words some of the regressors are endogenously determined hence; 
they do not stand for independent effects on dependent variable. Although this problem can 
be addressed with TSLS and other closely related IV estimators, there are some weakness 
within their formulation. For example, Green (2003) points out that the short comings of 
these estimators are that they require strong assumptions about the distribution and the data 
generating process. However, in the case of GMM estimator there is less information 
required about parametric assumptions such as the normality and data generating process.  
The criterion function of GMM estimator that solves βˆ  for β is given as follows:  
yZZWXXZZWXGMM ′′′′=
−1)(ˆβ ,                                                                         (3.13) 
Whereby W is a full-rank symmetric-weighting matrix. An important point to emphasize 
here is that there are different kinds of weights W and so, the results too are weight 
dependent. Cameron & Trived (2009) reveal that weights depend on data and on unknown 
parameters.  Unlike other IV estimators, the GMM estimator does not require the explicit 
specification of the likelihood function and probability distribution. This estimator fits our 
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estimation for the determinants of spreads because we do not have a specific theory to 
derive the likelihood function. Harris & Matyas (1998) point out that the main difference 
between  GMM estimator and other estimators lies in what must be specified of the model 
as in other estimators we begin with much less information about the data generating 
process. Although this has some advantages for estimation, it comes with some costs too. 
For example, Heij, De Boer, Franses, Kloek, & Van Dijk (2004) argue that assuming less 
information about the data generating process comes with loss of efficiency as compared to 
other estimators like the Maximum Likelihood estimator. Additionally, the GMM 
estimator can also perform poorly in finite samples. 
As Cameron & Trived (2009) point out, these IV estimators have the same starting 
point. IV estimators start with the so-called instrument variables (Z), the choice and 
evaluation of these instruments vary. After establishing the set of instruments, the next task 
is to evaluate statistically whether these instruments are good instruments. Good 
instrument should fulfil the following conditions: the relevance and validity conditions. 
There are three conditions required to implement TSLS and GMM methods which are: (i) 
there must be at least as many instruments as the number of parameters; this means that the 
dim (z) = dim (x) for a just identified case. When the dim (z) < dim (x) this under-
identified case means there are fewer instruments than the regressors. When the dim (z) > 
dim (x) this is the case where there are more instruments than the regressors. In (ii) and 
(iii) the instruments must be relevant and exogenous. The latter two conditions imply that 
the correlation between instruments and independent variables is not zero, while the 
correlation between the instruments and the error term must be equal to zero.  The common 
approach to select instruments is therefore to treat the predetermined and exogenous 
variables as instruments, and add lags of endogenous-independent variables to the list of 
instruments. This implies that the constant and dummy variables enter the set instrument 
variables by virtue that they are exogenous. To establish the validity of these instrument 
variables, we checked whether the value of criterion function in TSLS and GMM is 
positive. This value is given by the J-statistic and its associated p-value which indicates the 
significance level. This weighting matrix helps to ensure the positive definiteness of 
estimated co-variance matrix and the heteroscedasticity autocorrelation is consistent 
standard errors.122 
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3.2.3 Review of Empirical Studies about Determinants of Interest Rate Spreads 
The literature on the topic of ‘interest rate spread’ is extensive and most studies 
address the question of what the determinants of the interest rate spreads are. In many 
studies authors have shown that there are many determinants of interest rate spread. These 
determinants are either peculiar to a region or a country. For example, while some authors 
identified lending in dual currency as one of the cause of higher spreads in some of the 
Latin American countries; it is good to point out that this factor is not relevant in sub-
Saharan Africa. This is with exception to countries such as Angola and Zimbabwe where 
multiple currencies are still in operation. Hence, the underlying fundamental factors 
responsible may vary from country to country. The common thread is that higher 
intermediation spreads are a significant political and economic issue in the Latin American 
countries, the Caribbean, some Asian and the Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the main 
macroeconomic factors identified in the literature portray high economic risk profile of the 
country (persistent deficit and government debts), persistent high inflation volatility, and 
lack of financial depth and the use of multiple currencies for lending in the domestic 
economy. At micro-level many researchers identified micro factors such as overhead costs, 
abuse of market power through market concentration, and restrictive financial regulations. 
The common approach in the literature is to differentiate between macroeconomics, market 
structure variables, and bank-specific factors. For example, Crowley (2007), Beck & Hesse 
(2009), and Folawewo and Tennant (2008) argue that small developing countries tend to 
exhibit higher interest rate spreads in comparison  to large economies or economies with 
larger economies of scales.123 Therefore, these fundamentals are examined as time-varying 
macroeconomic factors which include economic growth, inflation and inflation volatility, 
the level of bank rate, interest rate and interest rate volatility. Other researchers investigate 
vectors of market structure and time-varying bank-specific factors together which 
generally include: the degree of market concentration, bank regulations, bank size, inter-
bank market liquidity, operation costs (e.g. overhead costs), taxes, and non-performing 
loans.  
Beck and Hesse (2009) examine the determinants of interest rate spreads and 
margins in Uganda. They used the fixed-effects panel data model to estimate determinants 
based on four broad-based views: risk based view, small financial system view, market 
structure view and macroeconomic view. The risk based view emphasizes the risk that 
banks take in extending loans and the compensation for ameliorating these risks that 
should be accounted for in the margins and spreads. The small financial system view 
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emphasizes the size of financial system. Beck and Hesse argue that smaller financial 
systems are not able to realize economies of scale and scope because of high fixed 
transaction costs and thus, they are prone to charge higher interest rate spreads. Another 
argument that supports the small financial system view is that, banks that operate in 
smaller financial systems with shallow financial markets are limited as to the number of 
financial products and services they can offer. This argument partially justifies why 
interest rate spreads are very high in the Caribbean nations.124 The third view is the market 
structure which emphasizes the degree of competition in the banking sector and the impact 
of foreign banks’ entry in the domestic banking sector. The proponents that support this 
view argue that higher interest rate spread is due to lack of competition, thus lower spread 
can be achieved by permitting foreign banks to participate in the domestic banking sector. 
On the other hand, the macroeconomic view emphasizes that interest rate spreads are 
driven by macroeconomic factors such as inflation, monetary and exchange rates policies. 
Hence, macroeconomic instability is the main source of higher interest rate spread. Beck 
and Hesse (2009) find that the size of the banking sector is relevant in explaining bank 
margins in Uganda. They conclude that the results for Uganda show that there is a 
relationship between higher interest rate spreads in smaller market place and the high cost 
of doing business. 
In this section, we will discuss empirical literature under five major determinants of 
interest rate spreads. These are: economic growth, competition, risk factors, institutional 
factors and other time varying bank-specific variables.  
Economic activity –the growth rate of real GDP 
Economic growth is one of the macroeconomic variables that are hypothesized as 
determinants of interest rate spreads. According to Antelo, Crespo, Cupe, Ramirez, and 
Requena (2000) assert that economic activity is an important macroeconomic variable, and 
its instability leads to high interest rates and consequently, interest rate spreads too. It 
means instability generates uncertainty which makes banks charge higher risk premium as 
a result of higher interest rate spreads. The theoretical expectation about expansion of 
economic activity or national income per se is that, it is positively related to the expansion 
of banks’ profits; this suggests that it is one of the determinants of interest rate spreads. As 
the economy grows, it raises peoples’ confidence and their future prospects which 
encourage financial institutions to increase lending at lower rates.  As deposit interest rates 
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are rarely decreased, lower lending rates reduce the size of the interest rate spreads in the 
economy. In addition, banks lower the lending rates because of good economic prospects, 
and as result, there will be low default rates and an increase in deposit rates to attract more 
income. However, we argue here that economic growth only matters when it generates 
enough bank deposits and raises banks’ confidence, which helps banks to lower the prime 
lending rate. Hence, if the rates at which new credit and deposits grow are lower than 
economic growth, many banks will keep their average prime lending rate higher. This 
implies that interest rate spread will remain higher too. Banking is a confidence business, 
thus economic growth can only make a significant impacts on spreads if it raises banks’ 
confidence to lend at lower rates. Furthermore Woodford and Curdia (2009) show that 
effects of changes in real income are ambiguous on interest rate spreads. 
Requena et al. (2000) also examined the determinants of interest rate spreads in 
Bolivia, after liberalization of the financial sector. Defining the spread as the difference 
between lending rate and deposit rate in their study, they observe the following results. 
Using random-effects and fixed-effects models with variable intercepts, their results show 
that macroeconomics variables such as money supply and fiscal deficit are positively 
related to interest rate spread and significant in explaining interest rate spread. Similarly, 
microeconomic factors such as capital adequacy and banks’ earnings also increase interest 
rate spread in Bolivia. They conclude that interest rate spread in Bolivia is better explained 
by macroeconomic factors such as monetary and fiscal policies; however, their conclusion 
is different from other studies that emphasize microeconomic factors. In a similar study, 
Basch and Fuentes (2000) explore the determinants of interest rate spreads in Chile and 
conclude that bench mark interest rate and inflation rate are the main determinants of her 
interest rate spreads. However, they find that the relationship between interest rate spread 
and monetary policy is bi-causal as the central bank impacts the interest rate spread, but 
also responds to interest rate with monetary policy.  
Competition 
Several studies indicate that the lack of competition in the banking sector in some 
countries is one of the main factors that cause higher interest rate spreads.125 Proponents of 
this view argue that the fewer the numbers of banks in the economy, the higher the 
likelihood that these banks will operate in a cartel-like form. Lack of competition may also 
occur when there are too many banks concentrated in one geographical area. Those who 
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seem to support high spread in a less competitive environment justify it on the following 
grounds. The argument is that fewer banks in large populated economies or large 
geographical areas operate with higher fixed, overhead and variable costs. Higher 
operation costs limit the products and financial services that banks can offer to generate 
revenues. Thus, banks in sparsely populated countries will charge higher interest rate 
spreads to cover additional costs.  
Analysis about the impact of competition in financial sector is examined by various 
authors using different models. The common hypothesis is that increase in the level of 
competition reduces inefficiency in the banking sector. On the one hand, some empirical 
studies argue that increase in the number of banks will help to improve level of efficiency 
and thereby reduce interest rate spreads in the banking sector. This position is supported by 
theoretical evidence particularly based on perfect competition models. According Rochet 
and Xavier (2008) perfect competition model whereby banks are price takers and quantity 
setters, this free competition will reduce interest spread. However, in this perfect 
competition model, they also show that free competition leads to too many banks in the 
economy.  
On the other hand, there are those who disagreed and identified contrary results 
which show that increasing competition in the banking sector does not improve interest 
rate spreads. Research evidence shows that increasing the population of banks does not 
always result in lower interest rate spreads but rather produces negative results such as low 
profit, unstable banking sector, and the increase in risk-taking activities by banks.126 For 
example, Ennew et al. (1995) pinpoint that, before increase in competition, banks’ profits 
are usually stable and secure, but after a new wave of competition, banks’ profits are 
reduced through pressure of competitive pricing. Thus, high competition affects the returns 
on assets for banks in equilibrium. Competition creates many banks with lower assets 
quality and weak balance sheets and eventually a fragile financial system. It may also 
reduce the profitability of banks as margins are kept small as many banks attempt to 
remain competitive to remain in business.  Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) argue that 
competition also affects relationship lending by making banks focus their lending only on 
captured borrowers. 127  On this basis Rochet and Xavier (2008) argue for a limited 
competition with restrictions on entry, branching, charting fees, and capital requirements.  
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Allen and Galle (2004) explore wide ranges of models of competition and financial 
stability. They produce mixed results about the effects of competition. It is mixed in the 
sense that models like the perfect competition support competition in banking sector. They 
argue that increasing the number of banks in the perfect competition model improves 
efficiency in that it lowers spread. Thus, if you believe in the perfect competitive model 
then you will support the view that competition may be good because it reduces the cost of 
intermediation in the economy. However, the results also indicate that there is some trade-
off between competition and financial stability. For example, they indicate that 
competition may generate financial instability as suggested by the result from other 
models. Beck (2008)  argues that competition and financial instability are positively related 
from the study of cross country empirical studies. This confirms the idea that competition 
can be harmful to the health of the financial system. He further reveals that the 
incompatibility between competition and financial stability is caused by financial 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Hence, Allen and Galle (2004) also 
conclude that bank competition can produce unwanted consequences such as excessive risk 
taking which increases financial instability.  
Podpiera, Weill, and Schobert (2007) investigates the relationship between 
competition and efficiency. These authors reject the hypothesis that bank competition 
increases or improves efficiency. The result shows that interest spreads may not narrow 
when we increase the number of banks in the domestic economy. The reason competition 
does not translate into lower interest rate spreads is because competition increases 
monitoring costs for banks hence increases in the cost of intermediation. Crowley (2007) 
examines factors that influence interest rate spread in the Caribbean countries. The results 
show that the size of the economy, size of the banking sector, and concentration measures 
do not considerably determine the interest rate spread.  In a related study, Demirguc-Kunt, 
Laeven, and Levine (2004) investigates the impacts of banks’ regulation and market 
structure on net bank margins and overhead costs. These authors find that tighter regulation 
on banks’ entry increases the interest rate spreads and other overhead costs of banking. In 
addition, they find that concentration as a measure of competition is positively related to 
interest rate spreads. These results support the fact that competition seems only to matter in 
some cases.  
However, there is a problem about the appropriate measure of competition. There 
are different measures of competition which make it difficult to conclude about the real 
effect of competition on interest rate spreads. Hence the result about the significance of 
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competition depends on the variable used to capture the influence of competition in the 
model. Favero (2002) examines the impacts of foreign banks’ participation on interest rate 
spreads and establish that foreign banks’ participation results in lower spreads as compared 
to domestic banks, but it is not clear whether this improves welfare gains in domestic 
economy. Foreign participation is not an entirely a welcome solution to the problem of 
large spreads when it makes the banking sector fragile through weak margins and thin 
profit for banks. Thus, it argued that foreign participation does not necessarily imply lower 
interest rate spreads but rather, a decline in overall cost in the banking system.  
Risk factors 
Requena et.al (2000) identify two types of risk that affect banking activity and 
interest rate spreads. These are market risk and systemic risk. The former consists of 
macroeconomic risks such as inflation and interest rate volatilities, fiscal deficit and 
country risk, which is the difference between domestic interest rate and foreign interest 
rate. The systemic risk in the banking system is expressed as the difference between short 
term interest rate and the deposit rate. They assert that deterioration of the country risk 
profile increases lending rates and the cost of intermediation and further creates uncertainty 
in loan transactions. In the same vein, Hossain (2012) and, Oreiro and de Paula (2010) also 
reveal that other major determinants of interest spread include the risk factors such as 
inflation, debts (public, private, and foreign), market risk, liquidity and credit default rate. 
These variables explain why interest spread is higher in countries such as Brazil, Argentina 
and Sub-Saharan Africa.128 The fact is that inflation rate increases risk premiums and this 
is because banks try to prevent loss of revenue from weaker currency value or as they 
revalue balance sheets. Mujeri and Yunus (2009) explore the factors that determine interest 
rate spread in Bangladesh with a sample of 48 banks over 2004-2008. They show that 
inflation as risk factor helps to explain interest rate spreads in Bangladesh. Mujeri and 
Yunus claim that Bangladesh has a long culture of default in the banking system; thus this 
unobserved factor contributes to the level of higher interest rate spread. Inflation factor is 
complemented by other factors such as operating cost and concentrated market share all of 
which; comprehensively explain spreads in Bangladesh.  
Other risk factors that significantly elucidate the interest rate spreads include the 
inflation and interest volatilities, exchange rate volatility and change in the risk aversion of 
banks or households. For instance, Classens et al. (2006) examine the issue of interest rate 
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spread in Brazil. This study addresses three main questions about the spread: why interest 
spread is so high, what the effects of high interest rate spread are, and what kind of policies 
should be implemented to reduce interest rate spread. Classens et al. (2006) study 
highlights, among others, the impacts of risk factors such as inflation volatility, interest 
default and leverage as main causes of higher interest spread. It also reveals that high 
interest rate (bank rate) is one of the main determinants of high interest rate spread in 
Brazil. Similarly, Beck and Hesse (2009) show that high treasury bills rate, inflation and 
exchange rate appreciation explain a large proportion of fluctuation in interest rate spreads 
and margins in Uganda. Other studies on Brazil, such as Aronomivch (1994) also indicate 
that inflation helps to explain the spread. This evidence justifies why inflation and interest 
rate volatilities should be included in the model that identify determinants of interest rate 
spread. Furthermore, Oreiro and de Paula (2010, p. 577) assert that “the greater the 
variation in the inflation and exchange rates, the greater the volatility in interest rate and as 
a consequence, the larger the spread.’  Beruments, Killinc, and Ozlale’s (2003) study 
identifies inflation rate as one of macroeconomic determinants of interest rate spread. This 
paper analyses how three types of inflation uncertainties affect interest rate spread in the 
UK. It defines interest rate spread as the difference between the overnight rate and lending 
rate, with the hypothesis that inflation uncertainty helps to explain the behaviour of interest 
rate spread. Their results show that inflation uncertainty increases interest rate spread while 
random shocks in inflation produce inconclusive results. Young (1996) argues that when 
there is a decline in the risk appetite of investors and bank managements, this may increase 
the cost of bank capital which raises the spread and thus lending falls.  This also implies 
that when bank institutions in the country are risk averse, this will translate into higher 
persistent interest rate spreads. 
Institutional Factors  
Many economists assert that institutional factors also play a major role in 
determining the interest rate spread.129 Non-regulation of deposits and credits and other 
law enforcement on debt recovery for banks increase the intermediation costs. It also 
includes binding constraints on balance sheet and tighter controls on external lending; 
these constraints often prompt banks to target optimal rates in order to increase returns on 
lending. Thus, it results in higher spread which reduces lending to households and 
businesses. The legal framework that enables customers to choose and change banks has a 
major role in influencing banks’ decisions on the interest rate spreads. For example, 
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Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) study provides empirical evidence which 
shows that tighter regulations on banks’ entry and bank activities raise interest rate spreads 
which, naturally increases the overall costs of intermediation.130 Hossain (2012) examines 
the interest rate spread in Bangladesh using a dynamic panel method of 43 banks over 
1990 -2008. Hossain’s study shows that high administrative costs, non-performing loans, 
and other macroeconomic factors are significant in explaining high persistent interest rate 
spread in Bangladesh. In addition, a large share of public debts to private loans shows 
public sector dominance in the credit market which may lead to crowding out through high 
interest rate spreads, because government offers good rates. However, regulation also has 
negative impacts on interest rate spread, because it limits the competition pressure which 
keeps the interest rates close to equilibrium in the competitive market. Siddiqui (2012) 
examines the issue of interest rate spread in Pakistan over a 2000- 2008 sample period. 
Using a panel data from 14 banks, he finds that overhead costs and non-performing loans 
are significant factors that explain interest rate spread in Pakistan.  
In all, the list of possible factors that influence interest rate spreads vary from one 
country to another and individual studies on the topic have used different methods too. 
However, there are common factors such as economic growth, inflation, perceived risk, 
volatility, nominal bank rate and micro level factors such as operation costs, competition, 
and regulations that should form part of independent variables. From these empirical 
literatures we found that many use single linear or a panel fixed effects model to examine 
the determinants of spreads. However, we did not find studies that account for endogenous 
structural breaks in the dependent variables. 
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3.3. Data, Estimation and Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics Analysis, and Unit root test with endogenous structural 
breaks 
This section discusses descriptive statistics and unit root of interest rate spreads and 
volatility as observed over the last two decades.131 We highlight some stylised facts on 
interest rate levels, examine any statistical correlation between interest rate spreads and 
unconditional volatility, and finally, determine the unit root with endogenous structural 
breaks. These initial summary statistics give the mean, range and the variation of spreads 
over the sample period. We also present the z-test on the hypothesis in regard to whether 
these average spreads were significantly different from zero over the sample period. To put 
our analysis into context we provide a brief summary about events that shaped the trends 
for interest rate and interest rate spreads over the last two decades. The summary statistics 
are presented in comparison with statistics in the Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU), 
with members consisting of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.132 
For the unit root test we provided results for ADF with and without structural breaks and 
graphical results for shift and impulse dummy in the first difference variables. 
Globally, interest rate levels have been falling across many countries. This overall 
decline is more pronounced in countries where restrictions on financial market rates have 
been removed after the waves of financial liberalisation. In the same vein, as shown in 
Figure 3.1, interest rates in Namibia have been falling too for the past two decades in many 
countries.133 Namibia’s repo rate closely but not exactly follows the SA (South Africa) 
repo rate. The difference between the two is given by the interest rate differential in Figure 
3.2. As shown in Figure 3.1 the movements of the prime lending rate follow the trend of 
the Namibia repo rate, which mimics SA’s repo rate. After independence, the policy rate 
(repo rate) trended above 10.0 percent and then remained below 10.0 percent from the year 
2000 onwards. Similarly, the prime lending rates, which indicate benchmark lending to 
prime customers in Namibia, have been falling but hardly went below 10.0 percent until 
April 2010. 
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 In the Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU), we have a common monetary area (CMA) which is made 
up of Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. The South African Rand is the anchor currency on 
which other members currencies are pegged one to one. 
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Figure 3-1 Interest Rates: Namibia Repo Rate, SA Repo Rate, Prime Lending Rate and 3-
Months Treasury Bills 1991 -2011. 
 
Higher interest rate levels in the first decade seen above reflect the climate of political 
instabilities and uncertainty that prevailed in Namibia and South Africa in the 1990s (see 
also the persistent volatility in figure 3.4). They also reflect a financially liberalised 
environment compared to the pre-independence era, where parallel systems operated.134 
The main factors that shaped the trend of interest rates include economic uncertainty that 
ensued after political independence in March 1990 in Namibia; the political uncertainty 
that prevailed within South Africa after the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 
February 1990; the eventual fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa in April 1994; the 
East Asia financial crisis in 1998 and the great financial crisis of 2008. In addition, there 
were economic and financial reforms too, such as Liquid Asset Requirements and 
Domestic Asset Requirements in 1995; and new institutions were introduced, which 
encompassed the introduction of the central bank (Bank of Namibia); the Namibia Stock 
Exchange 1992; the joining of the common monetary area (CMA), and the fixed exchange 
rate system with the new currency, the Namibia Dollar pegged to the South African Rand. 
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In all these important changes, Vollan (2000) reveals that liquid and domestic asset 
requirements helped the development of financial markets in Namibia. 
Figure 3-2 Interest Rate Spreads: Base spread, Retail Spread, Risk premium & Interest 
rate Differential 1991-2011. 
 
Notes: (1) Base spread is the difference between the Namibia repo rate (policy rate) and prime lending rates 
(the price at which most banks will lend to each other and to other prime institutions in the domestic 
economy). (2) Retail spread is the difference between average lending rate and average deposit rate. (3) Risk 
premium spread is the difference between prime lending rate and the three month Treasury Bills (risk-free 
rate). (4) Interest rate differential is difference between Namibia’s repo rate and South Africa’s repo rate. 
Although these new reforms and institutions may have contributed to the overall 
decline in interest rate levels and the volatilities, they did not reduce inefficiency, as 
indicated by the rise in interest spreads in the banking sector, as can be seen in Figure 3.2. 
While interest rate levels have been falling, as shown in Figure 3.1 above, in the base 
spread the difference between the repo and prime lending rates has been steadily widening 
from as small as 1.0 percent to as high as 6.0 percent with an average of 3.45 percent over 
the sample period. Base spread hovered around 4.75 percent level until late 2009, when a 
directive was given to all commercial banks to reduce their spreads by the end of 
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November 2009.135 The retail spread, which is the difference between average lending and 
average deposit rates, has been falling from as high as 10.0 percent annually to 6.0 percent 
average. Some other stylised facts about these two interest rate spreads are that they 
diverged in the 1990s; however, these series converged and tracked each other well over 
the last decade.  
Figure 3-4 Retail Spread, Risk premium & Unconditional Volatility 1992-2011 
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the trends of inflation and interest rate volatility, as they 
match the movements of retail spread and risk premium. As shown by ellipses 
superimposed on the graphs it is apparent that high volatility (as shown by inflation and 
interest rate volatilities) is associated with the persistently rising interest rate spreads. Of 
course, we understand that this relationship does not rule out that the reserve might be true 
until we examine the results from a multi-steps Granger causality test. For example, we see 
that the rising inflation volatility in the early 1990s and between 1998 and 1999 is 
associated with persistent rising retail spread and risk premium. We may deduce from 
these patterns that macroeconomic and financial instability conditions are linked to large 
                                                           
135
 A fall in interest spread from 4.75 to 3.75 came after the Bank of Namibia decided to intervene by 
ordering all commercial banks in Namibia to reduce the spread by November 2009. See the Bank of Namibia 
Directive in the Appendix. 
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spreads; therefore, stabilising these fundamentals is important for lower spreads in the long 
run. Hence, finally we used a scatter plot with linear graph fitted in order to illustrate the 
relationship between the unconditional volatility measures and spreads in Namibia. 
 
Figures 3-5 to 3-8 present the scatter plot of unconditional volatility measures against base and 
retail spreads. First, 3-5 and 3-6 show that there is a moderate positive relationship between base 
spread, retail spread and inflation volatility. These scatter plots also show that there are outliers 
possible that result in structural breaks over the sample period. The relationships seem to confirm 
that large spreads are positively related to real sector instability, as measured by unconditional 
inflation volatility. In figures 3-7 and 3-8 we show the scatter plot of the same base and retail 
spreads against interest rate volatility. Similarly, these relationships show a positive association 
between spreads and interest rate volatility. Although these scatter plots do not show one-to-one 
linear relationships, all fitted linear graphs have positive slopes and intercepts above zero. This 
results suggest that we priori expect a positive parameter to capture the moderate effects of 
volatility on spreads in the single equation model. Finally, we examined the strength of the 
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Figure 3-5 Scatter Plot Unconditional inflation Volatility vs Base Spread
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Figure 3.6 Scatter plot Unconditional Inflation Volatility vs Retail Spread
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relationships among variables both at level and first difference with the pair wise correlation 
coefficient. 
 
Table 3-1 below presents the pair-wise correlations between spreads and 
macroeconomic fundamentals realised in Namibia over the sample period. Firstly, 
correlations between base spread and inflation, interest differential M2/GDP, risk 
premium, and bank rate (repo rate) are statistically significant; however, the correlations 
with unconditional volatilities, although positive, are statistically insignificant. Similarly, 
the correlations of these macroeconomic fundamentals with retail spread are significant 
with the exception of unconditional interest rate volatility. In Table C.3-4 in the appendix 
we give the correlation statistics of the first difference of the same variables; however, the 
results show that some of the correlation statistics are weaker and statistically insignificant 
at first difference.  
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Figure 3.7 Scatter plot Unconditional Interest rate Volatility vs Base Spread
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Table 3-1 Pair-wise correlation statistics, sample 1992:01 – 2011:12 
 Inf Base 
sprd 
Retail 
sprd 
Int. 
Diff 
M2/ 
GDP 
GDP Risk 
pr. 
Vol. 
Inf. 
Vol. 
Int. 
Bank 
rate 
Inf. 1          
Base spr -0.50* 
(0.00) 
1         
Retail 
spr 
0.47* 
(0.00) 
-0.57* 
(0.00) 
1        
Int. Diff 0.33* 
(0.00) 
-0.89* 
(0.00) 
0.45* 
(0.00) 
1       
M2/GDP -0.29* 
(0.00) 
0.46* 
(0.00) 
-0.76* 
(0.00) 
-0.40* 
(0.00) 
1      
GDP -0.38* 
(0.00) 
0.66* 
(0.00) 
-0.87* 
(0.00) 
-0.58* 
(0.00) 
0.90* 
(0.00) 
1     
Risk pr. -0.006 
(0.91) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 
0.22* 
(0.00) 
-0.26* 
(0.00) 
-0.31* 
(0.00) 
-0.13* 
(0.04) 
1    
Vol. Inf. 0.07 
(0.27) 
0.62 
(0.33) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.13* 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.63) 
1   
Vol. Int. 0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.47) 
0.16* 
(0.01) 
-0.15* 
(0.00) 
-0.13* 
(0.04) 
-0.14* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.65) 
0.14* 
(0.02) 
1  
Bank 
rate 
0.59* 
(0.00) 
-0.64* 
(0.00) 
0.81* 
(0.00) 
0.49* 
(0.00) 
-0.75* 
(0.00) 
-0.86* 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.32* 
(0.00) 
1 
*indicates the 5% significance level. 
Table 3.2 on the following page displays a summary of descriptive and relative 
dispersion statistics for interest rate spreads in the SACU area. We present the mean, 
standard deviation, coefficient of variation and the z-statistic to evaluate the hypothesis 
about the mean over the sample period. The z-statistic in the last row is used to evaluate 
the hypothesis that the averages (!) of these spreads are equal to zero. A z-test is generally 
preferred when the sample is large enough, that is 	j > 30 . We set the hypothesis as 
follows: 
â&:	ä = 0                                                 â.: ä ≠ 0	. 
Our sample contains 251 observations; thus, the sampling distribution of the mean is 
approximately normal and we can use the sample standard deviation as an estimate of the 
population standard deviation. The z-value corresponding to the mean (!) is given by: 
å = U/æç¯ √Ã⁄ . 
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Meanwhile the coefficient of variation (cv) statistics shows the extent to which a variable 
varies about its mean (Lewis, 2012). This statistic is calculated as follows:  
<¡¼¼OpOjM	¡¼	V O MO¡j	(pV) = (êM jk k	kVO MO¡j ÷  j) × 100.  
Coefficient of variation statistics enables us to compare the relative dispersion and 
volatility of interest rate spreads among entities within the sample. Unlike the standard 
deviation, cv can be compared even when the entities in the sample have different means.  
Table 3-2 Relative Dispersions of Interest Rate Spreads among SACU Member’s states.136 
 Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa 
 
Base 
Spread 
Retail 
Spread 
Base 
Spread 
Retail 
Spread 
Base 
Spread 
Retail 
Spread 
Base 
Spread 
Retail 
Spread 
Mean  ì 1.27 7.87 1.04 9.42 3.53 6.60 3.36 4.41 
Maximum 2.38 10.34 6.50 15.00 6.00 9.77 4.50 6.50 
Minimum 0.00 5.00 -2.50 4.50 0.00 4.03 0.25 2.30 
Std. 
Deviation (í) 
0.45 1.03 1.49 2.50 1.62 1.61 0.38 0.86 
Coef. of 
Variation (îï) 
35.40 13.07 144.14 26.59 46.07 24.36 11.25 19.52 
z-statistic 44.76 121.3 10.99 59.59 34.3 65.02 140.8 81.15 
Source: Author’s own construction. The number of observations is 251.  
The summary of statistics in Table 3.2 shows that Namibia has the highest average 
base spread within the custom union. Over the sample period, base spread had a mean of 
3.53 percent and standard deviation of 1.62; and this is compared to South Africa with an 
average of 3.36 percent and standard deviation of 0.38. Among the SACU members, 
Lesotho had the lowest average interest rate spread of 1.04 percent and the standard 
deviation of 1.49. However, Lesotho also had a higher coefficient of variation, which is 
about 144.1 percent within the custom union. This higher coefficient of variation indicates 
that interest rate spreads in Lesotho were more volatile as compared to base spreads in 
other members of the custom union. If we use South Africa as the benchmark (on the basis 
that it is the largest economy in the custom union), the base spread in Lesotho was about 
                                                           
136
 This comparison here is only restricted to the members of the Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU) and 
Common Monetary Area (CMA). SACU members consist of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland; and the CMA members are: Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. The South African 
Rand is a legal tender in the all the member of CMA and it is pegged one on one. The statistics for Swaziland 
are excluded from the Table 3-1 because of incomplete data for interest rates. 
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thirteen times more volatile than the interest rate spread in South Africa. Namibia had 
average interest rate spreads about four times more volatile than the interest rate spreads in 
South Africa. The main points from this statistics are that base and retail spreads were very 
high in Namibia.  
Second, the average mean for spreads is not zero across the custom union. Apart 
from this mere observation, we tested the hypothesis that average spread is equal to zero. 
Although these differences exist, it is possible that statistically they are actually not 
significantly different from zero. As can be seen from the table, the z-statistics are greater 
than ±1.96	critical values, which imply that we reject the null in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis. In addition, Figure 3.3 seems to suggest that intermediation spreads always 
exist and gravitate around a mean above zero. The short-term persistence in the crises 
period might be due to panic, the fear factor and market sentiments (De Grauwe & Ji, 
2013). However, in the long run, spreads are tied to prevailing macroeconomic 
fundamentals in the country. After establishing these stylised facts, we examine the unit 
root process in the spreads and variables used in this study.  
3.3.2 Unit root test under structural changes 
Lastly, before we estimate the relationship between changes in spreads and the 
proposed determinants we examined two important issues: the unit root process and 
endogenous structural breaks in variables of interest for this estimation. Our primary focus 
in this section is the two dependent variables: the base spread and the retail spread. It is 
well acknowledged in applied research that the presence of unit root and structural breaks 
in the data generating process influences the decision about the method that needs to be 
used for estimation and the treatment of variables before estimation. In Figure 3.2 we 
showed that spreads and macroeconomic fundamental variables exhibited some forms of 
structural shifts over the sample period. Therefore, first we determined the order of 
integration of each variable through the ADF test, and further examined whether this order 
was affected by the presence of structural breaks in the time series. Harris and Sollis 
(2003), and Andrew and Zivot (1992) assert that it is common that most macroeconomic 
variables possess unit root and structural breaks. Generally, structural breaks emanate from 
changes in government policies, changes in the definition of variables and improvement of 
statistical methods collection and the compilation of data. Furthermore, some structural 
breaks are created by economic and political shocks, e.g. oil shock, economic and financial 
crises. Thus, it is important first to determine whether there is a unit root process and 
structural breaks in each variable so that we can avoid spurious regression and inconsistent 
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results from biased parameters. Specifically, the presence of structural breaks distorts the 
performance of pre-estimation tests such as AIC, BIC and ADF. For example, (Perron & 
Phillips, 1988) reveals that most macroeconomics time series suffer from structural breaks 
and this allows a unit root test to conclude that these variables have a unit root even when 
this is not the case. 
Since the first generation test for a unit root process was used Dicky and Fuller 
(1979), many researchers have recognized the weaknesses of using an Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test that does not account for structural breaks in the data generating process.137 
When a time series has one or a multiplicity of structural breaks the ADF test is biased and 
thus tends to accept that there is unit root process even when this is not the case. This 
means that the results from ADF imply that a time series variable is of integrated order one 
I(1) or higher while in actual fact the time series in question is a stationary process on two 
sub-samples around the structural break. It is therefore an important to use unit root test 
which allows structural breaks because it influences the first treatment of variables before 
regression and the choice of method for estimating the regression. The outcome of whether 
a particular variable possesses a unit root with structural break has a bearing on how such 
variable is estimated and analysed. Investigating structural breaks in a time series often 
takes several methods. For example, the following three modes of dummy variables are 
used to examine the form of structural changes exhibited by the time series understudy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
137
 (Baum, 2005, p. 54) revealed that the weakness of the Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root test with I(1) as a 
null hypothesis is its potential confusion of structural breaks in the time series as evidence of being non-
stationary. 
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Figure 3.9 below illustrates the varying effects of structural breaks represented impulse and 
shift dummy variables in unit root process and in a stationary process. 
 
First, in Figure 3.9 (a) and (b) we see the effects of a single pulse dummy variable 
in a unit root process and in a stationary process. The effects of single pulse dummy in a 
unit root process is that the mean jumps to a new value higher and never exhibits a 
tendency to return to the initial level before the break. The structural break as represented 
by the shift dummy will therefore have permanent effects on the level with a unit root 
process. However, if the structural break in a form of single pulse dummy occurs in a 
stationary process, this will generate a peak at the break date and thereafter converge on 
the level observed before the structural break. As shown in Figure 3.9 (b) this implies that 
the structural break (single pulse dummy) only has transitional effects on the data 
generating process.  
The second form of the dummy variable analysed is that of the shift dummy (or 
level dummy) with the impact on the mean and slope of DGP. This is shown in Figure 
3.9(c). The effects of the shift dummy on the data generating process with a unit root 
process is that it changes the slope from the break date without any tendency of this slope 
to return to a pre-break slope. This means that the structural break has permanent effects on 
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the slope of the unit root process. In chapter two we observed these patterns in some of the 
time series in Namibia in response to the 1998 East Asia financial crisis and the global 
financial crisis in 2008-2010. The former crises seemed to have a pulse or temporary 
effects on Namibia’s economy while the later global crisis had persistent and long-term 
effects on Namibia. Hence, the 1998 financial crisis can possibly be captured by a pulse 
dummy while the global financial crisis can be captured by a shift dummy variable. The 
effects of a level shift dummy in a stationary process changes the level of the data 
generating process without changing the slopes; hence, it has a permanent shift without a 
change in the slope of the variable understudy.  
Finally, the third mode of structural breaks is captured by the trend dummy 
variable. This changes the slope of the deterministic trend line in both stationary and unit 
root data generating processes. Applying this to the group of variables in our study we 
observed that most of them do not show upward or downward trends. This was done with 
the exception to the retail spread, base spread and interest rate differentials. Hence, the unit 
root test with the endogenous structural breaks we estimated concentrated on the test 
concerning one change in the level (intercept), and on a change in the slope.  
3.3.2.1 Unit root test results allowing endogenous structural break 
This section presents the results of the unit root test with one endogenous structural 
break in the intercept. We used the procedure of Lanne, Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2002) 
to determine the break dates instead imposing the break date ourselves. A unit root with an 
endogenous structural break is preferred to an exogenous break because it allows only 
those dates that are the most significant structural changes in the data generating process to 
be examined. Furthermore, an endogenous structural break is preferred because not all 
economic events produce significant structural breaks in a time series. For example Afandi 
(2005) observed that an economic shock that was deemed to have caused structural 
changes in many time series were found indeed to be statistically insignificant; therefore, 
imposing a structural break just because an event that occurred at that period might be 
statistically wrong. Thus, it is procedurally recommended to let the algorithm searches 
identify the most significant structural breaks and then test for a unit root process with 
these endogenous structural breaks included.  
Lanne, Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2002) suggest that a unit root test for processes 
with level or impulse shifts is designed to test a model given (in 3.14) below. Lanne, 
Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2002) used a shift function ¼(Z), which is added to the data 
generating process as follows: 
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  = ä& + ä.M + ¼(Z) + E                                                                                       (3.14), 
whereby θ and γ are unknown parameters and the E is the errors generated by an AR(p) 
process. The shift function with date shift date ñ in DGP is defined as follows: 
¼. = k. = ò0, M < ñ1, M ≥ ñ ô                                                                                                 (3.15) 
The γ parameter in ¼(Z) is a scale parameter such that when we differenced the DGP 
this shift function will lead to an impulse dummy. One weakness with Lanne, Saikkonen 
and Lutkepohl’s (2002) unit root test for structural changes is that it does not deal with a 
multicity of breaks in the DGP. This problem of many structural breaks can be assessed 
with (Andrew & Zivot, 1992) test for unit root process with multiple structural breaks. 
Results 
For the sake of space we only provide and discuss the t-statistics and graph results 
for the shift level dummy and the impulse dummy after differencing most variables used in 
this study. Tables 3-3 and 3-4 and figures 3-9 to 3-12 show the results of the unit root test 
with structural breaks. Firstly, the following variables of base spread, retail spread, risk 
premium, interest differential, repo rate, SA base spread, prime rate and M2/GDP fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of the unit root process with a structural break at a 5% 
significance level. Inflation, GDP growth rate and unconditional volatility measures all 
reject the unit process with a structural endogenous structural break. Specifically, all 
spreads exhibit the presence of unit roots even after accounting for structural breaks in the 
data generating process. In comparing the results with unit test without a structural break 
the results indicate a similar pattern with an exception for inflation, which suggests that the 
order of integration seems to depend on the presence of a structural break. An ADF test 
without a structural break shows that inflation has a unit root process while the later test 
rejects the unit root process in inflation. These results show that the degree of integration 
of spreads in Namibia is not affected by the presence of structural breaks within the time 
series. Next, we differenced the variables and test for the unit root process with a structural 
break represented by an impulse dummy. 
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Table 3-3 Unit root test allowing endogenous structural break (shift dummy) 
Variable t-statistic Crit.-value 5% Break date Sample range 
Base spread -1.08 -3.03 1995 M05 232 
Retail spread -1.62 -2.88 2001 M06 232 
Risk premium -2.34 -2.88 1998 M06 232 
Inflation -4.04* -2.88 1994 M04 232 
Interest Diff. -2.34 -3.03 1998 M06 232 
∆GDP -7.66* -2.88 2001 M01 232 
Repo rate -2.57 -3.03 1998 M07 232 
SA spread -2.30 -3.03 1998 M05 232 
Vol. inflation -5.31* -2.88 1993 M03 232 
Vol. interest rate -3.50* -2.88 1996 M06 232 
Prime rate -1.21 -2.88 1998 M07 232 
M2/GDP -2.78 -2.88 12009 M04 232 
*Critical values are for the Andrew & Zivot test with a 5% significance level. ADF test results without a 
structural break are given in Appendix C.2-2. In addition, the unit root test with a shift dummy and trend is 
given in Table C.3-5 in Appendix C.2-2.  
Table 3-4 presents the unit root test with one structural break represented by an impulse 
dummy. When we difference the shift dummy this leads to an impulse dummy; thus, our 
results in Table 3-4 unit root with an endogenous break represented by an impulse dummy. 
Take note, we did not take first difference for the variables that were in Table 3-3, thus 
there is no difference results whether we use shift dummy or impulse dummy. As opposite 
to earlier results, the result of the unit root test with structural breaks for first difference 
variables indicates that all variables now reject the unit root process at first difference.  
As shown in Table 3-3 and 3-4, and figures 3-9 to 3-12, the most significant 
structural breaks in spreads were observed at 1998M05, 1998M06 and 1998M07. In 
addition, the most significant structural changes occurred between 1997M04 and 
1998M09. IMF staff (IMF, 1998) revealed that the effects of the East Asia financial crisis 
during this period was exacerbated by the resignation of Indonesia’s prime minister and by 
a fall of the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rates and equity prices by more than 40 percent 
of the index value.138  
 
 
 
                                                           
138
 See also Fischer (1998) 
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Table 3-4 Unit root test allowing endogenous structural break (impulse dummy variable) 
Variable t-statistic Crit.-value 5% Break date Sample range 
∆Base spread     
∆Retail spread -7.35* -2.88 2001 M01 232 
∆Risk premium -6.72* -2.88 1998 M06 232 
Inflation -4.04* -3.03 1998 M04 232 
∆Interest Diff. -4.14* -2.88 1998 M06 232 
∆GDP -7.66* -2.88 2004 M01 232 
∆Repo rate -6.18* -.2.88 1998 M09 232 
∆SA spread -9.26* -2.88 1998 M06 232 
∆Vol. inflation -8.25* -2.88 1993 M03 232 
∆Vol. interest rate -7.06* -2.88 1998 M08 232 
∆Prime rate -5.10* -2.88 1998 M08 232 
∆M2/GDP -6.87* -2.88 2009 M04 232 
 
Furthermore, we find that the coefficient estimates of the shift function in equation (3.14) 
are statistically significant. In figures 3.10 and 3.11 the shift dummy is represented by a 
vertical line while in figures 3.12 and 3.13 the impulse dummy function is represented by a 
spike at the break dates. 
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Figure 3-10 Unit Root test with endogenous structural break: Base spread (Nabsprd) with 
shift dummy variable 
 
Figure 3-11 Unit Root test with endogenous structural break: Retail spread (Narsprd) with 
shift dummy variable 
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Figure 3-12 Unit Root test with endogenous structural break: ∆base spread (Nabsprd_d1) 
with impulse dummy variable 
 
Figure 3-13 Unit Root test with endogenous structural break: ∆retail spread (Narsprd_d1) 
with impulse dummy variable 
 
The results of the unit test with an endogenous structural break have the following 
implication on our model of determinants of spread in Namibia. Since our main variables 
of interest, which are the base and retail spreads, exhibit a unit root process even when we 
accounted for an endogenously determined structural break, this influenced our 
methodology of estimation in the following ways. First, this result implies that our single 
equation (3.8) will be estimated with all variables in the first difference and will include 
impulse dummies instead of a shift dummy to capture the effects of the endogenous 
structural break in the data. Inflation and other variables that are stationary with structural 
breaks will enter the regression model without differencing them. Secondly, these results 
imply that the smooth transition regressions are out of the question because the dependent 
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variables exhibit a unit root process in both sub-samples. Although STAR and LSTAR 
models are able to address the transition function in the time series and structural break 
issue, these models will also suffer from non-stationary problems.139 In addition, the first 
differenced variables show weaker correlations among themselves, thus we opt for a GMM 
estimator, which is a less restrictive regime than other non-linear models. Therefore, we 
estimate the model with OLS, TSLS and GMM and account for endogenous structural 
breaks by using impulse pulse dummies, as identified by the unit root test in this section.  
3.3.3 Methods of estimation  
This sub-section presents the specification we used to estimate the determinants of 
interest spreads using macroeconomics and financial variables.140 A macroeconomic view 
emphasises the role of macroeconomic stability and financial fundamentals in the 
determination of interest rate spreads. Our methods of analysis are motivated by the 
discussion about theoretical models in the literature review sub-section 3.2.2. Groth (2012) 
and Classens et al. (2006) suggest an implicit function which relates spreads to 
macroeconomic factors. In addition, Gertler, Hubbard and Kashyap (1991) and Birchwood 
Birchwood’s (2004) empirical models serve as guides to our linear regression model and 
are used to estimate potential determinants of interest rate spread. To take into account the 
unit root and structural breaks observed in the last section we used the likelihood function 
given in equation (3.8) According to Woodford (2010), the total changes in spread in 
equilibrium are determined by changes in income, perceived risk and other fundamental 
factors. 
In this empirical analysis we used two ex-ante definitions of changes in interest rate 
spreads: base spread and retail spread. Firstly, we explain the rationale for the 
macroeconomics view in regard to the determination of interest rate spreads. This is 
followed by a brief discussion about three methods of a moment’s estimators: Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) and Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM). We chose these methods to estimate the two linear equations, as 
specified in (3.2). Advantages in using these linear estimators are that they can 
accommodate the contemporaneous interaction between the dependent and independent 
variables. In addition, results from these methods are easy to compare against each other. 
                                                           
139
 Of course, STAR models might be appropriate to model a single equation model but this is possible when 
the dependent variable exhibits regime shifts and a stationary process over the sub-samples. However, we 
found that this was not the case with spreads. 
140
 There is a significant sample size, with over 200 monthly observations available for some macroeconomic 
and financial variables. Data was collected from the Namibia Statistics Agency and The Bank of Namibia’s 
databases and publications. 
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For example, we can check consistencies about the signs and size of the parameters across 
the three methods. Estimation techniques through OLS to GMM represent the approach 
from a restrictive regime to a more generalised method. Lastly, we discuss the results and 
the implications of the overall determinants of interest rate spreads in Namibia.  
Do macroeconomic and financial variables play a role in the determination of the 
size of interest rate spread? Curdia and Woodford (2010), De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and the 
note by Groth (2012) illustrate that there are valid theoretical arguments that suggest that 
interest rate spread is a consequence of macroeconomic and financial conditions in the 
economy. Specifically Groth (2012) identified the implicit function which links interest 
spread to income, inflation expectation and interest rate level.  
Another example is the empirical works by Beck and Hesse (2009), Classens et al. 
(2006) and Oreiro and de Paula (2010). These authors emphasise the importance of 
macroeconomic stability in determining interest rate spreads in the economy. For example, 
Beck and Hesse (2009) purport that interest rate spreads are influenced by economic cycles 
and macroeconomic policy such as monetary and exchange rate policy.141 In the case of 
monetary policy, these include the level of nominal interest rate, the reserve requirement 
and the risk free rate (which can be regarded as the marginal cost of lending) as candidates 
that determine interest rate spread. These results concur with the latest IS-LM, which tries 
to link macroeconomic with financial intermediation, as exposed by Woodford (2010) and 
Groth (2012)  
In our model specification we considered mostly macroeconomics and financial 
variables that are closely relevant as influences on interest rate spread, as suggested in the 
literature and the data in Namibia. As suggested in implicit function by Groth (2012), and 
the Classens et al. (2006) empirical model, we formulated two dynamic linear models that 
include both macroeconomic and financial variables. For example, we assume that changes 
in interest rate levels, interest rate volatility and inflation volatility are positively related to 
the size of the spread (see figure 3-4). As in Classens et al. (2006), the interest rate level 
represents the average cost of originating the loan, while higher volatility indicates the 
degree of uncertainty which increases the marginal cost of lending. Generally, the two 
volatility indicators capture and summarise the influence of macroeconomic and financial 
instability factors, including those factors that have been omitted. Additional important 
factors are the interest rate differential between Namibia and South Africa and the real 
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 See also Gertler, Hubbard and Kashyap (1991). 
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effective exchange rate. Interest differential illustrates the link between Namibia and South 
Africa’s financial sector. It therefore reflects the financial link between the two countries 
or foreign premium risk. In our model, this term will capture the ‘catch-up effects’ or 
correction between domestic spread and South Africa’s interest rate spread. The two 
interest rates are linked through fixed exchange rate arrangements. For example, if 
domestic interest rate is lower in comparison to South Africa (or world interest rate) in the 
current period, then in the next period local banks will raise the interest rate to catch up 
with their foreign counterparts.  
Furthermore, the retail spread model includes changes in the risk premium. This 
premium is defined as the difference between prime and short-term interest rates. 142 
Theoretically, it is assumed that the higher the credit defaults, the more banks will charge 
higher premiums, which then translate into higher interest rate spreads. 143  Therefore, 
financial institutions will regularly change the premium to reflect the perceived risk of 
lending at the prevailing economic conditions. This variable therefore captures the changes 
in the perceived riskiness of lending. Finally, the two unconditional volatilities capture the 
direct impact of uncertainty from financial market change either in response to commodity 
or financial shocks. We define the measures of unconditional volatility using Evans’ 
(1984) volatility measures. First, for unconditional interest rate and inflation volatility, we 
use three months of Treasury Bills and the monthly Namibia Consumer Price Index 
(NCPI). This is calculated as follows: 
2
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i
itt TBTBSRTB                                             (3.16), 
 whereby tTB∆  changes in the short-term rate in month i of year t, and 
−−−
∆ tTB  is the average 
monthly change in year t. Similarly, unconditional inflation volatility is derived using the 
same volatility measure.144 The greater the volatility in the inflation and interest rate is, the 
higher the spreads charged by financial intermediaries will be.  
Next we take into account the long-term influences of economic activity and 
economic cycles that might not be captured directly by the two measures of volatilities. 
One of these factors is the rate of economic growth or changes in total income influences 
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 Others studies define risk premium as a difference between 10 year government bonds and AAA 
corporate bonds.  
143
 Real effective exchange rate reflects the importance of current and capital and financial accounts, which 
therefore control for effects from the external sector on interest rate spread. However this was statistically 
insignificant. 
144
 Evans’ volatility measure can also be found in McMillin (1986) and Tatom (1985). 
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on interest rate dynamic behaviours. Firstly, we used the Denton method to transform the 
quarterly real GDP in to monthly observations. Quarterly GDP at high frequency was used 
as measure of economic activity in the absence of a Producer Price Index (PPI) in Namibia. 
Secondly, important factors are endogenous structural breaks identified with a unit root in 
the pre-estimation analysis. We take into account an endogenous break date of 1998M06 
suggested by the unit root with a structural breaks test in section (3.3.2). These are now 
impulse dummies because of the first difference in the dependent variables. The dummies 
takes the value 1 for tb =t and 0 elsewhere. Post-estimation dummies include shift dummies 
that aimed to address structural breaks in parameters after examining the residuals and the 
graph for individual parameters in the preferred regression. This is necessary especially 
when the impulse dummy is insignificant while there is evidence of structural breaks in the 
results. Finally, we considered the lags of dependent variables so as to capture the 
persistence as a result of the long memory observed in most time series variables. We 
believe that long memory in spreads is justified by the fact that central banks smooth the 
monetary policy rate while the policy reaction functions to facilitate and is moved from the 
current target to a desired target. Private credit/GDP ratio was excluded because private 
credit definitions changed a lot over the sampled period while the series for non-
performing loans, reserve requirements and HHI form bank level were very short for these 
modelling exercises. Although it was possible to increase the frequency of QGDP to 
monthly frequency, we point out that this procedure was not applicable to non-performing 
loans, reserve requirements and HHI. This is because the annual sample of 2005 to 2010 
does not completely overlap with the monthly observations sample, which starts from 
1992M1 to 2013M12.   
3.3.3.1 Empirical linear economic models 
Birchwood (2004), Fuentes (2000), Brock and Franken (2002) and Classens et al. 
(2006) already revealed that there are significant disagreements on the appropriate method 
to model interest rate spreads. Therefore, with these challenges in mind, in this analysis we 
used the likelihood function in equation (3.8). This is based on implicit function suggested 
by Groth (2012), and the transformation of Classens et al.’s (2006) regression model. 
Groth’s (2012) implicit function shows that in equilibrium changes an interest rate spread 
is a function of changes in income, liquidity, perceived riskiness of borrowers and other 
macroeconomic factors that influence the supply and demand of financial intermediary in 
the long-term. So, we specify that changes in interest spread in equilibrium are linear 
functions of changes in the benchmark interest rate (marginal cost), risk premium, 
volatilities, the adjustment term (catch-up-effect term) and other control variables that 
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affect the bank balance sheets over business cycles. In addition, we regressed these factors 
against two definitions of spreads to take into account the disagreements about the correct 
definition of interest rate spreads.145 The two single equations are specified as follows: 
∆> 	êrk = (& + (.­j¼~ MO¡j + (¦∆> j¢	 M + (´∆> 	rk/. + (µ­jM. ¤O¼¼/. +e¶»kr/. + (·∆2/»kr/. + (õ∆öO¢	r + (÷∆ê£	rk	/. +(ø)j. ¡~ MO~OM+(.&¤1998 + E                                                                                (3.17)                 
∆öM O~	êrk =e& + e.­j¼~ MO¡j + e¦∆> j¢	 M + e´∆)j. ¡~ MO~OM/. + eµ∆M O~	rk/. +e¶»kr/. + e·∆2/ù¤/. + eõ∆öO¢ + e÷¤1998	 + (ø­jM. ¤O¼¼/. + e.&∆ê£	rk/. +V                                                                                                                                     (3.18) 
Equation (3.17) shows the changes in the base spread as the dependent variable 
with inflation, changes in the bank rate, the lag of base spread, interest rate differential, 
QGDP growth rate, M2/GDP ratio, risk premium, the lag of South African base spread, 
unconditional inflation volatility and the structural break represented by an impulse 
dummy as an independent variable. Meanwhile equation (3.18) shows that the retail spread 
is the dependent variable with the inflation, bank rate, unconditional interest rate volatility, 
retail spread lag, QGDP growth rate, M2/GDP, risk premium, the lag of South African 
base spread, interest rate differential, and the structural break dummy as an independent 
variable. Inflation captures the effects of inflation risk on asset values as a financial 
intermediary and takes into account this factor in spread margins, while the bank rate 
captures the consequence of the monetary policy rate actions by adjusting the repo rate. 
Unconditional volatilities measures the effects of uncertainty and changes in the macro and 
financial fundamentals as argued by (De Grauwe & Ji, 2013) and (Beck & Hesse, 2009). 
The changes in the risk premium control the perceived riskiness of lending at the 
prevailing economic conditions with deteriorating government, household and business 
balance sheets. Interest rate differential is a correctional variable that keeps the spread level 
cointegrated while M2/GDP ratio captures the effects of financial depth. We make a 
distinction between the risk premium and interest differential as follows: a risk premium 
captures the marginal impact of the difference between risk free rate and prime rate 
charged by financial intermediaries on interest rate spread. This premium spread shows the 
private sector’s level of confidence in the government’s securities and its ability to fulfil 
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 A similar approach is applied in (Barajas, Salazar, & Stiener, 2000). Using changes rather than level of 
spreads as a dependent variable conveniently helps to eliminate the unit root and the shift dummies for 
different trends and therefore only applies the impulse dummy to control for the identified structural breaks 
in the dependent variables. 
P a g e  | 167 
 
short and long-term contracts. Lower confidence induces private institutions to charge 
higher premiums on credit, which translates into a large retail spread. 146  Interest rate 
differential is the difference between Namibia and South Africa’s interest rates. This 
difference forces interest rates between the two countries to co-integrate because of the 
fixed exchange rate arrangement. This term is lagged to indicate the speed of adjustment to 
catching up with the counterpart average spread in South Africa.147 Interest differential is 
given by the [Namibia repo rate(t-1) –SA repo rate(t-1)], which implies that if the difference 
in the last period was negative, in the current period the base spread will increase to catch 
up with the counterpart so that they will remain in equilibrium. It is also a forcing variable 
as it forces the interest spread to return to the equilibrium path with its counterpart when 
the Namibian base spread is hit by exogenous shock.  
Further, M2/GDP ratio controls for any economic cycles in spreads. We assumed 
that this variable was associated with lower interest rate spreads; however, the sign on 
M2/GDP ratio and the quarterly growth rate may be uncertain because the cycles of M2 
and GDP do not necessarily coincide. Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Groth (2012) 
showed that the effects of real GDP on spreads can be ambiguous. In other studies, such as 
Honohan’s (2001), the current interest rate differential was used as indicator for political 
risk from the foreign investors’ perspective. 
Given that we have already discussed the relationship between macroeconomic 
variables and spreads above; in this section we give explanations for the priori expectation 
about the signs between the dependent and independent variables the two linear equations. 
Firstly, the constants (& and e& give the conditional mean of changes spread, which should 
be close to zero in the complete perfect competitive market case.148 For reasons already 
discussed, these coefficients of β1, β2, β3, β7, β8 and β9 are expected to be positive while β4 
β5 and β6 are priori expected to be negative. Similarly, the following coefficients of e. e¦ e´ eµ	eõ	 jk	e.& are priori expected to be positive while e¶, e·,  jk	eøare expected to be 
negative. Interest rate differential coefficients capture the correcting effects in the model 
that keep the dynamic model integrated with South Africa’s financial sector.  
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 We assumed that the prime rate takes into account risks such as default, taxation, liquidity, currency and 
political risk. Thus, in the event of declining confidence, private lenders anticipate that these risks will rise, 
therefore translating into higher prime rate, large risk premium and retail spread too. 
147
 Honohan (2001, p. 79) in his model called this a ‘catch-up effect’. We can also assume that it captures the 
perceived riskiness of investing in Namibia by foreign investors. Some researchers have used the difference 
between domestic and foreign interest rates as a measure for a country’s risk profile. 
148
 If banks have the same level of technology, the constant can also be considered as the average marginal 
cost of extending extra loans.  
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Some variables enter the models as lags to take into account the time effects on the 
spreads. For example, the current interest rate difference is only relevant to the next period 
spread while the lags of dependent variables in each equation are motivated by the fact that 
macroeconomic variables are sluggish in nature while others have a long memory. The 
validity of these assumptions will be examined through a Correlogram test for 
autocorrelation, partial autocorrelation and the redundant variable tests. In order to arrive at 
the preferred results, we use the strategy of moving from general to specific to arrive at the 
preferred results. This means that we started with an over-parameterised model and 
continued to drop off the insignificant variables to arrive at the representative results.  
3.3.3.2 Empirical results 
In this section we present the results of the two linear models in (3.17) and (3.18) as 
estimated with OLS, TSLS and GMM methods. The sample starts from 1992:01-2011:12, 
which makes 239 monthly observations. All results were estimated with robust standard 
errors through a HAC-Newey-West covariance weighting matrix – this is a 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator. Our procedure starts by 
estimating the linear models as given by the two equations. We then evaluate the quality of 
results from these specifications through different dimensions: functional form, dynamic 
structure (lags), the stability of coefficients in each linear model and finally arrive at the 
results reported in tables 3-2 and 3-3. Specifically, we evaluate the regression results with a 
redundant test to determine individually and jointly whether insignificant variables in the 
regression are redundant. This is followed by the omitted variable test, which evaluates 
individually and jointly whether some of the variables removed through the redundant test 
or those that we deemed to be part of the regression model are omitted from the final 
results. At the end we provided the summary discussion of the coefficient, residuals and 
stability diagnostic tests for the final results. 
First, Table 3-2 presents OLS, TSLS and GMM results using the changes in the base 
spread as the dependent variable of equation (3.11). Table 3-3 shows OLS, 2SLS and 
GMM results using the changes in the retail spread as the dependent variables in equation 
(3.12). Each column shows coefficient estimates from three methods: OLS, TSLS and 
GMM. Meanwhile, the results of some of the specifications and diagnostic tests and the list 
of instruments are listed in the rows below.149 
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 Other regression results that contain other determinants such as unconditional interest volatility and others 
variables listed in the linear models specification are not reported here.  
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Table 3-2 OLS, 2SLS and GMM Coefficient Estimates of Macroeconomic Determinants 
of the Base Spread (dependent variable –∆base spread) 
Independent variables OLS 2SLS GMM 
Constant 0.04 0.03 0.05 
 (1.43) (0.53) (0.47) 
Inflationt -0.03 
(-1.67)* 
-0.08 
(-2.00) 
-0.07 
(-2.38) 
∆Bank Ratet  8.01 
(5.63) 
7.16 
(3.86) 
6.52 
(4.73) 
∆Base Spreadt-1 -0.22 
(-2.19) 
-0.21 
(-2.78) 
-0.19 
(-3.31) 
Interest Differentialt-1  -0.08 
(-1.19) 
-0.10 
(-1.34) 
-0.04 
(-0.69) 
∆South African Interest Spreadt-1  -0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.00 
(-0.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.40) 
∆M2/GDPt-1 -0.38 -0.44 -0.47 
 (-3.76) (-3.84) (-4.52) 
∆Risk premium  0.40 0.38 -0.58 
 (6.32) (4.93) (-3.08) 
Impulse Dummy(1998M06) -0.06 -0.13 0.17 
 (-1.77)* (-0.80) (1.01) 
2007-08-09 Fin. Crisis Dummy 0.34 -0.16  
 (2.52) (-0.34)  
Adjusted R-Square 0.32 ... ... 
S.E. of Regression 0.29 0.31 0.32 
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Instrument Rank  14 15 
J-Statistics  2.81 2.75 
Prob.(J-statistic)  0.72 0.83 
D-Watson statistic 2.0 1.91 1.87 
Normality J-Bera (P-value) 0.00 0.00 ... 
HAC Standard Errors (Newey-West) Yes Yes Yes 
Included observations: (After Adjustments) 238 237 237 
Instruments: ∆Base spread (-2), Inflation (-1), ∆Bank rate (-1), Bank rate (-2), Interest differential (-1), 
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Interest differential (-2), Interest Volatility (-2), GDP (-1), ∆SA Spread (-1), ∆SA Spread (-2), M2/GDP (-
1), Dummy 1998, ∆risk premium (-1) and Constant. 
Notes: The (*) indicate significance at 10.0 percent significance level, while the remainder bold case estimates are 
statistically significant at the standard 5.0 percent significance level.  T-statistics are given in (). (...) indicates that the 
variable is excluded through redundant variable test when it is not significant and its removal does not change the result 
much.  We tested the residuals from OLS with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller. AFD rejects the null hypothesis H0: unit 
roots in the residuals. In order to preserve parameters stability some of the insignificant dummy variables in OLS 
equation were not deleted. Results on parameter stability test are given in Fig.C.3-1 and 3-3 on the Appendix C. 
Diagnostic tests the null hypotheses are F-test: explanatory variables equal to zero; J-Bera test: normality - the 
residual are normally distributed; and J-test: instruments are valid. The p-values for J-statistic show that we do not 
reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid, thus we conclude that our regressions are correctly specified. 
OLS results 
Column (2) in Table 3-2 presents OLS results with independent variables: inflation 
rate, ∆bank rate, ∆base spreadt-1, ∆SA spread, interest differential, ∆M2/GDPt-1, and two 
dummy variables that capture the structural break 2006M09150 and the 2007-08-9 financial 
crisis. The dummy variables were introduced to take into account significant structural 
breaks in the results from the stability test.151 First, the OLS regression results show that 
the inflation, ∆bank rate, ∆M2/GDP, ∆risk premium and structural breaks dummies are 
statistically significant. The SA base spread and interest differential are statistically 
insignificant. M2/GDP, which represents financial depth, inflation and ∆bank rate results, 
were estimated with signs as priori expected in the literature. The ∆base spread has a 
negative relationship with ∆M2/GDP and a positive relationship with inflation. In 
unreported results, the GDP growth rate and unconditional volatility were individually and 
jointly statistically insignificant; as such, these were dropped out of the regression without 
significantly influencing the results from the OLS equation. 
The sign on the ∆bank rate show that there is a positive relationship between policy 
rate and ∆base spread. The positive sign indicates the initial partial effect of the ∆bank rate 
on the base spread before the prime rate adjusts to reflect the increase in the base rate. 
Honohan (2001) and Classens et al. (2006) find that there is a positive long-term 
relationship between intermediation spreads and policy rate. We observe that changes in 
the repo rate are followed by changes in the base spread that balance the demand and 
supply of financial intermediation services in the financial sector. However, taking into 
account the non-normality of this result it seems that this coefficient might have 
overestimated the role of changes in the policy rate in the size of the base spread. Further, 
we examined the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for this coefficient in order to check the 
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 This is the impulse dummy identified with the unit root test with a structural break. However, due to the 
persistence of structural instability in some of the parameters we changed this dummy to shift dummy with a 
permanent effect on the trend of base spread. 
151
 In the post-estimation analysis we used Wald and CUSUM tests to identify any significant structural 
breaks and parameter instability in both the residuals and the individual parameters.  
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severity of collinearity with other explanatory variables in the regression. We observed that 
this coefficient has a VIF= 1.78 far less than 5.0 or 10 values, which are regarded as the cut 
for the tolerance level of multicollinearity to exist in the regression. 152  Inflation is 
statistically significant and negative; this result is contrary to Crowley (2007), who 
discovered that high inflation is associated with higher interest rate spreads in English-
speaking countries of Africa. Similarly, SA spread is statistically insignificant and 
estimated with a negative sign. An interest rate differential coefficient captures the 
correcting effects in the model that keeps the spread integrated with South Africa’s 
financial sector. Others assume that the interest rate differential reflects the perceived 
riskiness of investing in Namibia by foreign investors. However, in this study we interpret 
the effects from this variable as having a correctional effect towards long run equilibrium. 
It helps to implement the two countries’ spreads trend together in the long-term. Interest 
differential is statistically insignificant and shows -0.08 percent of ‘catch-up effects’ or 
correction effects from the past period to the current base spread. We argue that the 
negative sign for this coefficient indicates that the Namibia’s repo rate has been below 
SA’s repo rate over the sample period. The lag of the base spread is statistically significant 
and shows a negative sign. It is widely recognised that central banks smoothen interest 
rates; therefore, we append the regression to include the lags in order to capture any 
memory of changes in the base spread.  
After examining the ACF and PAC results it shows that the ∆base spread have 
shorter memories that are statistically significant to the current base spread. Empirically, 
this term improves the model fit by reducing the presence of serial correlation in the 
residuals. ∆M2/GDP ratio is statistically significant and the negative sign indicates that 
financial depth is inversely related to spread as priori expected. The coefficient for the 
dummy for the structural break at 1998M06 identified by the structural break test in section 
3.3.2 is statistically significant. Another financial crisis dummy was created after 
examining the stability of individual coefficients. The 2007-08-09 financial crisis dummy 
is statistically significant, and these results show that the last financial crisis had a major 
positive impact on the spreads in Namibia. Although the redundant test shows that the 
insignificant variable contribution is less significant we decided to leave insignificant level 
dummies in the model in order to preserve parameter stability. After taking into account 
the structural breaks in parameters with the specified dummy the outcome effects are 
observed in the results of recursive residual in Figures C.3-1 to C.3-7 in Appendix C. 
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 VIF statistics quantify the severity of multicollinearity in OLS regression analysis. Often the rule of 
thumb is that the VIF should not exceed 5 or 10. See Table C.3-8 for full result for VIF. 
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Firstly, this post-estimation of results shows that the obtained residuals are within the 95% 
confidence intervals of the cumulative sums of the squares test. Secondly, changes in 
spread have a shorter memory with Q* statistics showing that there is a correlation after 
the second lag. This indicates that in equilibrium the significant variables have a strong 
relationship with the ∆base spread.  
TSLS results 
The estimation above was repeated with a TSLS estimator to overcome the problem 
of endogeneity between the covariates and the error term. Results from TSLS are presented 
in Column (3). As can be seen, the results from TSLS show that the variables of inflation, 
∆bank rate, ∆risk premium, lag term for base spread, ∆M2/GDP and the endogenous 
structural break dummy are statistically significant. The M2/GDP as a financial depth 
indicator has the correct sign and it is statistically significant. Although ∆SA spread and 
interest rate differential remains statistically insignificant in the TSLS results we decided to 
leave these variables in the model on the basis that, when we dropped them, they 
considerably changed the size of other parameters in the regression. As expected, we note 
that there are small marginal differences between the results obtained through OLS and 
TSLS methods. The size of some parameter drops has become statistically insignificant 
because of large standard errors from the TSLS estimator. For example, although the 
structural break dummies have improved the stability of coefficients in TSLS results these 
are not statistically significant in the overall results. The p-value for the J-statistic shows 
that we do not reject the null hypothesis that these instruments are valid for the TSLS 
regression. Since we are not sure whether the functional form between the spread and 
macroeconomic factors are realised in the countries we further estimate this relationship 
with GMM. This estimator takes into account the fact that the single equation we used was 
a partial specified model. 
 
GMM results  
In order to present a balanced view of the relevance of these factors to the base 
spread, we used a GMM method, which fits in well because the linear models in (3.17) and 
(3.18) are partially specified. There is no guarantee that the relationship between spreads 
and macroeconomic fundamentals is linear. Holly and Turner (2012, p. 21) pointed out that 
‘the main advantage of a GMM estimator is that we don’t have to write down a 
conventional regression relationship. Instead we can specify an implicit relationship 
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between variables.’ For example, the p-values for the J-Bera test statistic show that the 
residuals from OLS and TSLS are not normally distributed. Thus, to overcome this strict 
criterion we applied the GMM estimator, which only requires generalised moment 
conditions and independently distributed errors. As can be seen in column (4), the GMM 
results show that inflation, ∆bank rate, ∆M2/GDP ratio, ∆risk premium, lag of ∆base 
spread and one structural break dummy are statistically significant. Inflation rate is 
statistically significant although it bears the negative sign, which is contrary to what priori 
expected in the theory. This inverse relationship may be due to the lack of a clear 
alternative variable to control for economic cycles given that the economic growth rate 
variable was rejected by both omitted and redundant variable tests. Interest differential and 
SA base remain statistically insignificant. The financial depth indicator seems to indicate 
that shallow and lower finance in relation to demand will increase the cost of credit such as 
base spread.  
Specification and diagnostic results 
Finally, we evaluated the results from OLS, TSLS and GMM with specification and 
diagnostic tests. We start with coefficients diagnostic tests which are mostly applicable to 
the OLS and TSLS regressions. Firstly, we used omitted and redundant variable tests to 
evaluate whether unconditional inflation and interest rate volatilities are omitted or 
redundant variables in the OLS and TSLS regressions. The omitted variable test result is 
given by F-statistic (df. 2, 227) =0.52 and p-value = 0.36. The F-statistic indicates that we 
do not reject the null hypothesis that unconditional inflation and interest rate volatility are 
jointly insignificant, which means that their contribution to the variation the dependent 
variable is negligible or zero. However, the redundant variable test rejects the null 
hypothesis that ∆SA spread is a redundant variable in the base spread equation; therefore 
these regressors remained in the based spread equation. Results from these tests were 
consistent both in the TSLS and GMM equations.153 Second, we examined the severity of 
multicollinearity among regressors using the VIF statistics. Table C.3-8 show that none of 
the VIFs both centred and uncentred display a value higher than 5, which is a conservative 
cut of the level. Third, we evaluate the residuals using the following residual diagnostic 
tests: Q*-stat correlogram test for serial correlation; Jaque-Bera test for normality; and the 
White test for heteroscedascity. Table C.3-5 on the Appendix C shows the Q*-stat 
correlogram with PAC and AC statistics and their associated probabilities at 13th lag. The 
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 GMM alternative for redundant test is the J-statistic and its associated p-value for the difference that 
comes from comparing the likelihoods from restricted and unrestricted regressions.  
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Q* correlogram and LM-test [F-stat. (2, 227) =0.49] show that there is no serial 
correlations in the residuals for the base spread equation. However, the J-Bera with p-
value= 0.00 shows that we reject the null hypothesis in relation to how these residuals from 
OLS are normally distributed. For the stability diagnostic tests, we present the result in 
figures C.3-1, C.3-2 and C.3-3 in the Appendix. The results show a Recursive Least 
Squares Test, Cumulative Sum of squares (CUSUM) and the Recursive Least Square Test 
for individual coefficients in the ∆base spread equation. The first two figures show that the 
residuals lie within 5% confidence intervals. These indicate stable residuals while in the 
last figure, C.3-3, we see that inflation coefficient and interest rate differential coefficients 
are showing signs of shift in the year 2003. We made efforts to use an impulse dummy at 
this point, which was statistically insignificant and thus rejected by the regression. Finally, 
the J-statistics for both TSLS and GMM regressions show that we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that these instrument variables used are valid for these regressions. Generally, a 
large J-statistic with a significant p-value of less than 5% casts doubts on the validity of the 
list of instruments used in the estimation.  
In all the results, using the ∆base spread as the ex-ante definition of interest rate 
spread, we found empirical evidence which supports the view that changes in some 
macroeconomic and financial variables explain interest spreads. In Namibia, some of these 
fundamentals are the ∆bank rate, inflation, ∆SA spread, ∆M2/GDP ratio, risk premium and 
interest rate differential rate. In the following section we use retail spread as an alternative 
definition for interest rate spread. 
Table 3-3 on the following page presents the results from OLS, TSLS and GMM 
estimation using equation (3.18) with ∆retail spread as the dependent variable. Using 
equation (3.18) we examine the following macroeconomic and financial variables such as 
bank rate, unconditional inflation volatility, SA spread, ∆M2/GDP ratio, risk premium, 
retail spread (-1), the East Asia financial crisis and the 2007-08-09 financial crisis 
dummies, which produce a significant stable economic relationship with retail spread. As 
usual, each column in Table 3-3 presents the coefficient estimates of a different regression 
with the same independent variables. 
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Table 3-3 OLS, TSLS and GMM Coefficient Estimates of Macroeconomic Determinants 
of Retail Spread (dependent variable –∆retail spread) 
 OLS TSLS GMM 
Constant -0.02 
(-0.82) 
-0.02 
(-0.74) 
-0.02 
(-1.22) 
Inflation Ratet  0.10 
(1.98) 
0.10 
(1.98) 
0.07 
(1.99) 
∆Unconditional Infl. Volatilityt 0.21 
(1.67)* 
0.21 
(1.58) 
0.19 
(1.56) 
∆SA Base Spreadt-1  -0.11 
(-1.64)* 
-0.11 
(-1.61)* 
-0.12 
(-1.60)* 
∆M2/GDPt 0.47 
(3.24) 
0.46 
(3.30) 
0.47 
(3.51) 
∆Retail Spreadt-1 -0.57 -0.57 -0.49 
 (-7.20) (-7.38) (-6.82) 
∆Retail Spreadt-2 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 
 (-4.53) (-4.54) (-4.23) 
∆GDPt-1 -3.99 -4.05 -3.32 
 (-2.03) (-2.06) (1.85)* 
2007-08-09 Fin. Crisis Dummy 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 (1.09) (1.09) (1.27) 
Adjusted R-Square 0.32 30 ... 
S.E. of regression 0.30 0.46 0.48 
Instrument Rank  12 14 
J-Statistics  9.82 8.84 
P-value (J-statistic)  0.14 0.11 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 … 
D-Watson Statistics 2.02 2.02 2.19 
Normality J-Bera (P-value) 0.28 0.31 ... 
HAC standard Errors (Newey-West) Yes Yes Yes 
Included observations (After Adjustments) 237 237 237 
Instruments: ∆Retail spread (-1), ∆Retail Spread (-2), Inflation (-1), ∆M2/GDP (-1) ∆Bank rate (-2), ∆Risk 
premium (-1), ∆GDP (-1), ∆GDP (-2) Inflation Vol. (-1), Inflation Vol. (-2), ∆SA Spread (-1), Dummy08-
09 and constant. 
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Notes: The (*) indicate significance at 10.0 percent significance level, while the remainder bold case estimates are 
statistically significant at the standard 5.0 percent significance level. The t-statistics are given in (). While the (...) 
indicates that the variable is excluded when it is not significant and its removal does not change the result much.  
Residuals from all three estimations are stationary. In order to preserve parameters stability, the insignificant dummy 
variables in OLS equation were not deleted. Stability diagnostic tests are given in Fig. C.3-5 and Fig.C.3-7 in the 
Appendix C. Diagnostic tests the null hypotheses are F-test: explanatory variables equal to zero; J-Bera test: 
normality - the residual are normally distributed; and J-test: instruments are valid. The p-values for J-statistic 
show that we do not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid, thus we conclude that our regressions are 
correctly specified. 
OLS results 
Firstly, column (2) presents the OLS regression results which indicate that 
inflation, ∆SA base spread, unconditional inflation volatility, ∆M2/GDP ratio, retail spread 
lags and the GDP growth rate are statistically significant while the endogenous structural 
break dummy is statistically insignificant. Inflation rate is estimated with a positive sign 
therefore indicates a positive relation with retail spread. It suggests that financial 
institutions take into account the rate of inflation so as to maintain asset value in the long-
term. Thus, inflation and unconditional volatility form part of the fundamentals that 
influence retail spread. Further, we find that financial depth indicator ∆M2/GDP is 
estimated with a positive sign in the retail spread equation. The positive sign might be 
attributed to the fact that the economic cycles of M2 and GDP do not coincide over the 
sample. However, economic growth suggests that higher growth is associated with lower 
changes in the retail spreads. The structural break dummy for the 2008-09 financial crisis 
remained in the equation in order to induce stability in the parameters. The lag terms for 
the dependent variable indicate the persistent effects of retail spread, which show that 
changes in the retail spread have longer memory. The results from retail spread equation 
passed most criteria form OLS, as shown by the diagnostic tests. For example, the J-Bera 
test statistic shows that the residuals from this regression are normally distributed and have 
no serial autocorrelation up to the 2nd lag. 
TSLS and GMM Results 
The GMM results are similar to the TSLS results; the only difference is that the 
measure for macroeconomic instability is now statistically insignificant. However, positive 
relationship inflation, unconditional inflation volatility and ∆retail spread is consistent with 
the argument that uncertainties, fear in the financial market, and the prospect of financial 
instability perpetuate the rise of spreads in the economy.154 In addition, as Groth (2012) 
illustrated, the lack of economic growth might lead to high margins on the supply of 
financial intermediary services. Other candidate variables such as unconditional interest 
                                                           
154
 See (De Grauwe & Ji, 2013) for two divergent views about the determinants of spreads. 
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rate volatility, changes in the policy rate, risk premium and the structural break earlier 
identified in the dependent variables remained insignificant; therefore, these were left out 
of the retail spread equation. Although the result from OLS passed strong criteria for least 
square we emphasise the GMM results. This is because of the possibility of endogeneity 
between some of the covariates and the error term as suggested by VIFs in Table C.3-12. 
Other variables such as SA spread and the crisis dummies indicate some degrees of 
consistency with the overall result. GMM result shows that inflation rate, unconditional 
inflation volatilities, SA spread and the 2008-09 financial crises are some of the significant 
factors that explain ∆retail spread.  
Lastly, we evaluate the results from OLS, TSLS and GMM with the specification 
and diagnostic tests. Firstly, we report the omitted and redundant variables tests concerning 
changes in the nominal bank rate and interest rate volatility. The omitted variable indicates 
that bank rate can be omitted from the retail spread equation when tested alone; however, 
the null hypothesis is rejected when this variable is jointly tested with unconditional 
interest rate volatility. The omitted variable test result is given by F-statistic (df. 2, 225) 
=0.09 and p-value = 0.36. This indicates that we reject the null hypothesis whereby bank 
rate and unconditional interest rate volatility are jointly statistically insignificant. Hence, 
we conclude that this variable’s contribution to the variation in the dependent variable is 
not negligible. Similarly, the VIF statistics in Table C.3-12 show that the collinearity 
among regressors in the retail spread equation is less than 5%, which means it is less 
severe. Next, the redundant variables test shows that interest rate differential is a redundant 
variable in the retail spread equation; therefore, this covariate was dropped completely 
from the based spread equation. Results from omitted variables and redundant tests were 
consistent both in the TSLS and GMM equations. Third, we evaluated the residuals with 
the following diagnostic tests: the Q*-stat correlogram test for serial correlation, the J-Bera 
test for normality and the White test for the presence of heteroscedascity. Table C.3-9 in 
Appendix C shows the Q*-statistic correlogram with PAC and AC statistics and their 
associated probabilities at 13th lag. The Q* correlogram and LM-test [F-stat. (2, 226) 
=0.59] show that there is no serial correlations in the residual for the ∆retail spread 
equation. The heteroscedascity test (i.e. White test: F-stat. df. [41, 195]=0.65) shows that 
we reject the null hypothesis of heteroscedasticity and find that the residuals from the retail 
spread equation for OLS are homoscedascitic. Similarly, the J-Bera with p-value= 0.28 and 
0.31 show that we do not reject the null hypothesis that these residuals from OLS and 
TSLS equations are normally distributed. For the stability parameters, Figures C.3-5, C.3-6 
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and C.3-7 show the results from the Recursive Test, the Cumulative Sum of Squares 
(CUSUM) and the Recursive Least Square Test for individual coefficients in the retail 
spread equation. Figures C.3-5 and C.3-6 show that the residuals lie within a 5% 
confidence interval. This, therefore, indicates stable residuals while the last Figure (C.3-7) 
shows that SA spread and retail spread (-2) coefficients were showing signs of structural 
shifts in the year 2005. Finally, the J-statistics of in both TSLS and GMM show that we do 
not reject the null hypothesis, as these instrument variables are valid in these regressions.  
In all, the regression results in Tables 3-2 and 3-3 establish the importance of 
macroeconomic and financial variables in the determination of interest rate spreads. 
Although we emphasised that the factors might be different from country to country, it 
seems that inflation, the policy rate, financial depth, economic growth and changes in the 
risk are some of the fundamental determinants of spreads in Namibia. Using both 
definitions of ex ante interest rate spreads – that is, ∆base spread and ∆retail spread – these 
empirical results show that there is a statistically significant economic relationship between 
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals and intermediation spreads. This analysis 
concurs with Mujeri and Yunus (2009), Chirwa and Mlachila (2004) and Saunder and 
Schumacker (2000), who found that interest rate spreads are significantly influenced by 
macroeconomic factors such as inflation, high policy rates and other operating costs in the 
financial sector.  
3.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we investigated the macroeconomic fundamentals that explain 
spreads by using two distinct definitions of interest rate spreads: the ‘ex ante’ base and 
retail spreads. Starting with an extensive literature review, we recognise the following 
essential views about interest rate spreads. Firstly, although there is considerable coverage 
about the topic, particularly at the micro-level, we observe that many authors on this topic 
lament that there is no agreed framework on how to model interest rate spreads. This 
problem has made it difficult to compare empirical results about what factors determine 
interest rate spreads. However, we view that there is a consensus among economists that 
interest rate spreads are a major cause of concern in many economies. As Blinder (2013) 
indicates, spreads make borrowing prohibitively expensive and destabilise the economy as 
whole. As a result, several government packages in the recent financial crisis have aimed 
to reduce excessive changes in spreads in order to restore confidence and pre-crisis volume 
lending. In addition, we find in the literature that the persistent problem of huge spreads is 
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significantly observed in Latin America, Caribbean and Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
East Asian economies.  
Secondly, researchers such as Beck and Hesse (2009) have grouped determinants of 
interest rate spreads under four broad classes: market structure view, risk view, 
macroeconomic view and small financial system view. This means that, in equilibrium, 
spreads can be analysed as an outcome of market structure in place, changes in perceived 
risk or risk perceptions, and macroeconomic fundamentals realised in the country. In the 
case of Namibia, we identified that there is lack of empirical evidence about what explains 
large interest rate spreads, the dynamic interaction among spreads and the impact of 
interest rate spreads on sectors such as households and businesses. In order to fill this gap, 
we used the available data to examine the unit root with structural breaks, cause and 
dynamics of spreads in Namibia. These efforts contribute to empirical knowledge on the 
topic and therefore can help to develop possible policy proposals about how to address 
spread in the long run. In this study we encountered problems concerning interest rate 
spreads as defined by base and retail spread. Some of the problems with spreads are regime 
shifts from structural breaks as identified with the unit root test with structural breaks. 
Although different regime shifts could be addressed with methods such as smooth 
transition autoregressive and logistic smooth transition models, these alone could not help 
in the presence of unit root and endogenous structural breaks. When a unit root is present 
even after accounting for endogenous structural breaks in the time series it is 
recommended to use first difference and then an impulse dummy to cater for an 
endogenous break in the data. In our preliminary results we find that base spread can be 
modelled with a smooth transition method; however, the base rejects the non-linear part of 
the STAR model. This means that both linear and non-linear regimes in the time series 
have a unit root. As an alternative to this method we applied the GMM with first difference 
variables and a dummy to take care of the unit root and the apparent structural breaks. The 
spread equation in the first differences is consistent with the static implicit function 
suggested by Groth (2012). This implicit function shows that, in equilibrium, total changes 
in the spreads are determined by changes in perceived risk, changes in income and other 
fundamentals realised in the country. 
Firstly, the descriptive statistics show that the unconditional mean base and retail 
spreads are significantly different from zero over the sample period. Average 
intermediation spreads trend above the mean zero and the null hypothesis so that the 
unconditional mean of spread over this sample period is statistically equal to zero is 
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rejected. We find that on average most spreads are significant and always there; however, 
it is true that their movements are significantly amplified during crisis periods, which is 
reflected by different mean shifts and structural breaks over the sample period. Second, the 
unit root test results showed that spreads in Namibia have a unit root with endogenous 
structural breaks. We find that most significant endogenous structural breaks were 
identified between 1997M1 -1998M8 periods. This period coincided with the East Asia 
financial crisis. The presence of unit root process in spreads is contrary to the view that 
theoretically there is nothing that can make us expect a unit root process in the interest 
spreads. Thus, it generally expected that spreads are of integrated order of less than one 
and are cointegrated. Third, our regression results from OLS and GMM show that 
fundamental factors such as inflation, inflation volatility, bank rate, financial depth, risk 
premium and economic growth are some of the statistically significant factors that explain 
large changes in interest rate spreads in Namibia. We find that ∆M2/GDP is inversely 
related to ∆base spread while interest rate volatility and inflation volatility are positively 
related to retail spread.  
Nominal policy rate also significantly influences the ∆base spread. In all, whether 
we defined interest spread as the ∆retail spread, the difference between average lending 
rate and average deposit rate or the ∆base spread, or the difference between prime lending 
rate and the bank rate, our empirical results indicate that there is a statistically significant 
role of macroeconomics and financial variables in the determination of interest rate 
spreads. This is shown by the consistence between the results from descriptive statistics 
and the regression results from OLS, TSLS and GMM. Finally, the endogenous structural 
break dummies identified by the unit test with structural breaks were not all statistically 
significant; however, if we replace these with the shift dummies then we have significant 
coefficients and improvement in the stability of parameters in OLS and TSLS regression. 
3.4.1 Policy implications  
In terms of policy proposals we suggest that policymakers should take into account 
the presence of endogenous structural breaks in the spreads when devising policy proposals 
to address large spreads in Namibia. This is because significant structural breaks affect the 
size of parameters and the forecasts based on these parameters. Further, we suggest that 
policymakers should enact policies that target the reduction of volatility, risk perceptions 
and uncertainty. At the macro level, fiscal authority and the central bank should use both 
monetary and fiscal policy to smoothen the credit supply to the economy. This strategy 
will improve macroeconomic and financial stability as the risk premium decreases. In 
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addition, low inflation volatility and hence less uncertainty will translate into smaller 
changes in average spread in the long run. Our result suggests that maintaining small 
interest differentials will help to reduce the average size of interest rate spreads. Finally, 
our empirical evidence agrees with evidence from Crowley (2007) and Beck and Hesse 
(2009). These authors find that nominal interest rate, inflation and risk premium, 
∆M2/GDP and economic growth are some of the determinants that influence the size of 
spread in Namibia. This implies that changes in volatility, risk perception, economic 
growth and financial depth determine the changes of spreads, which bring the demand and 
supply of financial intermediation into equilibrium. Additionally, Hossain (2012) Barajas, 
Salazar and Stiener (2000), Beck and Hesse (2009) and Mujeri and Yunus (2009) have 
established that a higher interest rate spread in developing countries is mainly caused by 
high operating costs and macroeconomic instability. 
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Appendix C 
Appendix C.3.1 Namibia Financial system: A brief overview  
Namibia’s banking sector currently consists of eight banks of which five are retail 
banks and two, specialized banks which are majorly owned by the government. Overall 
above on the hierarchy is the Bank of Namibia which is the central bank and government 
banker. Its main aims are to ‘support economic growth and development, act as fiscal 
advisor and banker to government, promote price stability, manage reserves and currency, 
and ensure sound financial system and conduct economic research’ (Bank of Namibia, 
2010). As indicated in the last essay that Namibia maintains a currency peg one-to-one of 
the Namibian dollars to the South Africa Rand. Although this arrangement exists, Allen, 
Otchere, & Senbet (2011) point out that Bank of Namibia has major influence on monetary 
policy to some degree to pursue interest rate level different from South Africa.  
Commercial banks dominate the financial sector as main lenders to various 
economic agents in the economy. Although banks participate in the Namibia Stock 
Exchange, the stock market is largely dominated by industrial metals, food and drugs, 
retailers and mining companies. As a result, commercial banks are major financiers of 
economic activity in agriculture, construction, manufacturing and the services sectors. The 
bond market is dominated by government as the main issuer and attracts mostly 
commercial banks, investment trusts, insurance company, and stock brokers as 
participants. For example, Vollan (2000) reveals that most allotments at primary issue are 
made to commercial banks which also makes many banks depend on government treasury 
bills.  
List of Banks in Namibia (December 2013) 
1. First National Bank of Namibia (Ltd.) 
2. Standard Bank of Namibia (Ltd.) 
3. Bank Windhoek (Ltd.) 
4. Nedbank Namibia (Ltd.) 
5. FIDES Bank (Ltd.)155 
                                                           
155
 FIDES Bank (Ltd.) and SME Bank (Ltd) are new established in 2010 and 2012. These banks mainly lend 
to SMEs and target enterprises in the economy. As for this analysis they are excluded in the sample due to 
the fact their operations are yet small to make a significant impacts on the spread. There is also NAMPOST 
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Other banks (specialized banks) 
6. Agricultural Bank of Namibia Ltd 
7. Development Bank of Namibia Ltd. 
 8. SME Bank Ltd. 
The stock market in Namibia is managed by the Namibia Stock Exchange (NSX) which 
was established in 1992. The Table 3.1 below shows the market capitalization of the 
Namibia Stock Exchange (NSX) which illustrate a low level of liquidity. As the case with 
stock exchanges in Southern Africa, many companies listed on NSX are dual listed to trade 
on Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in Johannesburg, SA. 
Table C.3-1 Namibia Stock Exchange (NSX) Market Capitalization 
 
While, on average, the Namibian’s banking sector can be describe as an oligopoly 
market, it is also much linked to South Africa’s financial sector. Fitchat and Ikhide (2002) 
reveal that competition seems to be lacking among banks in Namibia. If it exists, it is 
rather through advertisement and less through prices and charges. Three out of the major 
eight retail banks in Namibia are subsidiaries from South Africa while two are state-owned 
banks which only lend to specific sectors such as agriculture and the development industry 
which target SMEs, franchise and other upcoming entrepreneurs. Namibia’s strong link to 
South Africa has many economics and financial benefits albeit with some costs too. For 
                                                                                                                                                                                
SAVING Bank which is part of Namibia Post and Telecom Holdings, however, this is also very small and its 
major customers are pensioners and people with disabilities. 
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example, free capital movements between the two countries do less to encourage 
innovation and development of the locals’ financial markets.156 As for the last decade, 
Namibia has become a net export of capital to South Africa because their market is 
relatively developed than local counterpart.  
There are also well established non-financial institutions such as pension institution 
funds, insurance, and microfinance institutions that serve as alternative sources for 
liquidity to banks. According to the current review in the NFSS (2011), there are about 167 
active registered pension funds, 18 long term insurance companies and 186 microfinance 
institutions registered in Namibia. Among the pension fund institutions, the Government 
Institution Pension Fund (GIPF) is the main player and accounts for about 70 percent of 
assets of pension funds in the country. In money markets the most instruments are call 
deposits, interbank loans and deposits, bank acceptances, negotiable certificates of 
deposits, and treasury bills. 
In comparison to many countries, Namibia is sparsely populated, only surpassed by 
Mongolia. It is argued that due to the large scattered population of Namibia, the costs of 
running a banking business in Namibia are very high.157 These facts in some quarter are 
used to justify why interest rate spreads are so high, because banks need to take into 
account the transportation and security costs in their spreads. In addition, although there 
are about seven banks in the economy, the real market power concentrates on the top three 
largest banks – First National Bank of Namibia Limited, Standard Bank of Namibia 
Limited and Bank Windhoek Limited. As shown in Table 2 these three banks dominate the 
banking sector as their total assets account for more than half of all assets in the banking 
sector. The data in Table 2 shows that there is a high concentration of assets in the three 
major banks. These three banks hold more than 80 percent of total assets with almost equal 
shares of the loan market.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
156
 One the reasons that prevent innovation are the lack of willingness from foreign institutions to spend on 
local training of human resources and money market development. Although these measures are applied with 
the aim to keep costs very low they have also disadvantage financial development in Namibia.  
157
 World Bank Quick Facts shows that Namibia has: surface area about 824.3 (thousands sq. km); population 
2.32 million; GDP Per Capita 6,600 (current US$); Category: Middle Income country. For world ranking on 
least densely populated countries see: http://www.aneki.com/sparsely.html 
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Table C.3-2. Banking Industry Structure Year (2010) 
Rank Bank Name 
Value 
USD 
Cumulative 
values % 
Cumulative 
% 
 Total Assets - Last available year 8,255,103 37,911,159 100   
1 First National Bank of Namibia Limited 2,334,546 2,334,546 28.28 28.28 
2 Bank Windhoek Limited 2,298,838 4,633,384 27.85 56.13 
3 Standard Bank Namibia Limited 2,155,498 6,788,882 26.11 82.24 
4 Nedbank Namibia Ltd 1,052,069 7,840,951 12.74 94.98 
5 Agricultural Bank of Namibia - Agribank 217,343 8,058,293 2.63 97.62 
6 Development Bank of Namibia 196,809 8,255,103 2.38 100.00 
Data Source: Bank Scope. Table author’s own construction. 
In order to gauge the amount of competition in the banking sector, we calculated 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the sum of squared loan market shares. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measures the size of firms in relation to the banking industry 
and the level of competition among banks. The conventional interpretations of HHI are as 
follow: the index below 1000 indicates a highly competitive industry, between 1000 and 
1,500 indicates un-concentrated markets; 1,500 and 2,500 indicates moderates 
concentration; and 2,500 or above indicate high concentration. The HHI = 2,930 which is 
above 2,500 index value, indicates there is a high market concentration in the banking 
sector in Namibia. The evidence, therefore, supports the argument that there is lack of 
competition which increases inefficiency which as a result manifests in the form of high 
interest spreads. This index is used to test whether competition significantly affects interest 
rate spread in the econometric model. 
Table C.3-3. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
HHI 2442.2 2431.7 2456.5 2431.2 2461.3 2409.6 
HHI* 2930.4 2917.8 2947.6 2917.3 2953.4 2891.4 
* Source: Author’s own construction. 
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Appendix C.2 
Bank of Namibia media release 22 July 2010 
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Appendix C.2-2 Descriptive statistics and Unit Root test results 
Table C.3-4 Pair-wise correlation statistics for the first difference variables, sample 
1992:01 – 2011:12 
 ∆Base 
sprd 
∆Retail 
sprd 
∆Risk  
pr. 
∆M2/ 
GDP 
∆Infla ∆Int. 
Diff. 
∆GDP ∆Vol. 
Inf. 
∆Vol. 
Int. 
∆SA 
spread 
∆Base spr 1          
∆Retail 
spr 
0.20* 
(0.09) 
1         
∆Risk spr 0.30* 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.53) 
1        
∆M2/GDP 0.03 
(0.40) 
0.19* 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.54) 
1       
∆Inf 0.03 
(0.61) 
0.13* 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.86) 
-0.05 
(0.38) 
1      
∆Int. Diff. -0.06 
(0.91) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
-0.08 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(0.91) 
0.06 
(0.34) 
1     
∆GDP -0.03 
(0.55) 
-0.20* 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.83) 
-0.12* 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.68) 
-0.04 
(0.45) 
1    
∆Vol. Inf. 0.07* 
(0.09) 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.12* 
(0.08) 
-0.10* 
(0.08) 
-0.10* 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.72) 
-0.15* 
(0.00) 
1   
∆Vol. Int. -0.02 
(0.96) 
-0.02 
(0.63) 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.58) 
0.07 
(0.28) 
-0.01 
(0.79) 
-0.11* 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.52) 
1  
∆SA sprd 0.46* 
(0.00) 
-0.15* 
(0.09) 
0.16* 
(0.01) 
0.15* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.59) 
-0.02 
(0.72) 
-0.03 
(0.55) 
0.10* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.09) 
1 
*indicates the 10% significance level. 
Figure C.3-0 Interest rate spreads, macroeconomic and financial variables in first 
difference 
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Appendix C.3-4 Residual and Stability Diagnostic Tests 
Table C.3-5 Base spread Q* statistic with probabilities adjusted for one dynamic regressors 
     
     
 AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* 
     
     1 -0.036 -0.036 0.3204 0.571 
2 -0.027 -0.028 0.4971 0.780 
3 0.030 0.028 0.7219 0.868 
4 -0.019 -0.018 0.8122 0.937 
5 -0.054 -0.054 1.5238 0.910 
6 -0.136 -0.142 6.0539 0.417 
7 -0.159 -0.176 12.281 0.092 
8 0.061 0.039 13.210 0.105 
9 -0.029 -0.029 13.414 0.145 
10 -0.001 0.000 13.414 0.201 
11 0.019 -0.010 13.503 0.262 
12 0.048 0.012 14.073 0.296 
13 -0.023 -0.065 14.204 0.360 
 
 
Table C.3-6 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.707426     Prob. F(2,227) 0.4940 
Obs*R-squared 1.474224     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.4785 
     
     
 
Table C.3-7 Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 0.740237     Prob. F(43,194) 0.8785 
Obs*R-squared 33.54550     Prob. Chi-Square(43) 0.8490 
Scaled explained SS 294.4562     Prob. Chi-Square(43) 0.0000 
     
     Table C.3-8 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
 
Sample: 1992M01 2011M12, included observations: 
238 
 
    
    
 Coefficient Un-centred Centred 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    C  0.000818  4.866403  NA 
INF  0.000905  2.178071  1.810222 
∆Bank rate  1.936935  1.783333  1.782303 
∆SA sprd(-1)  0.004378  1.667112  1.561798 
Int. Diff.(-1)  0.005175  1.474540  1.439261 
∆M2/GDP(-1)  0.009024  1.248832  1.227664 
∆Base sprd(-1)  0.004324  1.648056  1.601241 
∆RISK  0.003648  2.692820  2.485641 
D9908  0.001258  5.474075  1.529361 
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Fig.C.3-3 Recursive parameter  stabil i ty test for individual parameters in the base spread eq .
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(1)Recursive Residuals test shows plots of recursive residuals about the zero mean within two confidence 
bands of +/- 2 standard errors. The recursive residuals outside the area indicate parameter instability. (2) 
CUSUM test indicates parameters instabilities when the cumulative sum of recursive residuals goes out the 
confidence bands -/+2 s.e. The CUSUM that fall exactly on the zero indicate perfect parameter stability. The 
CUSUM test results shows that with the inclusion of dummy variables in both equations the parameters have 
become statistically stable.  
Residual and stability Diagnostic Tests Retail spread Equation 
Table C.3-9 Retail spread Q* statistic with probabilities adjusted for one dynamic 
regressor. 
     
     
 AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* 
     
     1 -0.012 -0.012 0.0336 0.855 
2 0.017 0.017 0.1009 0.951 
3 -0.086 -0.086 1.9090 0.592 
4 -0.117 -0.120 5.2187 0.266 
5 -0.114 -0.117 8.3915 0.136 
6 -0.017 -0.028 8.4634 0.206 
7 -0.024 -0.045 8.6037 0.282 
8 0.011 -0.027 8.6330 0.374 
9 -0.035 -0.069 8.9296 0.444 
10 0.045 0.016 9.4338 0.491 
11 0.060 0.050 10.347 0.499 
12 0.097 0.085 12.710 0.390 
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Fig. C.3-4 Leverage plot Base Sprd vs Variables (Partialled on Regressors)
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13 0.028 0.027 12.904 0.455 
 
 
Table C.3-10 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.516682     Prob. F(2,226) 0.5972 
Obs*R-squared 1.078728     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5831 
     
     
 
Table C.3-11Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 0.892835     Prob. F(41,195) 0.6578 
Obs*R-squared 37.45873     Prob. Chi-Square(41) 0.6288 
Scaled explained SS 38.08430     Prob. Chi-Square(41) 0.6009 
     
     
 
Table C.3-12 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) retail 
spread Eq.  
Sample: 1992M01 2011M12, included observations: 
237  
    
    
 Coefficient Un-centred Centred 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    Constant  0.000889  1.154140  NA 
Inflation  0.002957  1.889105  1.817837 
∆SA sprd(-1)  0.005105  1.433719  1.428555 
∆M2/GDP  0.020016  1.489899  1.481368 
∆Retail Sprd(-1)  0.006121  1.538727  1.522749 
∆Retail Sprd(-2)  0.002947  1.756569  1.756404 
∆GDP(-1)  3.852947  1.256278  1.219135 
VOL. Inflation  0.018151  1.145555  1.139618 
D0708  0.011880  1.648231  1.522867 
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Table C.3-13 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test  
Variable t-statistic (Level) Crit.-value 5% Observations  
Base spread -2.25 2.87 238 
Retail spread -1.45 2.87 238 
Risk premium -3.00* 2.87 238 
Inflation -2.26 2.87 238 
Interest Diff. -1.97 2.87 238 
GDP -3.55* 2.87 238 
Repo rate -1.42 2.87 238 
SA spread -5.93* 2.87 238 
Vol. inflation -4.83* 2.87 238 
Vol. interest rate -4.50* 2.87 238 
Prime rate -1.08 2.87 238 
M2/GDP -1.60 2.87 238 
Note: MacKinnon (1996) critical values, Minimum lag=2, Maximum lag =14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 197 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Simple Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule (STR): Empirical evidence 
 
 ‘Financial stability is part of the ‘genetic code' of central banks and the uncertainty 
of the last five years has proved that it has consequences for different departments 
and functions, in particular monetary policy. The line between monetary policy and 
financial stability has blurred as central banks have been forced to intervene to 
maintain stability and confidence in markets.’ ....Goodhart C. (2013). 
‘An important question is whether and by how much monetary policy should adjust 
to financial market disturbances to prevent spill over to the rest of the economy. 
[…] one possible approach to adjusting the systemic component of monetary policy 
would be to subtract a smoothed version of this spread from the interest rate target 
[…]Such an adjustment has the advantage of being more transparent and 
predictable than an arbitrary or purely discretionary adjustment.’ (Taylor, 2008, p. 
3). 
4.1 Introduction 
Financial instability resulting from the recent 2008-2009 financial crisis has once 
again revived the debate about the implementation of monetary policy such as the standard 
Taylor rule. As part of this debate, Curdia and Woodford (2009), McCulley and Toloui 
(2008), and Taylor (2008), proposed a simple STR that seems to adequately respond to 
economic and financial disturbances. This innovation was deemed necessary so that 
monetary policy rule can perform its main task which is to guide the implementation of 
monetary policy strategy in normal and abnormal times. It is widely acknowledged in the 
last decade that the ‘Taylor rule’ by John B. Taylor (1993) has made the subject of 
feedback rules very popular among academic economists and central bankers. Taylor rule 
has influenced monetary policy framework and the communication of monetary policy to 
the public. Underlying advantages are that monetary policy rules convey greater 
information which has increased transparency, cemented the public interests in the 
implementation of monetary policy, and simplified the process of economic 
stabilization.158 
 Historically, monetary policy rules evolved from fixed-exchange rate targeting, 
nominal income targeting, money growth targeting to interest rate targeting regime. 
Accordingly, this effort to revise current monetary policy rule is a continuation of 
                                                           
158
 Monetary policy rules show with simplicity how central banks go about to stabilize the economy in the 
short term. Taylor & Williams (2011) reveals that for the past 25 years the general public have become more 
familiar with the systematic behaviors of central bank as result. 
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monetary policy evolution so that it can adequately responds to macroeconomic shocks on 
multiple fronts. There are challenges that face modern monetary policy and these include: 
how to stimulate economic growth when nominal policy target is near zero level; how to 
respond to rising financial instability in an environment of low stable inflation; and how to 
fight inflation in the face of tight credit conditions in the financial sector. For example, 
monetary policy in a low stable inflation environment induces growth of asset price 
bubbles which if it continues unencumbered, it will generate financial instability and 
destabilises the economy as a whole.159  
STR is proposed to address the inadequacy of standard Taylor rule – a near strategy 
loosely followed by many central banks to set the interest rate target. In this study we 
empirically estimate and examine the posterior means and the posterior densities of this 
rule. Spread-Adjusted Taylor is proposed by Taylor (2008) and McCulley & Toloui (2008) 
and theoretically calibrated by Curdia & Woodford (2009), Hirakata, Sudo, & Ueda 
(2011), Teranishi (2011) and Sudo & Teranishi (2008). STR adjusts downward the 
nominal policy target in response to tight credit conditions as a result of rising spread. For 
example, STR may be useful in response to an economic shock which increases external 
finance premium and eventually slows down economic activity. Proponents of STR argue 
that it can mitigate the effects of economic shock by adjusting the nominal policy rate 
downward by less than one percent or equal to one percent change in the credit spread.  
Many researchers ponder at the question about what information is missing or 
neglected by the standard Taylor rule. Taylor rule is well known to emphasise the price 
stability as an overriding goal for monetary policy stabilization. However, it has been 
exposed that the price stability is not a sufficient condition for financial stability. Thus, 
Curdia & Woodford (2009), Taylor (2008)  and Teranishi (2011) suggest that the standard 
Taylor rule should be adjusted so that it includes a financial indicator such as spread (credit 
spread) as an explicit target variable to which monetary policy responds in a systematic 
manner. According to their works, there are economic disturbances although not posing 
inflationary danger, they however increase equilibrium spread which contract the supply of 
credit. Aside from the debate about monetary policy rules versus discretion policy in the 
literature, many economists that advocate for the rule-based monetary policies such as the 
standard Taylor rule concedes that current monetary policy rule that weight inflation and 
                                                           
159
 See also Bayoumi et al. (2014, p. 4). 
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output seems not to work effectively in the face of financial instability.160 The problem is 
now recognized that it goes beyond the insufficient in the feedback rules. As Blinder 
(2013, p. 238) indicates, ‘it is all about the spreads’. Blinder argues that spreads are very 
important because they ‘provide an objective, numerical market-base measure of financial 
market distress.’ 
4.1.2 Main Objective 
 Curdia and Woodford  (2009) and Teranishi (2011), proposed a monetary policy 
rule that responds to equilibrium spread with parameter value Zú ∈ −1,0). 161  Our 
objective is to estimate the posterior parameter values of the simple STR using the 
Bayesian linear regression method.162 We used Bayesian method so that we can make use 
of available information about STR model. It is well known that classical maximum 
likelihood method (frequentists) ignores any prior knowledge about the model that is being 
measured. The advantage of using Bayesian analysis is that: it combines prior information 
we have about the model with the sample data in the likelihood function to estimate 
posterior means for the parameters in the model understudy. We used data from South 
Africa (SA) with the sample period that starts from January 1991 to December 2011. This 
sample covers both pre- and inflation-target regime period in SA. We combined the prior 
information about standard Taylor rule and Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule with data to 
estimate what these parameters would have been suppose the central bank in South Africa 
responds systematically to equilibrium spread.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 4.1 starts with the introduction; section 4.2 
reviews the literature which discusses with monetary stability vis-à-vis financial stability 
                                                           
160
 The demand for rich financial model(s) that includes financial friction gave the impetus of spread adjusted 
and credit policy rules which cater for much of the information that should be incorporated in the monetary 
policy decisions.  Of course, we acknowledge that this is not the first time call to adjust the Taylor rule. 
There were other calls like the call to include asset price, or exchange rate in the policy rule as we pointed out 
in our main conclusion of chapter one of this thesis. Some feedback rules were rejected e.g Taylor rule with 
exchange rate; Taylor & Williams (2011, p. 834) indicate that feedback rule with exchange rate will be ‘too 
herky-jerky’, this negatively feed into the economy. Another important policy proposal is the Credit policy 
feedback rule. This is an independent rule different from Taylor rule and it is aimed at stabilizing financial 
sector in the same way that Taylor rule stabilizes output and prices. It emerged in recognition of the 
importance of financial frictions in determining economic activity. 
161
 Nominal interest rate target should be lowered when credit spread increase by one unit or less than a unit 
change in equilibrium interest rate spread to prevent further credit supply contractions from the rising 
equilibrium interest rate spread.  
162
 As in the present case, these parameters are obtained through calibrations of dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model; however, in this study we estimate this parameter of spread adjusted Taylor rule 
and observe how close they are to the values proposed in the theoretical models. In addition, our goals hear is 
estimation of parameters values and models comparison between STR and standard Taylor rule. 
 
P a g e  | 200 
 
goals. We discussed optimal monetary rules from households’ inter-temporal optimizations 
and advantages of using simple monetary policy rules.  Section 4.3 -4.5 present the results 
from the simple STRs and finally concluded with what we have learned from this 
exploratory analysis. As with Ball (1999) we point out that our analysis emphasises 
empirical evaluation based on data rather than optimal rules from agents based inter-
temporal optimization models.  
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4.2. Literature Review on Monetary Policy in the face of Financial 
Instability 
One of many important lessons learned from the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008 is that price stability does not guarantee financial stability. Hence, it is possible to 
experience excessive financial instability in an environment characterised by stable prices 
(i.e. stable inflation). Goodhart (2013, p. 1)  argues that after the recent financial crisis, 
central banks have taken the goal of financial stability seriously, and therefore there is a 
need to rethink the construction of the monetary policy strategy in place. He asserts that: 
‘the line between monetary policy and financial stability has blurred as central banks have 
been forced to intervene to maintain stability and confidence in markets.’163 The idea that 
price stability should remain a primary and overriding goal for monetary policy is 
undermined by the insufficiency of standard monetary policy framework which was unable 
to address financial instability in the financial system. This deficiency resulted in a clarion 
call by many researchers to amend the standard monetary policy framework that elevates 
price stability above financial stability. For example, Villa & Yang (2011) proposes 
independent credit policy that should be used to strengthen the response of inflation 
targeting monetary policy in the face of financial instability. Currently, there is 
proliferation of monetary policy rules aimed at taking into account financial conditions 
such as financial imbalance indicators, financial stress and interest rate spreads to address 
financial instability within monetary policy framework.   
Schwarz (1998) and many others argue that price stability is the pre-requisite or 
sufficient condition for financial stability. It is pursued as the main long run goal for 
monetary authority to determine the level of inflation which is compatible with efficient 
utilization of economic resources. Furthermore, it is assumed that central banks essentially 
maintain price level stability in order to ensure financial stability which promotes sound 
banking through proper valuation of assets. For example, Issing (2003) argues that stable 
prices with properly focused monetary policy will ensure stable financial markets. Issing’s 
argument demonstrates why many central banks elevated the goal of price stabilization 
above other goals of stabilization. Price stability goal was and is still pursued with vigour 
based on the understanding that when achieved, it will guarantee the financial stability in 
the financial sector. Additionally, price stability prevents consequential outcomes of high 
and volatile inflation or deflation. Issing (2003) and others well noted in the literature that 
high and volatile inflation presents an environment for fraud, corruption and 
mismanagement of financial resources. However, the contrary is less emphasised. 
                                                           
163
 See also (Reichlin, 2013). 
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Experience now shows that price stability164 also bleeds excessive leverage and assets 
overvaluation which eventually threatens financial system through financial instability. For 
example, the period of great moderation (i.e. 2000-2006) gave birth to overconfidence and 
over leveraging of the financial sector in advanced and emerging economies. The 
unwelcome events that followed the financial crisis of 2007-2008 showed that we need a 
robust monetary policy rule. We believe that such rule must systematically and explicitly 
take into account financial instability indicators such as spreads and financial imbalance in 
monetary policy reaction function. In addition, the financial crisis showed that financial 
system can also be undermined or compromised by economics disturbances originating 
independently from inflation or deflation e.g. government debts.165  Although pre-crisis 
literature such as Issing (2003) show that financial stability and monetary stability 
reinforce each other, there was lethargy from central banks to explicitly integrate financial 
indicators into monetary policy rules. Thus, the main aim of the STR is to adjust standard 
Taylor rule such that it takes into account explicitly important financial indicators in the 
financial sector.  
Issing (2003) and Palley (2003) revealed early efforts to integrate financial stability 
in monetary policy reaction function. These authors illustrated in their work how central 
banks tried to improve monetary policy framework and how to remedy the weaknesses of 
inflation targeting strategy. For example, Issing (2003) argued that we need to understand 
that there might be some trade-off between price stability and financial stability objectives 
as introducing financial variable in monetary policy will produce conflicts between 
inflation targeting and financial stability goals. Although there might be conflicts in 
targeting price and financial stability concurrently, recent events have shown that the two 
objects need to be co-ordinated in the monetary policy strategy without waiting for one 
goal to be achieved before the other goal is attained. Curdia and Woodford  (2009) and 
Teranishi (2011) revived the subject of monetary policy in the face of financial instability 
with the proposal to add smoothed deviations of equilibrium spread to the standard Taylor 
rule. STR is just one among many proposals of feedback rules designed to address 
economic and financial shocks that create financial instability either in low inflation 
environment or in an environment where credit condition are tight and inflation creeps 
around in the corner. Similar proposal includes a credit policy that is independent from 
                                                           
164
 Borio & Lowe (2002) claim that success can breed overconfidence and banish doubt, sowing the seed of 
its own destruction. 
165
 See (Nolan & Thoenissen, 2009) for the discussion about financial structure shocks as an independent 
source of volatility in quantitative models. 
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standard Taylor rule but complementary in the mission to stabilize prices, output and 
financial sector. 
Bauducco, Bulir and Cihak (2011) argued that monetary policy that  responds to 
credit conditions instantly will trade-off more variability in output and inflation as 
compared to the standard Taylor which only responds to inflation deviation from the target 
and output gap. Bauducco, Bulir, and Cihak (2011) defined financial condition indicator as 
the rising of default rate; and in this paper they altered monetary policy so that it can 
responds simultaneously to price and financial stability. Using a new-Keynesian model in 
DSGE their result suggests that monetary policy rule amended to respond to financial 
shock can militate against the effects of financial instability. However, Bauducco, Bulir 
and Cihak (2011) did not explicitly indicate how central bank will go about to forecast the 
default rate that will prevail in the future periods as to calculate the forecast errors that 
should be included in the policy reaction function. Furthermore, they have not provided a 
motivation or justification why the default rate possesses a random component which plays 
significant role in determining the success of this policy innovation. Thus, it is a challenge 
to use this default indicator in the credit policy so that it can provide real guidance on 
monetary policy in a practical environment.  
Curdia and Woodford  (2009) and Teranishi (2011) examined the success or 
welfare gains from STR. In these papers, the authors examined how STR improves 
household welfare as compared to the standard Taylor rule without credit spread. Teranish 
(2011) theoretically analysed optimal monetary policy adjusted with credit spread in the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) with heterogonous loan contracts. He 
finds that STR is optimal in the new-Keynesian model with heterogonous loan contracts. 
STR produces welfare with minimum loss as compared to Taylor rule that does not take 
into account spread. However, he revealed that the sign for spread’s coefficient in the 
optimal monetary responses is ambiguous. Teranish (2011) concludes that the sign of 
spread in optimal monetary policy response is determined by financial structure that is, the 
cost channel and transaction cost in which the disturbance occurred.  
Taylor (2008), McCulley & Toloui (2008), and Curdia and Woodford  (2009) 
explored the ways of modifying monetary policy so that it can sufficiently respond to 
inflation and output in the face of financial instability. Curdia and Woodford  (2009) gave 
a detail analysis on how monetary policy with spread would respond to various economic 
disturbances. In this analysis, they examined one proposal: the spread in the Taylor rule. 
Firstly, they examined the impact of adjusting the standard Taylor rule with changes in 
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level of credit spread. Secondly, the effects of using spread deviations from the trend as an 
additional variable in the monetary policy rule. The algebraic presentation of the spread 
adjusted rule is as follows:166 
ö = ∗ + Ã + ZS( − ∗) + Zü( − ∗) − Zúý                                                     (5.1) 
Spread-adjusted Taylor rule (STR) is fundamentally similar to standard Taylor rule 
with one difference in the last term. The policy instrument is the usual short-term nominal 
interest rate which represents a target set by central banks. As in the standard Taylor rule, 
central bank raises nominal rate when inflation is above the target and output above the 
potential trend. In addition, central bank explicitly lowers the intercept in the Taylor rule 
by changing the interest rate spread to prevent tight credit condition from rising 
equilibrium credit spread which increases financial instability. Curdia and Woodford 
(2009) show that STR helps to maximize average welfare in the DSGE model. Other 
things being equal, a positive increase in interest rate spread will suggest that central bank 
will adjust downward nominal target by less than one percent change of the spread.167 
Interest spread is important because it is at the heart of monetary transmission mechanism 
as it was shown by wide spread effect in the credit crunch and the subsequent sovereign 
debts crisis. As shown by Bauducco, Bulir and Cihak (2011) that in the presence of 
deteriorate conditions in the financial system, central banks will adjust the rule by changes 
in the spread. This intervention will produce different outcomes as compared to the 
standard Taylor rule without spread. Financial stability is therefore recognised by many as 
equally important goal that should be explicitly included in the monetary policy rule. This 
can be done by choosing a target that recognises influence of variation of credit spread or 
the variation of private sector credit. Monetary policy strategies that incorporate financial 
information should clearly define the variables that should form parts of the reaction 
function. In addition, central bank should determine whether the financial targets should be 
defined in deviation or levels.  
Curdia and Woodford (2009) analysis used the credit spread defined as the 
difference between deposit rate (which is assumed to be equal to policy rate) and the prime 
lending rate. Credit spread enters the monetary policy rule either as level or deviation from 
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 We discussed the model in detail explaining the parameter and variables in the methodology. The 
variables can be interchanged from level of spread or deviation of the spread from the time trend. 
167
 We agree that Tinbergen Arguments against the standard Taylor rule are still applicable to STR. Issing 
(2003): (i) one instrument -one goal, Tinbergen spirit-one instrument should be assigned for one objective, ii) 
division of labor who is to do the job central bank or another independent institutions  (iii) Conflicts arises 
when trying to achieve both objectives at the same time hence central bank should indicate the degree of 
preferences, (iv) the chance of calling for more inflation which seems to be the unpopular thing to do. 
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the trend. Curdia and Woodford (2009) theoretical analysis shows that credit spread 
deviations produces better results than using the level of credit spread. This result is similar 
to Teranish (2011). However, it does not depend on the financial structure of the financial 
system. 
Hirakata, Sudo and Ueda (2011) examined the subject of spread adjusted Taylor 
rule in Japan. In this paper Hirakata, Sudo and Ueda (2011) showed that the performance 
of STR largely depends on how shocks such as financial and total productivity shocks 
influence credit spread. Thus, in the event whereby financial shock increases the external 
finance premium the STR will minimize (dampen) effects on household welfare, but this 
depends on the weight attached to credit spread by households.  The work of Teranish 
(2011) suffers from two caveats. Firstly, credit spread deviation or smoothed spread are 
non-observable variables; secondly, the elasticity of household responses to spread is not 
constant but rather depends on the level of debts household owned. In addition, other 
factors such as the recognition and implementation lags; and low inflation may prevent the 
successes and impact of the STR. For example, when there are no immediate threats to the 
goal of price stability central banks may not act fast enough to prevent credit contraction 
by equilibrium spread in the economy if price stability remains a perceived guarantor for 
financial stability. 
Borio (2004) and Borio & Lowe (2002) argued for monetary policy to incorporate 
aggregate credit in order to address the weakness of current monetary policy in the 
presence of financial instability. They argued that simple standard Taylor rules that set 
nominal policy rate target so that inflation rate will be close to its target are less optimal on 
many occasions. Hence, central bank should incorporate more financial information such 
as financial imbalance indicator in the simple standard Taylor rule. Additional financial 
indicator is needed to capture important information which may not be represented by 
inflation and output gap indicators. Borio & Lowe (2002) suggest the financial imbalance 
indicator as alternative because  it contains useful information about future developments 
in the financial system.  
4.2.1 Optimal rules versus Simple policy rules  
Estimating monetary policy rule usually raises the question of how optimal is such 
rule in comparison with other existing rules.  There are vast numbers of studies that 
compare simple monetary policy rules with optimal rules derived from inter-temporal 
optimization models. From the central bank perspective, optimal rules are justified on the 
ground that the monetary rule chosen and applied should yield optimal results i.e. minimal 
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welfare losses and induce small variation on future output as well as consumption. 
However, most monetary rules used in practice are simple policy rules that capture 
observed behaviours of central banks. Simple monetary rules are robust and perform 
statistically well in contrast to optimal rules. Keatings & Smith (2012) assert that simple 
policy rules fits data and provide clear information on the success of the simple monetary 
rule than the complex rules from welfare optimization. Simple monetary policy rule are 
easy to implement and communicate to the general public. However, successes of simple 
monetary rules are subject to data revisions and measurement errors.168 It is argued by 
many researchers that they are too simplistic and sometimes less realistic.  
Optimal monetary rules which take into account the full theoretical structure of the 
general equilibrium are complex in nature. One main advantage is that optimal rules can 
help to build a tractable monetary policy framework and are also useful to perform 
counterfactual analyses. However, Taylor & Williams (2011) claim that the benefit or 
information advantages from large optimal rules are very small as compared to simple 
monetary policy rules. Ball (1999) examined the efficient rules which minimize inflation 
and output variances. He finds that efficient rules do a better job on the variances of 
inflation and output as compared to nominal GDP targeting. However, he found that in a 
backward looking model, Taylor rule as specified with weight of 1.5 on inflation and 
output are inefficient as compared to Taylor rule with more weight on output.  
4.2.2 Augmenting monetary policy rules with Assets prices and exchange rate 
As we indicated in the introduction of this chapter, there are other important factors 
that have been considered for inclusion in the monetary policy rule i.e. whether systematic 
reactions should be called for in order to achieve price and financial stability. Of course, 
most of these alternatives are aimed at improving price stability rather the financial 
stability which is our main point of discussion. In this section, we briefly discussed two 
alternatives of augmented Taylor rules: one with asset prices (i.e real estate, stock prices), 
and second with the exchange rates. We point out the important roles of asset prices, and 
the weakness of adjusting the Taylor rule with the asset price and exchange rates. 
Firstly, augmenting Taylor rule with changes in asset prices is one of the 
alternatives overwhelm discussed in the literatures -see Lansing (2008), (Mishkin, F. S., 
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 See Stuart (1996) and Taylor & Williams (2011) for example, CPI, RPI and GDP deflator are all measures 
of inflation; however, some measures include components that are distorting the true movement of the 
inflation indicator. Secondly, the simple monetary rules use expected future inflation: but there is no 
agreement on how much in the future should be included in the simple monetary policy rule. 
P a g e  | 207 
 
2007b), Malkiel (2010), and (Borio, 2004).169 One clear example of asset price implication 
to financial instability was manifested by the catastrophic consequences of asset price 
crashes in the last global financial crisis. Asset prices had an inedible role in the 2008-2009 
global financial crises by weakening balance sheets of financial institutions and households 
through deteriorating net worth and financial distresses. Empirical evidence showed that 
asset prices lead to increases in wealth while the reverse of asset prices level results in 
sharp declines in economic activity worldwide.170 Given the important role asset price 
channel, many economists argue that central banks should react systematically to asset 
prices in addition to inflation and output gap. For example, Mishkin (2007b, p. 15) 
indicated that many economists suggest that ‘monetary policy should react to asset prices 
changes when changes in the prices provide useful information about the future 
development inflation and future path of the economy’. Proponent argues that when 
monetary policy take into account the asset price bubbles this prevent the spillover effects 
when the asset prices bubble bust.   
However, there are serious weaknesses associated with adjusting or augmenting 
Taylor rule with asset prices such as real estate and stock prices. Malkiel (2010), Goldstein 
and Weatherstone (2010) argued that asset price misalignments are difficult to recognize in 
advance. Practically, it is rarely that central bankers, financial regulators and governments 
know that asset price bubbles exist or developing in the financial market. Even those that 
claim to know in advance they rarely present convincing evidences rather than 
speculations. Furthermore, there is no reliable methodology how to tackle bubbles and 
associated misalignments effectively as interest rate rule may be a blunt tool to do the job. 
Therefore, this uncertainty about when asset prices are misaligned and time lag from 
recognition to reaction to the anomalies in asset prices may prevent monetary policy to 
take into accounts the changes in the assets prices. It is therefore unclear when monetary 
policy should respond and which assets should be considered for this role in the Taylor 
rule. Some empirical works such (Keatings & Smith, 2012) suggest augmenting Taylor 
rule with asset prices will leads worse outcome than a monetary strategy that 
systematically react to inflation and output. Hence, the monetary policy that aimed to 
target asset prices in order to prick the bubble might even cause more damage by 
accelerating the down fall and financial instability than the bubble itself. Although asset 
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 Lansing (2008) specifically suggest Taylor rule with assets although be it address the price stability. 
170
 Mishkin (2007b) pointed out that most serious economic down turns in the global economy are associated 
with financial instability.  
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price have clear implication to financial instability through leverage of both consumers and 
financial institutions this is not clearly the case with exchange rates. 
Bouyami, Laxton, Kumhof and Naknoi (2004) emphasized the benefits of exchange 
rate in monetary policy formulation, because of its ability to change relative prices of 
goods in the presence of price rigidities. Exchange rates are shock absorbers of the effects 
from the rest of the world to the domestic economy. Therefore, their inclusion in monetary 
policy rule is very important as it may help achieve the goal of price stability. It is argued 
that the advantage using exchange rate as an addition target to augment monetary policy 
rule. However, exchange rates naturally fluctuates and explosive volatile to form a stable 
indicator for monetary policy decisions. Mishkin (2007b) indicated that exchange rates are 
important prices as the depreciation can cause massive financial instability triggered by 
ensuing financial crisis.  He also argued that exchange rates excessively fluctuate 
compared to others indicators such as interest rate spreads. Hence, this incorporation of 
exchange rate will make monetary policy less transparent and obscure to the general public 
which it want to serve in the first place.  Others such as Taylor and Williams (2011) argue 
that responding systematically to exchange rates will make monetary policy too ‘herky-
jerky’ and this may create instability in its own merit to the economy.  
In all, while it is true that central bank and government care about the role of 
exchange rate and asset prices this is primarily for the goal of price stability. Hence, there 
are significant weaknesses on implementing these alternatives in order to achieve the goals 
of price stability and financial stability. Some of these indicators do not fit directly the 
characteristics desired for an indicator that should form part of systematic monetary policy 
rule.  For example, exchange rate prices are not directly concerned with financial 
instability but rather they affect the real sector thereby impacting price stability. Monetary 
policy with asset price or exchange rate are not as transparent as the spread adjusted Taylor 
rule. 171  Empirically, these innovations to augment monetary policy might be easy to 
estimate with classical regression methods. However, they might be too difficult to 
estimate using Bayesian method because they lack precise information on what should be 
the prior means and variances in the likelihood function. Therefore, these indicators are not 
easy to follow by the general public therefore they cannot serve as communicating devices 
in sending the message as to what central intending to do.  
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 This means that while it may be easy to estimate and come up with the policy parameters for asset prices 
and exchange rates it may not as transparent communicating to the general public as the case with the spread. 
For spread, it clear that central bank will systematically adjusts the target when spread by less than one 
percent when spread increase by one percent above the target. 
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4.3. Methodology: Bayesian Structures, STR Model and Result 
Presentation 
Our method of estimation and analysis in this chapter is the Bayesian linear 
regression method.  The aim is to derive Bayesian parameters by combining the sample 
data and prior information about the STR model specified by Curdia and Woodford 
(2009). 172  Taylor (2008), McCulley & Toloui (2008) considered the desirability to 
incorporate equilibrium interest rate spread in the standard Taylor rule model. The spread 
augmented Taylor rule forms the economic model which represents the likelihood function 
that will be used in the Bayesian estimation.  The economic meaning and relevance of 
standard Taylor rule is discussed in the last section. Hence, this section starts with brief 
descriptions of the structures for Bayesian analysis, and these are: prior distribution, 
likelihood function, and the posterior distribution. We discussed the Bayesian estimators 
used to obtain posterior means, priors selection and roles of prior information in the 
posterior parameters. Finally we present the posterior results and inferences of the 
posterior distributions.  
4.3.1 Bayesian Linear Regression structures 
According to Bolstad (2007) Bayesian inference procedures depart from classical 
regression methods by utilizing what is called the prior beliefs or initial information about 
the process being measured to obtain posterior model probabilities for inferences. 
Meanwhile classical regression methods such as MLE/LS emphasize the sample data while 
neglecting prior information available or already known by the researcher. Bolstad (2007) 
asserts that ‘throwing or ignoring this prior information away is wasteful of useful of 
information.’ Essentially, prior information are important in empirical analyses because 
they represent the researcher’s past experiences, existing theories or empirical evidence 
form past literature. For example, theoretical literature suggests that monetary policy  
reacts negatively to interest rate spread and the response parameter falls in the range or 
class interval of [0,1] in absolute terms.173 In addition, Taylor rule principle suggests that 
interest rate should rise by more than one and half percent to keep monetary policy 
effective when inflation increase by one percent. This information can be used as prior 
beliefs for scale parameter and prior density when estimating the STR. Bayesian method 
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 See Curdia & Woodford (2009) for detail derivation from inter-temporal utility maximization and welfare 
analysis. In their paper the spread-adjust Taylor rule is stated in current term (n=0). We argue that whether 
we use one lag or current term, this does not change the fact that output and inflation are generally available 
with the lag. Hence, STR in their paper is backward-looking model. 
173
 A value of zero means spread not part of the rule while one implies that one percent increase in the spread 
results in a cut of the same amount to target. 
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combines prior information using a single tool called Bayes theorem to generate the 
posterior distribution of parameter values in the model.  
Empirical researchers that used Bayesian methods emphasize the advantages of 
Bayesian over classical regression methods. According to Bolstad (2007, p. xxi) the main 
advantage of Bayesian method is that it relies on a single tool the Bayes theorem which is 
used in all situations. This is unlike classical methods which are clustered with so many 
formulas to obtained fixed parameters. Other advantages are that, Bayesian method can be 
applied in the face of small sample size. Bayesian is convenient when the specified model 
has many parameters to estimate –e.g. VAR system, or when the parameters of the model 
are not constant over sample period. Another advantage is the fact that the Bayesian 
method use prior information about the process being measured rather than solely depend 
on sample data information to calculate the posterior parameter values of the model 
understudy. In all, Bayesian posterior probabilities help to account for parameters 
uncertainty and risk which are expressed as probability distributions rather than fixed 
points parameters as the case in the classical regression analysis. 
Bayesian method has two main components combined to produce results called 
posterior distributions. These are: 
(i) Data Likelihood function   ¼(|(),                                                                (4.2) 
(ii) Prior Distribution    r((),                                                                              (4.3). 
The prior and likelihood are combined based on the Bayes Theorem to form a joint 
posterior distribution	r(, (). The joint distribution of data and parameter is described as  
r(, () ∝ ¼(|()r((),                                                                                                     (4.4)                     
and the marginal distribution of the data  
r() = o¼(|()r(()k(                                                                                                (4.5). 
Finally, using Bayes rule we can form a posterior distribution of parameters given the data 
as follows:174 
r((|) = (ü|)¨()¨(ü) .                                                                                                         (4.6) 
                                                           
174
 Bayes Rule:r(£, >) = r(£|>)(>) = r(>|£)r(£), implying  r(£|>)r(>) = r(>|£)r(£) or r(£|>) =¨($|)¨()¨($) . 
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In simple terms, the probability density r((|) describes what we know about β, given the 
sample data. For us to estimate this probability density by applying the Bayes theorem we 
need to formulate prior beliefs about r(() and specify the parametric model ¼(|(). 
As is the case in the classical maximum likelihood methods, the Bayesian approach 
uses the likelihood function which represents the empirical or theoretical model that 
describes the distribution of data for the given parameters or reflects the economic theory. 
We write the likelihood function in the matrix forms as follows: 
 = á( + °                                                                                                                      (4.7), 
 is a vector of nx1; (	is vector of ¢ × 1, X is j × ¢ matrix with column 1 consist of ones, 
and other elements of X are fixed variables independent from  . Further, 	is an j × 1 
vector of errors ~	A(0Ã, Iσ¦). Koop (2003) defined the variance V (|á) as follows ℎ = N/¦  for convenience purpose. He argues that it is convenient to work with error 
precision than the variance itself. So, the error term is rewritten as ~	A(0Ã,h/.I) with ­Ã×Ã as the identity matrix. From the multivariate normal density, the likelihood function 
can be written as:  
(|(, N, á) = (2N¦)// +-( − á()( − á()	.                                                      (4.8) 
After rearrangement of terms in the brackets the likelihood function is expressed as 
follows: 
(|(, ℎ) = 2/
 Fℎ+ exp n−( − (áá( − (qG (ℎ exp− ,)                        (4.9) 
Well known estimators for OLS such as, OLS estimator for  ( , population variance N¦ or 
sample variance ¦, and V -the degrees of freedom are given here as follows:175  
OLS estimator for ( = (á′á)/.á                                                                          (4.10) 
Variance N¦ = +
, − á(( − á()  or ¦ = + − á(( − á()                       (4.11), 
and the degrees of freedom V = A − ¢                                                                        (4.12). 
4.3.1.1 Priors  
Aside from specifying the likelihood function, Bayesian inference procedures 
progress in the following logical steps to posterior densities of the linear regression model. 
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 See Hayashi (2000)  Green (2003) matrix definitions of OLS estimators. Koop (2003) shows the algebraic 
procedure how to obtain the likelihood from (4.8) to (4.12). In as convection, the X is usually dropped from 
the conditional probability function. 
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We start with prior information about the parameters of the model summarized in the prior 
distribution. Choosing priors implies that we decide on what we believe are the mean 
values of the coefficients in the model. There are many different forms of prior 
distributions; however, some priors make the computation of posteriors very complex and 
cumbersome. We avoid these by choosing normal or flat conjugate priors that are 
straightforward to interpret and take the form that make computational of posteriors easier. 
It is also worthy to say that it is important that the researcher should be able to come up 
with the likelihood function otherwise it is not possible to proceed further; while for the 
priors, it is possible to use flat priors to feign ignorance about the mean and variance about 
parameters in the model. Prior distributions indicate researchers’ beliefs and information 
held about unknown parameters before looking to the data. These beliefs are updated as 
new information becomes available after looking to the sample data.  In this Bayesian 
estimation we used three kinds of priors: non-informative priors and informative priors 
(this also known as flat priors and normal priors); and empirical Bayesian priors derived 
from pre-sample OLS estimation. Bagasheva, Fabozzi, Hsu, & Rachev (2008) show that 
prior distributions account for uncertainty and risk around the parameters; and thus, they 
incorporate information necessary to estimate parameters. Generally, it is convenient to 
work with priors that come from same class of distributions as the posteriors. These priors 
are called Natural Conjugate priors. Natural Conjugate priors when combined with the 
likelihood function yield a posteriors distribution that have similar characteristics as the 
priors. The joint prior distribution for ( and ℎ,+ is given as follow:176 
r((, ℎ) = r((|ℎ)r(ℎ)                                                                                                    (4.13) 
(|ℎ	~A((,	ℎ/.)                                                                                                          (4.14) 
ℎ	~ù(/., V)                                                                                                                  (4.15). 
Equation (4.14) is normally distributed with the mean ( and variance	ℎ/., and equation 
(4.15) is the Gamma distribution with the mean /.	and	V O jp	V. Hence, the joint prior 
distribution for (4.14) and (4.15) forms the Normal-Gamma prior distribution which is a 
natural conjugate prior for the parameters ( and	ℎ. Take note: the underscore notation is 
used to distinguish hyper-parameters (i.e. the parameters before see the data) from 
posteriors parameters (i.e. parameters after updating our prior beliefs sample data). The 
natural conjugate prior is noted as follows: 
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 The mathematical proofs of the these formulae are given in Koop (2003) and Greenberg (2013). See also 
Bolstad (2007) for further analytical solutions. 
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 (, ℎ	~Aù((, , /¦, V)                                                                                                  (4.16). 
The hyper-parameter ( is a ¢ × 1 vector of coefficients, and  is ¢ × ¢	 priors variance-
covariance matrix. The parameter V  represents the fictitious sample that is assumed to 
generate the hypermeters set by the researcher before looking to the data. The researcher 
chooses the priors  ( , 	, /¦ and V  as priors information which are combined with the 
likelihood function in order to form the posterior distributions.  
4.3.1.2 Posterior 
The posterior is the ‘result’ which is the main object of interest in Bayesian 
estimation. This is obtained as proportional product of the likelihood function and joint 
prior’s distribution.  Posterior density summarizes the information contained in the priors 
and sample data about the unknown parameters ( and ℎ. Individual posteriors are obtained 
from the marginal posterior distribution of (, ℎ  conditional on data which is given as 
follows:  
(, ℎ|	~Aù((, , /¦, V)                                                                                               (4.17), 
Whereby 
 = (/. 	+ á′á)/.                                                                                                     (4.18), 
( = (/.	( + á′á()                                                                                                  (4.19), 
V = V + A                                                                                                                      (4.20), 
/¦ is implicitly defined as  V¦ = V¦ + V¦ + (,)
5(),+                                            (5.21). 
As can be seen, the posterior distribution in equation (4.17) is similar to the prior 
distribution in equation (4.16) with both distributions drawn from a Normal–Gamma 
distribution.  However, the parameters in the posteriors are noted with a-bar on top to 
distinguish them from hyper-parameters. This differentiation is necessary to indicate that 
the posterior parameters represent updated parameters that reflect information from the 
sample data and prior beliefs. Equation (4.19) show that the posterior mean of ( is a matrix 
weighted average of information in the error precision of the prior variance  (/.) and the 
sample data	á′á/.. These two components play a significant role in determining the value 
the posterior mean ( . The weights are the proportions of the error precisions to the 
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posteriors precision. Lastly, we gave the posterior distribution of ℎ  conditional on the 
sample data. This is given as follows: 
ℎ|	~ù(/¦, V)                                                                                                            (4.22). 
The mean and variance of ℎ given by: 
%(ℎ|) = /¦, and  
V (ℎ|) = ,

.                                                                                                             (4.23) 
At this juncture, we briefly explain the roles and implications of different priors in the 
posterior distribution. We start with roles of non-informative priors in the posterior 
distributions. Non-informative priors are obtained by setting a larger variance   which 
means that   	→ ∞ ( i.e. more uncertainty about the posterior mean); and by setting the 
pre-sample of the prior V = 0.  The former implies that when that   	→ ∞ , then  /. ≈ 0 
in equation (4.18). Meanwhile the V = 0 shows that posterior sample is equal to the data 
sample in (4.20). Thus, in the case of non-informative priors,   is completely driven by 
information from the data sample. Similarly when   is very large (i.e. /. ≈ 0  ) the 
equation (4.19) will also imply that the posterior mean  ( will equal to (  from the data. In 
summary, when we use non-informative priors the posterior parameters contain 
information from the likelihood function only (i.e. the information from the sample data). 
Therefore, arguably the results estimated under non-informative prior’s assumption should 
be as close to the results from OLS regression. This is because the Bayesian estimator for ( under non-informative priors is the same as the estimator for  (  under the OLS. The 
Bayesian estimators given in equations (4.17) to (4.21) illustrate the quantities involved 
under informative prior’s assumption. These normal conjugate prior distributions allows us 
to combine it with likelihood function formulated under normal conditions to analytically 
calculate the posterior distribution which will also be a normal conjugate posterior 
distribution as given in (4.14) and (4.15). For convenience in the estimation, there are 
common procedures that Bayesian econometricians follow to obtain priors for hyper-
parameters in (4.17). For example, a Bayesian econometrician can start with non-
informative priors; theory informative prior; or use OLS estimates for (  from a regression 
run on pre-sample data. The advantage of non-informative is that the researcher 
demonstrates that he is unsure of the exact parameters the model should take. In the case of 
theory based informed prior, we can use the parameter values and variance which are 
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already suggested in the theory and therefore gauge the impact such priors on posterior 
values.  
4.3.1.3 Bayesian Models’ Comparison 
The last Bayesian result for statistical inferences we would like to discuss is called 
the posterior odd ratio. The posterior odd ratio is derived from the Bayes theorem, and it 
shows which among many models analyzed by the researcher are supported by the prior 
beliefs and sample data. The ratio allows the researcher to make comparisons between two 
or more models conditional on the sample data. In this study, we calculated the posterior 
odd ratio so that we can compare between the Taylor Rule models as to which model is 
supported by the prior beliefs and sample data. We start with the standard Taylor Rule 
without spread as model one (M1) nested into the simple Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule as 
model two (M2). The standard Taylor Rule is nested into Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule 
because the two models only differ by the last term	ý in (5.1) which captures the interest 
rate spread, while the rest of the terms in the models are the same. Simply the standard 
Taylor rule can be regarded as the restricted model with the coefficient on the spread set 
equal to zero while STR is the unrestricted model. The posterior odd ratio is given by:  
.¦ = ¨(+|ü)¨(|ü)                                                                                                                (4.24) 
.¦ = F¨+¨G Fo+(ü|\+,+)S(\|+)Â\+o(ü|\,)S(\|)Â\G                                                                              (4.25) 
The first term in equation (4.25) represents the odd ratio whereby the r.	and r¦ are prior 
probabilities attached to model one and model two. The second term is the ratio of the 
marginal likelihoods from M1 and M2. The posterior odd ratio (PO12) is given by the 
product of the prior’s odd ratio multiplied and the marginal likelihood ratio.177 In the case 
whereby the researcher attaches equal weights (i.e. equal probabilities p1 and p2) on each 
model the posterior odd ratio equals the ratio of marginal likelihoods. The odd ratio is 
interpreted as follows: a large value of PO12 points to empirical evidence in favour of M1 
that is M1 is better supported by the prior information and the sample data; a small value of 
PO12 less than one indicates that M2 is better supported by sample data and the prior 
information than M1. Meanwhile, PO12 around 1 indicates that both models are all equally 
supported by sample data and the prior information. 
Having defined the Bayesian estimators involved in the Bayesian linear regression, 
we are now ready to set values for the priors and provide the motivations for our prior 
                                                           
177
 The subscripts 12 in (P12 ) refers to model 1 compared to mode 2. 
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means and variances in the parametric model. Our empirical model is the Spread-adjusted 
Taylor rule suggested by Taylor (2008) and McCulley & Toloui (2008) and discussed in 
the theory of Curdia & Woodford, 2009 (2009). In this study we restrict our Bayesian 
analysis to three forms of priors: non-informative priors, theory based informative priors 
and empirical Bayesian priors derived from OLS results.  
4.3.2 Simple Spread-Adjusted Taylor Rule  
STR is described as the standard Taylor rule augmented with another term ‘credit 
spread’ (or simple spread) which adjusts nominal policy rate downwards by a fraction of 
changes in the current credit spread. As given in equation (4.26): ö∗ represents the target-
rate (repo rate) which responds to inflation rate, output gap and changes in the level of 
spread. Thus, depending on the framework pursued by individual central banks, we 
assumed that nominal target rate is set in response to past inflation, output gap and current 
spread level; or in the case of forward-looking the nominal target rate set in anticipation of 
that expected inflation will increase above the inflation target, output gap forecast and 
current changes in the spread. Teranishi (2011) and Taylor (2008) show that the Central 
Bank reacts negatively to spread in the money market to improve economic conditions for 
growth. Simple STR includes the spread as a financial indicator which explicitly captures 
financial information to achieve the goal of financial stability. Simple STR target and the 
backward-looking STR are specified as follows:  
ö∗ = Z& + ZS( − ∗) − ZU(!) − Zúý                                                STR (target) (4.26) 
ö = Z& + ZS(/Ã − ∗) − ZU(!/Ã) − Zúý + E                                            STR (4.27)                                                                                         
We explain the variables in the rule as follows: 
ö∗  represents the target repo rate178  (expressed as a monthly or quarterly percentage), 
which is the nominal overnight repo rate for bank reserves. Repo rate is the price at which 
banks charge each other for overnight loans. πt = inflation rate – this is a four quarterly 
average consumer price inflation in percentage term. π* = inflation target set by the 
monetary policy committee in quarterly percentage term. (/Ã − ∗), this is the deviation 
of inflation from its target. We assumed that SA has a fixed-inflation target, although 
practically, SA has the inflation target range of 3-6%. So our assumption implicitly means 
a fixed annual inflation target of approximately 4.5%.  !/Ã = ( − ∗) is the output gap 
or deviation of GDP from its trend expressed in quarterly percentage term.    = real GDP 
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 This is central bank’s monetary policy rate referred to as repurchase rate (repo rate) in the South Africa. 
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(400xlog) and ∗ = real potential GDP (400xlog). For simplicity, we assumed that ∗ is the 
long run aggregate output which matches full-employment and the natural rate of 
employment.  
Spread is our main variable of focus in the Taylor rule. ∆ω represents the changes 
in the level of spread while  ý = (ý − ý∗)   is the deviation of spread from the trend 
obtained from HP-filter. ý  is the cyclical component of the spread and ý∗ is the trend 
component of the spread. We use three different spread indicators credit spread, base 
spread and risk premium. Credit spread is difference between 10 year government bond 
and 1 year government bond in SA. Base spread is defined as the difference between the 
prime lending rate and the repo rate. Risk premium is the difference between the prime 
lending rates and short term risk-free rates. When we use deviation of the spread we are 
assuming that there is a specific natural equilibrium spread or target spread that stabilises 
the financial sector interest rate spreads. Thus, the deviation from this target or natural path 
makes monetary authority to adjust the intercept by  Zú weight. Taylor (2008) suggested a 
value approximately ≈ 0.5 of percentage point of the smoothed spread. The parameter Zú	 is a prior expected to be negative and has the absolute magnitude 	Zú 	 ∈ (0,1 . If Zú = 0  we have the standard Taylor rule, while Zú < 0 suggests that the Central Bank 
reacts negatively to spread by adjusting the intercept downwards by the value of Zú when 
spread increases above the trend by one percent. The backward-looking model in (4.27) 
gives the likelihood function of STR. 
¼(|Z, á) = Z& + ZS( − ∗) + ZU(!) − Zúý + E.                                    (4.28) 
This likelihood function has three independent variables and intercept. In the following 
section we set the prior values for informative priors and variances on these coefficients (θ0 
θπ θx θω) and the error term E . In our first estimation, we applied theory informed prior 
and non-informative priors, followed empirical Bayesian priors to estimate the posterior 
means.  
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4.4. Data and Prior Setting 
To estimate the STR model through Bayesian linear regression method, we used 
monthly data from South Africa with the sample that starts from January 1991 to 
September 2013. We used the first 38 observations - from January 1991 to December 
1993- to derive pre-sample empirical Bayesian priors from OLS. The overall sample 
period covers both pre-inflation target regime from 1991 to 2000 and inflation targeting 
regime which started from January 2000 until now. Spread-adjusted Taylor rule is 
expressed as a linear relationship with the repo rate as policy variable, inflation rate and 
quarterly real GDP or (monthly) Producers Price Index (PPI) represent demand and supply 
economic factors while the spread indicator captures the effects of financial conditions.179  
Next, we used three measures of spread interchangeably. Alternative measures of 
spread are motivated by the fact that literature about the Spread-adjusted Taylor rule does 
not clearly specify the type of spread that should be augmented into the rule. This lack of 
specificity in the rule shows one limitation about the application of Spread-adjusted Taylor 
rule.  While this might be a setback, we wish to point out that in the last chapter we 
established that on average, most spreads are co-integrated in the long run; thus, it means 
that statistically all three measures of spread contain information about the true 
representative spread (equilibrium spread) in the economy. Although, it is possible that in 
the short run these spreads do not show perfect correlations among each other, however in 
the long run, they follow the equilibrium spread.   
Globally, and as well as in SA the trends for repo rate, money market interest rates 
and inflation have been falling in the last two decades. These patterns are observed in 
Figure 5-1 showing trends for repo rate, inflation, growth rate for producer price index, 
credit spread and risk premium. SA repo rate varies between 5 – 18 percent while inflation 
varies between 0.5 percent and 14 percent. Although volatile, industrial production 
remained in the range of -1 to 2 percent while quarterly real GDP varied between -0.4 and 
6 percent inflation varied between 0.2 and 15 percent while spreads gravitate around the 
mean between 0 and 5.0 percent over the sample period. Next, we used this information 
and our general knowledge about the SA’s economy to set prior means for parameter 
values in the STR model. 
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 We used the PPI as an indicator for economic activity in the place of real GDP. Quarterly real GDP 
figures were used in the estimation for robust analysis to check whether this will improve the statistics on 
output in the STR. 
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Figure 4-1 Repo, Inflation, PPI, Credit spread, Base Spread and Risk premium trends. 
4.4.1 Priors -setting 
Firstly, it is well known that the South Africa Reserve Bank (SARB) monetary 
policy is based on an inflation targeting framework with the annual target range fixed 
between 3.0 – 6.0 percent. We assume that on average the nominal repo rate posits the 
average nominal target of 4.5 percent plus 2.0180 percent average nominal interest rate 
observed in advanced economies. Thus, in equation (4.28) we set the prior mean for Z& = 
6.5 percent in the STR model. The posterior mean for Z& represents the average expected 
mean for the policy rate-target set by the monetary policy committee given that inflation 
rate, output and spread remained constant. For the rest of the parameters, we used prior 
means from the literature. Inflation prior mean is set as θπ = 1.5 percent. This prior mean 
value is derived from the Taylor rule principle which suggests that monetary policy target 
should move in the same direction as inflation by an amount greater than the increase 
observed in inflation. When inflation rate increases by one percent above the target, the 
Central Bank needs to raise interest rates by more than one and half percent.181  Next, the 
prior mean for output is set as θx = 0.5 percent.  The prior mean for output is set at a value 
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 A 2.0 percent nominal policy rate corresponds to the average nominal rate in major economies Canada, 
US and UK. 
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 See Woodford (2001) 
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less than the weight on inflation to indicate central banks’ preferences for more weight on 
inflation than output. Simply, price stability guarantees financial and economic stability in 
the long run. In addition, prior mean 0.5 percent is observed on output in the studies such 
as Taylor (1993).182 Lastly, spread is suggested to take a prior mean between 0 and 1 in 
absolute terms. Hence, we set prior mean for θω = -0.5 percent. This hyper-parameter is set 
midway of the interval suggested by Taylor (2008, p. 2), Curdia & Woodford (2009) and 
McCulley & Toloui (2008). Altogether the column vector for the prior means is given as 
follows: 
	 = (6.5, 1.5, 0.5, −0.5) . 
The above informative priors are derived from standard literature concerning 
Spread-adjusted Taylor rule and also based on our knowledge about the SA’s monetary 
policy. However, the difficult exercise lies in how to choose the variances that we should 
attach to individual priors in the model. Variance represents the degree of confidence we 
have in these prior densities. Thus it captures the precision errors which specifically help 
us to determine the lower and upper bounds of an increase in inflation, output and spread 
for a one unit change.183  Generally, population variance statistics are rarely known or 
given, thus we based these estimates on our prior knowledge about the variation of 
monetary policy target in SA. For example, monetary policy targets are commonly 
adjusted by 25 basis points with exceptions to crisis periods. This practice makes policy 
targets to move in a lock steps pattern as can be seen in Figure 4-1.  Many central banks 
employ this strategy to ensure a gradual process from a current target level to a desired 
target level which stabilises inflation and output. This is done to avoid policy surprises or 
sudden stops in the economy due to large changes in the policy target. Therefore with this 
prior information in mind, we assumed that a conservative monetary policy committee 
adjusts the target for the next three quarters by a percentage within the range of 0.25 - 3.0 
percent. This means the committee is ready to make an error less than 3.0 percent overall 
until the next revision.  Since we assume Gaussian errors, this means the 3.0 percent off-
target translates into a standard deviation () of approximately 1.5 percent errors either 
way. Alternatively, a non-conservative monetary policy committee may be satisfied with 
6.5 percentages overall which translate into  =	3.25 percentage errors either above or 
below the target. Using this strategy helps to ensure that 95% of errors of non-conservative 
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 Koop (2003) indicated that usually choices of prior means are based on economic theory, or common 
sense knowledge from earlier studies that used different data sets. 
183
 Prior variance represents the degree of confidence a researcher has in the informative priors – with large 
variances reflecting uncertainty while small variances reflect high confidence about each prior. 
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monetary policy committee will be less than 6.375 percent while the former will yield 95% 
errors less than 2.94 percent (i.e. 2.94 % of target). Adopting the choice for non-
conservative monetary policy implies that the sample variance is ¦ = 40.64	  and the 
standard deviation  = 6.5	percent. This means that we set the value of the error precision 
in equation (5.14) as 	ℎ = +
ç. . This implies that sample variance equals	/¦ = 	2.46 ×10/¦.  We set prior variance for Z& the intercept equals s2= 8.452 percent and the prior 
variance for inflation at ¦ = 8.45¦	percent. This implies the effects of inflation (.i.e. the 
posterior density of	Z&	 jk	ZS) will fall within (1.96 − 6.5; 6.5 + 1.96) 95% intervals. 
For output, we set the variance of ¦ = 6.25¦ percent while the prior variance for spread is 
set at 3.705 percent which means the standard deviation s = 1.925 percent. As can be seen 
above, these priors’ elicitations are rough and readily based on our knowledge. Thus, we 
set pre-sample V = 3 when assuming informative priors and V = 0	for the non-informative 
priors.184 A pre-sample of V = 3	implies that we attached less than 1 percent of the sample 
to the prior variances above. Bolstad (2007) suggests another strategy that seems 
transparent in choosing the priors for Z	 jk	N. First, we decide on what we think is the 
mean for each parameter. Second, we decide on what we think are the points below and 
above that should be lower and upper bounds of the dependent variable. Finally, divide the 
difference by 6; this will give you the prior standard deviation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
184
 This implies that these variances are derived from a fictious sample of three observations. This is about 1% 
of the total sample (276 observations) used in the study (Koop, 2003, pp. for more details see 48-54).  
P a g e  | 222 
 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Posterior Distributions: Results based on Informative priors  
Table 4-1 presents the summary of posterior distributions for the regression 
coefficients in the Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule with credit spread. Meanwhile, the results 
from STR model with two alternative measures of spread: base spread and risk premium 
spreads are presented in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.  The results in each table are given in the 
following order: the prior means (see column three), posterior means, standard deviations, 
credibility intervals with lower and upper bounds185, probability posteriors and posterior 
odd ratios. The Informative priors in column (2) are the theory-informed priors derived 
from literature on Spread-adjusted Taylor rule while results based on empirical Bayesian 
priors are given in Tables 4-4 to 4-6. 
For easy interpretation, the coefficients in the vector θkx1 represent the marginal 
effects on expected values for the dependent variable (repo rate) given a small change in 
the value of the independent variables (i.e. inflation, output, and spread). The standard 
deviations and 95% credible interval estimates provide measures of uncertainty around the 
posterior mean. Using the credibility intervals in conjunction with the posterior probability 
we assessed whether the posterior means are individually different from zero. Specifically, 
we are interested to know whether our belief of Zú = 0 is credible given the data. In 
addition, these criteria and posterior odd ratios are used to evaluate the following 
hypotheses r(Z&, ZS , ZU, Zú > 0|, Y) and make model comparisons about which model is 
better supported by the prior beliefs and the sample data. For the sake of space, in column 
(8) we provide the posterior odd ratio for the spread, the remainder variables we already 
know form part of the standard Taylor rule. Thus, we only need the posterior odd ratio for 
the spread in standard Taylor rule. A posterior odd ratio greater than one suggests that 
Taylor rule without spread is better supported by the priors and sample data while the 
posterior odd ratio less than one shows the results are in favour of the Spread-adjusted 
Taylor rule. If the posterior odd ratio is equal to one or close to one then there are no 
significant differences between the two models. 
 
 
                                                           
185
 Note: The (-) under non-informative prior imply a zero mean. Credibility interval (CDI) indicates the 
degree of confidence that a parameter lies within the confidence bounds. This means that every point inside 
the credible intervals has higher believability than any point outside the CDI. The Bayesian credible interval 
for Z is the posterior mean ± the critical value × the posterior standard deviation i.e. (Z − 1.96 × ; 	Z +1.96 × ). 
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Table 4-1 Summary of Posterior Distribution for the coefficients (θ0 θπ θx θω): STR model 
with Credit Spread  
Part A Coeff. Informative 
Priors 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post. 
ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& 6.5 7.5346 0.6503 6.2590 8.8102 1 - 
 ZS 1.5 0.5880 0.0856 0.4200 0.7559 1 - 
 ZU 0.5 0.6729 1.0460 -1.3791 2.7249 0.74 - 
 Zú -0.5 -0.5502 0.1264 -0.7979 -0.3025 0.00 0.0096 
 
Part 
B 
Coeff. Priors Non-
Informative 
Posterior  
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post. 
ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& - 7.5790 0.6681 6.2683 8.8896 1 na 
 ZS - 0.5827 0.0877 0.4107 0.7546 1 na 
 ZU - 0.6725 1.0590 -1.4051 2.7500 0.73 na 
 Zú - -0.5549 0.1279 -0.8057 -0.3040 0.00 na 
Notes: Part A contains posterior results under informative priors, while Part B contains results based on non-
informative priors. CDI- refers 95% credibility intervals. Probpos –probability posterior. Na- posterior odd 
ratio is not available from models with non-informative priors. 
We start with the results in Table 4-1 Parts A and B, with Part A showing the 
results obtained under informative priors and Part B under non-informative priors’ 
assumptions. In Part A, the posterior means are approximately equal to the results obtained 
under non-informative priors which reflect OLS estimates.186 Although there are small 
indications of posterior means shrunk towards the priors; these results suggest that the 
posterior means are largely influenced by the sample data information rather than the prior 
information used in the model. In addition, the posterior means obtained under informative 
prior falls between the priors and the posterior means under non-informative priors which 
indicate more weight attached to the sample data than priors.  
We interpret these posterior values as follows. Under informative priors, the 
intercept is estimated with the posterior mean equal to 7.5346 percent. This posterior mean 
represents the average expected mean for the target set by monetary policy committee 
conditional on the sample data and that no changes have occurred in other economic 
factors that enters the STR model. On average and after observing data, it is certain that the 
expected mean of the target is positive and it takes probability values within the (6.2590; 
8.8102) 95% credibility interval. In the case of inflation, the posterior mean is estimated at 
0.5880 percent (58 basis points). This posterior mean represents the marginal effects for a 
one percent increase in inflation above the inflation-target. Other things being equal, 
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 Koop (2003) shows that the Bayesian estimators for a linear regression model under non-informative 
priors are similar to OLS estimators. This is because Bayesian estimators under non-informative priors are 
closely equal to OLS estimators. 
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monetary policy committee in SA will raise the policy target by more than 0.5880 percent 
to counter the increase in inflation by one percent above the target. The posterior mean for 
inflation is somewhat smaller compared to the prior mean theoretically suggested by the 
Taylor rule principle. According to Walsh (2010), the Taylor rule principle implies a 
coefficient between 1 and 1.5 percent as a weight attached on inflation. Our posterior mean 
for inflation is much lower than 1.5 percent in the Taylor rule principle. The posterior 
mean for output gap is estimated at 0.67 percent. This value represents the marginal effects 
in response to one percent increase in output. This posterior mean shows that ‘other things 
being equal’ the South Africa Reserve Bank will raise the repo rate target by 0.6729 
percent in response to one percent increase above the potential output. However, the 
picture is not clear-cut about the significance of the posterior mean for output under 
informative and non-informative results. Evaluating this posterior mean using credibility 
intervals shows that θx could be zero; however, the probability posterior shows that there is 
a 74% chance that θx is positive hence the Null Hypothesis:	r(ZU > 0|) is not rejected. 
Credibility intervals under informative priors show that the 95% symmetric Bayesian 
intervals for θx is (-1.3791, 2.7249), while under non-informative prior the interval is (-
1.4051, 2.7500). These credibility intervals include zero which suggests that we cannot 
rule out the possibility that this variable has zero influence in the determination of 
monetary policy target using the STR model. Using the credibility interval at 95% we find 
that there is evidence to suggest that the posterior means θ0, θπ >0|y, and the θω <0|y. 
However, the posterior mean for output gap is probably equal to zero whether we use 
informative or non-informative priors.  This uncertainty around θx is clear from the fact 
that its associated credibility intervals are not entirely negative or entirely positive. 
Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the posterior mean of θx is equal to zero. 
Our main goal is to examine whether there is empirical evidence to suggest that the 
Central Bank systematically reacts negatively to spread in the Spread-adjusted Taylor rule. 
Empirically from this Bayesian estimation this means based on the credibility interval and 
posterior probability criteria, we would like to reject the following null hypothesis:	r(Zú >0|, Y).  The results for posterior parameter value on credit spread show that whether we 
use theory-based informative prior or non-informative prior we find that the posterior mean 
θω = - 0.5502 percent. The posterior mean for the spread in the STR model given the data 
is less than zero and these results are consistent with the  95% credible interval with the (-
0.7979; -0.3025) lower and upper bounds. Thus, using the probability posterior in 
conjunction with the 95% credible interval we reject the null hypothesis that θω >0|y. In all, 
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we find that on average a higher credit spread is associated with probability that the policy 
target will be adjusted downward by 55 basis points in response to a marginal increase of 
one percent in credit spread. The posterior mean is likely to vary between -79 and -30 basis 
points with 95 % credible intervals. In addition, we find that an increased inflation rate 
above the target by one percent is associated with probability that the repo rate target will 
be raised by an amount within the range of 42 -75 basis points, while little can be said 
about central banks’ reaction to a marginal increase in output .  
Table 4-2 Summary of Posterior Distribution for the coefficients (θ0 θπ θx θω): STR model 
with Base Spread 
Part 
A 
Coeff. Informative 
Priors 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post. 
ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& 6.5 12.1433 1.7800 8.6514 15.6351 1 - 
 ZS 1.5 0.7603 0.0791 0.6052 0.9155 1 - 
 ZU 0.5 -0.1354 1.0413 -2.1781 1.9073 0.44 - 
 Zú -0.5 -1.8600 0.5132 -2.8667 -0.8533 0.00 0.0381 
 
Part 
B 
Coeff. Priors Non- 
Informative 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post.ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& - 14.5896 2.1251 10.4208 18.7584 1 na 
 ZS - 0.7373 0.0797 0.5811 0.8936 1 na 
 ZU - -0.2141 1.0451 -2.2643 1.8360 0.41 na 
 Zú - -2.5302 0.6037 -4.0912 -1.3460 0.00 na 
Notes: Part A contains posterior results under informative priors, while Part B contains results based on non-
informative priors. CDI- refers 95% credibility intervals. Probpos –probability posterior. 
We repeated the same exercise however, with different measures of spread and the 
results are presented in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3. The use of alternative measures of spread 
is motivated by the fact that there is no agreement as to which spread should be used in the 
estimation of Spread-adjusted Taylor rule. Apart from the spread, other variables in the 
model remain the same and so their priors do too. Table 4-2 parts A and B summarises the 
posterior distributions of STR with the base spread.  Base spread represents the margins 
over the repo rate (i.e. policy rate) set by financial institutions after borrowing from the 
Central Bank. Empirical results of STR with the base spread show some minor differences 
such as large posterior mean for the intercept and inflation much higher than earlier 
observed while output and spread have much lower posterior means than results in Table 
4-1. Credibility interval and probability posteriors associated with the intercept and 
inflation confirms that these parameters are significantly positive. Similarly, we cannot 
make a clear conclusion about the posterior density for output. The probability posterior 
shows that the null hypothesis is not rejected while the associated credibility interval 
contains zero. The posterior mean for base spread is negative and it falls within the 
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negative credible interval. However, the magnitude of the posterior mean seems overstated 
as one percent increase in the spread suggests that monetary policy committee will 
aggressively lower the policy target by more than -1.86 percent. Although such aggressive 
reactions are a possibility, we argue that such drastic monetary policy actions are limited to 
crisis periods.  
Table 4-3 Summary of Posterior Distribution for the coefficients (θ0 θπ θx θω): STR model 
with Risk premium 
Part 
A 
Coeff. Informative 
Priors 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post.ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& 6.5 5.0744 0.3806 4.3278 5.8209 1 - 
 ZS 1.5 0.4442 0.0562 0.3339 0.5545 1 - 
 ZU 0.5 -0.2474 0.7070 -1.6343 1.1396 0.36 - 
 Zú -0.5 3.5675 0.2037 3.1679 3.9670 1 2.85x10-42 
 
Part B Coeff. Priors Non- 
Informative 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post 
ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& - 5.0307 0.3883 4.2690 5.7924 1 na 
 ZS - 0.4492 0.0570 0.3373 0.5611 1 na 
 ZU - -0.2436 0.7150 -1.6463 1.1590 0.36 na 
 Zú - 3.5732 0.2048 3.1715 3.9750 1 na 
Notes: Part A contains posterior results under informative priors, while Part B contains results based on non-
informative priors. CDI- refers 95% credibility intervals. Probpos –probability posterior. Na- posterior odd 
ratio is not available from models with non-informative priors. 
In Table 4.3 we present the results from STR model augmented with risk premium. 
Risk premium is the difference between the prime lending rates and short term risk-free 
rates. This premium represents the private sector’s assessment of the risks of investing in 
short term bonds. We observed that the posterior mean for θω is significantly different 
from earlier results for spread. When we use risk premium as measure of spread the 
magnitude of θω is over-stated and it is positive. This is contrary to the theoretical 
proposition that central banks react negatively to spread with a magnitude between 0 and 1 
percent in absolute terms. Lastly, Table 4-1 to 4-3 show the posterior odd ratios of 0.009, 
0.038, and 2.85 × 10/.¦ which are close to zero. These posterior odd ratios are in favour 
of the Spread-adjusted Taylor rule than the standard Taylor rule without spread. Next, we 
discuss the posterior results obtained under pre-sample data priors.  
We find that credit spread produces consistent results closely to what is predicted 
by Akinci (2013) and Taylor (2008). STR model with credit spread shows that whether we 
use theory motivated priors, or non-informative priors, the posterior means obtained are 
negative and have magnitudes between 0 and 1 in absolute term. In addition, the estimated 
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posterior means for the intercept, inflation, and spread fall within credible intervals. This 
Bayesian estimation could not find conclusive evidence about the marginal effects of 
output in the STR model. Credibility intervals and probability posterior criteria both give 
conflicting results. The results for the posterior odd ratio show that the STR is better 
supported by the prior beliefs and the sample data. 
4.4.2 Posterior Distributions: Results based on empirical Bayesian priors  
Table 4-4 Summary of Posterior Distribution for the coefficients (θ0 θπ θx θω): STR model 
with Credit Spread  
 Coeff. Emp. 
Bayesian 
Priors 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post. ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& 7.39 7.4539 0.3905 6.6877 8.8200 1 - 
 ZS 0.63 0.5977 0.0587 0.4825 0.7128 1 - 
 ZU 0.54 0.6725 1.0349 -1.3576 2.7027 0.73 - 
 Zú -0.51 -0.5410 0.1125 -0.7618 -0.3203 0.00 1.156x10-4 
Notes: Posterior results under empirical Bayesian priors; CDI- refers 95% credibility intervals, and Probpos –
probability posterior. 
Tables 4-4 to Table 4-6 present the results based on empirical Bayesian priors. We did not 
present non-informative results here because they are the same as those given in part B in 
Tables 4-1 to 4-3. Empirical Bayesian priors in column (2) are obtained from OLS 
regression results based on the pre-sample January 1991 to December 1994. The prior 
vector of Z is given as follows: (θ0, θπ, θx, θω) = (7.39, 0.63, 0.53, -0.51). Firstly, based on 
these empirical Bayesian priors, the average expected posterior mean is estimated at 
7.4539 percent. This parameter value is close to 7.5346 percent and 7.5790 percent 
obtained under theory-based informed priors and non-informative priors’ assumptions in 
Table 4-1. These results show that the posterior means in θ are pulled toward non-
informative results. Although, our prior means 6.5 and 7.39 percent average target fall 
within the credibility intervals it seem we have underestimated the intercept of the repo 
rate when compared with the posterior mean of 7.4539 percent above. The posterior mean 
for inflation is estimated at 0.5977 percent which is 97 basis points higher than the result 
obtained under theory of informed priors. Results obtained show that regardless of whether 
we use theory informed priors, empirical Bayesian priors or non-informative priors, the 
probability posterior that θπ >0|y is certain; and this result is consistent irrespective of the 
measures of spread included in the STR. Therefore, the probability weights 1.0 – 1.5 
percents implied that the standard Taylor rule seems to overstate the reaction of monetary 
policy committee to inflation above the inflation target in SA. Our results again show that 
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the marginal effects of output in the STR remain inconclusive under empirical Bayesian 
priors. The posterior parameter on the credit spread is estimated at -0.5410 percent.  
Table 4-5 Summary of Posterior Distribution for the coefficients (θ0 θπ θx θω): STR model with Base Spread 
 Coeff. Emp. 
Bayesian 
Priors 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post. 
ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& 10.48 10.7981 0.4684 9.8793 11.7170 1 - 
 ZS 0.65 0.7101 0.0509 0.6103 0.8100 1 - 
 ZU -2.07 0.1505 0.8966 -1.6083 1.9094 0.56 - 
 Zú -1.07 -1.3878 0.1715 -1.7241 -1.0514 0.00 6.15x10-
11 
Notes: Posterior results under empirical Bayesian priors; CDI- refers 95% credibility intervals, and Probpos –
probability posterior. 
Table 4-6 Summary of Posterior Distribution for the coefficients (θ0 θπ θx θω): STR model 
with Risk premium 
 Coeff. Emp. 
Bayesian 
Priors 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post. Odd 
Ratio 
 Z& 4.89 4.8840 0.2483 4.3969 5.3711 1 - 
 ZS 0.53 0.4765 0.0425 0.3931 0.5599 1 - 
 ZU -0.17 -0.2136 0.6752 -1.5382 1.1110 0.37 - 
 Zú 2.99 3.5128 0.1906 3.1388 3.8868 1 3.36x10-44 
Notes: Posterior results under empirical Bayesian priors; CDI- refers 95% credibility intervals, and Probpos –
probability posterior. 
In Table 4-5, the posterior mean for base spread is -1.3878 percent this is higher than the -
1.8600 percent obtained under theory informed priors in Table 4-2. Similarly, the results in 
Table 5-6 show that risk premium is estimated with positive marginal effects in the STR 
model. Using these results, we can infer that there is evidence to suggest that SARB 
systematically reacts negatively to credit spread and based spread in the Spread-adjusted 
Taylor rule. Our empirical results are theoretically consistent when we used credit spread 
as a measure of spread in the STR model. The appropriateness of credit spread in STR is 
probably explained by the fact that credit spread is a leading indicator which increases 
when financial instability deteriorates and decreases when the financial stability conditions 
prevail. Furthermore, 95% symmetric credibility intervals and probability posterior 
obtained clearly indicate that the monetary policy committee reduces the target when credit 
spread increases by one percent. 
4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness check 
We examined how sensitive our results are to the changes in our informative priors. Firstly, 
for the priors in Table 4.1 we changed the prior belief for inflation from 1.5 to 0.5 percent. 
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This change is motivated by the fact that some central banks attached equal probability 
weights on inflation and output in the standard Taylor rule. It means that the monetary 
policy committee expresses equal preference to penalise inflation and output fluctuations 
to achieve price stability. After re-estimation, the posteriors’ means from this sensitive 
analysis exercise are θ0=7.5346, θπ=0.5880, θx=0.6729, & θω=-0.5502. Since the posterior 
means are the same we conclude that our results are not sensitive to changes in inflation 
prior. Secondly, we changed the prior mean for credit spread from -0.5 to -1 percent. This 
change implies that when credit spread increases by one percent, monetary policy 
committee reduces the interest rate target by 1 percent to induce financial stability.
  
Similarly, our results from this robust analysis are similar to the results presented in Table 
4-1; hence, we conclude that these results are not sensitive to changes in informative 
priors.  
Finally, we used quarterly data with quarterly real GDP replacing industrial 
production index (PPI) in the STR model. These results are presented in Table A.4.1 in the 
appendix. It is certain that the expected average target and marginal effects of inflation are 
positives while marginal effects from spread given the data remain negative. The posterior 
mean for output is estimated at -0.1560 percent. This shows that the marginal effects’ 
output on the target is negative while the credibility interval includes both positive and 
negative values, and the probability posterior gives conflicting conclusions. We find that 
both PPI and quarterly real GDP produced inconclusive results in our estimations. 
However, the marginal effects of credit spread are negative and this is supported by the 
credibility intervals in conjunction with the probability posterior.  
4.4.1 Summary 
In all, we obtained important results about empirical Spread-adjusted Taylor rule 
through the Bayesian method. Spread-adjusted Taylor rule is a monetary policy rule 
augmented with spread to address simultaneously the price stability and financial stability 
goals. There is now widespread understanding that price stability does not always 
guarantee financial stability. Thus, the new consensus monetary policy framework should 
be amended to explicitly and systematically react to financial conditions to achieve these 
goals. McCulley and Toloui (2008), Taylor (2008) and Woodford and Curdia (2009) 
proposed the inclusion of the spread as one of the systematic components to which central 
banks should react in order to adjust the policy target downwards when spread rises. This 
strategy will dampen the effects of higher spreads and thus, counter the effects of financial 
instability in the economy.  
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Using the monthly data from SA, our results show that the average expected repo 
rate-target (i.e. the intercept), inflation rate and spread form part of the systematic factors 
that enter the simple Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule. We find that under the theory, informed 
priors, empirical Bayesian priors and non-informative priors, the mass of posterior 
densities for these factors are concentrated either on the negative or positive values of the 
distribution. These results show that there is clear-cut evidence that shows that the mean 
target, marginal effects of rate of inflation and spread are significant factors that explain 
monetary policy target in SA. However, this estimation could not find conclusive evidence 
about the marginal effects of output in the STR model. Credibility intervals and probability 
posterior criteria both give conflicting results. The probability posterior suggests that there 
is a 73 percent chance that a marginal effect of output is positive, but at the same time the 
95% credible interval includes zero. Finally, the STR model with credit spread shows that 
whether we use theory-motivated priors, empirical Bayesian priors, or non-informative 
priors, the posterior means of credit spread obtained are negative and have magnitudes 
between 0 and 1 in absolute terms. Finally, we find evidence showing that the Spread-
adjusted Taylor rule is preferred to the standard Taylor rule without spread. The results for 
the posterior odd ratios are all in favour of the Spread-adjusted Taylor rule. 
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Appendix D 
Appendix 4-1 Robustness analysis results 
Table D.4-1. Summary of Posterior Distribution for the coefficients (θ0 θπ θx θω): STR 
model 1993:01-20011:04 
Part 
A 
Coeff. Prior 
Informative 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post 
ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& 5.5 8.3383 1.2315 5.9191 10.7575 1  
 ZS 1.5 0.5612 0.1105 0.3441 0.7782 1  
 ZU 0.5 -0.1560 0.1665 -0.4831 0.1710 0.1729  
 Zú -0.5 -0.4243 0.1875 -0.7926 -0.0560 0.0122  
 
Part 
B 
Coeff. Prior Non- 
Informative 
Posterior 
mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CDI-
Lower 
CDI-
Upper 
Prob. 
Posterior 
Post 
ODD 
Ratio 
 Z& - 8.3802 1.2656 5.8938 8.8896 1  
 ZS - 0.5577 0.1132 0.3353 0.7546 1  
 ZU - -0.1604 0.1700 -0.4945 0.1737 0.17  
 Zú - -0.4258 0.1933 -0.8055 -0.0460 0.01  
Notes: Part A contains posterior results under Informative priors, while Part B contains results based on non-
informative priors. CDI- refers 95% credibility intervals. Probpos –probability posterior. 
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Conclusion, Contributions and Policy Recommendations 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
This thesis has empirically investigated three interrelated concepts: the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, interest rate spreads seen as a conduit of monetary policy 
effects and the Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule. The thesis started with reviews of monetary 
theory in chapter one, followed by three empirical chapters that examined: the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in Namibia; unit root process with structural breaks and 
determinants of spreads; and finally, we estimate the Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule (STR), 
which is a monetary policy augmented with interest rate spread. 
 Chapter one details the background of the study by examining the monetary 
theories in the mainstream and post-Keynesian paradigms. This chapter summarises the 
nature and roles of money and monetary policy. It then points out how the mainstream and 
post-Keynesian paradigms influence the new consensus monetary policy framework, and 
how monetary policy effects are assessed in contemporary times. In this chapter we learnt 
that: there is now a prevailing consensus that money is endogenous, and it plays a role only 
as an information variable in the new macroeconomic consensus. Walsh (2010, p. 330) 
clearly spells out this consensus by saying that ‘most central banks today use short-term 
nominal interest rate as their monetary policy instrument for implementing monetary 
policy. The nominal quantity of money is endogenously determined to achieve the desired 
nominal interest rate.’ This idea is supported by Chadha and Holly (2012, p. 22) who 
pointed out that ‘money itself does not enter the objective function of central banks and sits 
somewhere as part of the information set on which interest rate paths are predicted.’ 
Nowadays, central banks set or ‘peg’ the nominal interest rates and use it as a lever for 
stabilisation of output and inflation in the long-term. It is also undoubted that the changes 
in the level of policy instrument start the monetary policy transmission mechanism. First, 
these monetary changes are identified through structural shocks with a systematic 
component accounting for endogeneity of monetary policy instrument in the SVAR. The 
impacts of such interest rate changes are measured through the structural impulse response 
functions of GDP, inflation, credit and other variables of economic interest.  
 Although we find consensus among economists that ‘money is endogenous’ and 
the assertion that ‘interest rate is the policy instrument’, we also find that the reasons for 
the later as advanced by mainstream and post-Keynesian approaches are remarkably 
different. Mainstream uses interest rate as the policy instrument because the money 
demand is unstable and the link between money inflation is broken down; furthermore, 
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there is disagreement on the appropriate monetary aggregate definition to be used as the 
target and the fact that monetary aggregate definitions are also periodically redefined. It 
argued that the nominal interest rate provides clarity of monetary policy stance and good 
controllability, which lacks the money-growth targeting approach. Meanwhile the post-
Keynesian approach recommends interest rate as the monetary policy instrument because 
central banks cannot control money as a result of the inevitable fact that it is endogenously 
determined by aggregate demand. In addition, some post-Keynesian economists argue that 
enforcing strict control on money supply to achieve monetary targets is difficult to 
reconcile with the mandates of central banks as the lender of the last resort.  
Across the schools of thought, we find that there is acknowledgement that 
monetary policy in relation to weight inflation and output fluctuation does not guarantee 
financial stability. Therefore, economists within and outside the mainstream suggest that 
monetary policy should explicitly and systematically react to financial conditions in order 
to realise the goal of financial stability. This must come in some form of asset prices, 
exchange rate augmented monetary policy rule, individual credit policy over and above 
policy rate or an adjustment like the Spread-adjusted Taylor rule.  
In chapter two, after using data from Namibia and identifying the repo rate as the 
monetary policy instrument that generates the transmission mechanism, we showed that 
monetary policy through the repo rate is effective in stabilizing inflation and output in 
Namibia. The results form SVAR substantiated that interest rate shocks in the domestic 
repo rate significantly reduce quarterly real GDP, inflation and private credit in Namibia. 
In addition, we find that private credit shock increases the quarterly real GDP and inflation 
at impact. Furthermore, results from the variance decomposition analysis show that credit 
channel is relatively stronger than the interest rate channel and that domestic monetary 
policy shock seems relatively stronger and persistent compared to monetary policy effects 
from the SA’s repo rate. This evidence argues against the idea that BoN does not need to 
change the level interest rate independently from SA because such changes are not 
necessary and they do not significantly differ from the changes in the foreign interest rate 
in the anchor country. 
In the third chapter, we investigated the concept of ‘interest rate spreads’ (IRS), 
which is seen as the transmitting belts of monetary policy effects to the rest of the 
economy. Literature on the topic shows that interest rate spreads are very important 
because they determine the actual cost of borrowing. It is argued in the literature that good 
macroeconomics fundamentally improves the risk perceptions which, as a result, minimise 
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the size of spread in the economy. However, we find that there is lack agreement on how to 
empirically model interest rate spreads. This is due partly to the fact that there are many 
definitions of interest rate spreads, and spreads exhibit unit root process with structural 
breaks. Thus, chapter three first examined the unit root and structural breaks in spreads and 
other fundamentals in Namibia. Next we investigated whether there are significant 
relationships between ex-ante spreads - ∆base spread, ∆retail spread and the changes in 
macroeconomics fundamentals realized in the country. Firstly, results from descriptive 
tests show that the sample averages of interest rate spreads investigated in this study are 
significantly different from zero; thus, indicating that, on average, the size of these spreads 
were statistically significant over the sample period. Second, spreads exhibit unit root with 
several endogenous structural breaks over the sample period from 1992:01 to 2011:12. 
Lanne, Saikkonen, & Lutkepohl (2002) unit root test for processes with structural breaks 
show that most significant structural breaks coincide with the 1998 East Asia financial 
crisis period while the global financial crisis only caused a significant structural break in 
quarterly GDP. Third, using the OLS, TSLS and GMM we found that, whether we use the 
∆base spread or ∆retail spread definitions, these fundamentals – inflation rate, 
unconditional inflation volatility, economic growth, changes in bank rate, SA’s base spread 
and risk premium – are some of the significant factors that determine large changes in the 
spreads in Namibia. In addition, both equations of ∆base and ∆retail spread statistically 
produced stable and significant stationary residuals, which indicate that these equations 
represent important stable economic linear relationships. From these results we conclude 
that there is enough empirical evidence showing that macroeconomic fundamentals play an 
important role in determining the size of spreads in Namibia.  
Finally, in chapter four, we estimated the simple Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule (STR). 
As summarised in chapter one, most researchers nowadays agree that price stability does 
not always guarantee financial stability; therefore, the new consensus monetary policy 
must respond systematically to financial shocks. Chapters three also confirm that it is all 
about spreads and spreads are important. One popular solution to this problem is the so-
called Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule. We applied the Bayesian method on the monthly data 
from South Africa (SA) in order to estimate the posterior distributions of parameters in the 
STR model. Empirical results from this estimation show that the standard Taylor Rule can 
be augmented with credit spread to caution against tight credit conditions and thereby 
realise the goals of price and financial stability simultaneously. We find that, on average, a 
higher credit spread is associated with the probability that the policy target will be adjusted 
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downward by 55 basis points in response to a marginal increase in credit spread. The 
posterior mean for credit spread lies between -79 and -30 basis points with 95% credible 
intervals. In addition, we find that an increase in inflation above the target by one percent 
is associated with the probability that interest rate targets will be raised by an amount 
within 41-75 basis points, while little can be said about the marginal increase in output. 
These posterior means are consistent with fixed parameter values calibrated by Curdia and 
Woodford (2009) and McCulley and Tuloui (2008). 
Contributions to the Literature 
The thesis has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of the theoretical 
evolution of monetary policy and practical evidence of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Namibia. It extends our knowledge that monetary policy of changing the 
level of interest rate is effective in the stabilisation of inflation and output fluctuations. 
However, we also find that that SA’s monetary policy effects rarely dominates as 
suggested by the literature on monetary policy within the fixed exchange rate economy. 
We found that domestic monetary policy actions caused more significant impact on output, 
inflation and credit, while SA monetary policy effects barely significant and slow as 
compared to domestic monetary policy. Further, we showed that a interest rate channel is 
relatively stronger than the credit channel. In addition, empirical findings in this thesis 
provide rarely known evidence that spreads in Namibia exhibit unit root with structural 
breaks. Further, the most significant breaks are associated with1998 East Asia financial 
crisis rather than global financial crisis. This is explained by the fact that the former crisis 
was sudden and sharp, while the global financial crisis was gradual which gave the 
government enough time to prepare for the loss of revenue. This thesis provides new 
understanding about fundamentals that seem to explain major spreads in Namibia. There is 
a fundamental link between the spreads and the prevailing macroeconomic picture, as 
presented by risk indicators such as unconditional volatility, inflation, economic growth, 
changes in perceived risk and policy rate. At least, we now know that statistically the 
averages of major spreads over this sample period were significantly different from zero; 
secondly, spreads exhibit unit root with structural breaks and the order of integration does 
not depend on the presence structural breaks. Finally, our thesis contributes empirical 
Bayesian evidence, which shows that monetary policy can be augmented with interest rate 
spread in order to address the problem of financial instability. We showed that a one 
percent marginal increase in the credit spread in STR will make monetary policy 
committee to reduce the target by 55 basis points. The posterior odd ratio, which compares 
the marginal likelihood from the standard Taylor Rule and the Spread-adjusted Taylor 
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Rule, is significantly less close to zero. This indicates that the results from the Bayesian 
estimation are favour of the Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule rather than the standard Taylor 
Rule without spread. These empirical findings are practically helpful in the revision of 
monetary policy framework at the Bank of Namibia. Our finding about spreads will inform 
the Namibia Financial Charter, which aims to improve the efficiency, financial depth and 
inclusion of the financial sector. 
Policy Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research 
We recommend that the central bank should keep the current monetary policy 
framework which advocates for the use of domestic repo rate to stabilize inflation and 
improve domestic short and long term macroeconomic conditions. We also recommend re-
examination of the role SA’s monetary policy effects in the domestic inflation. This will 
help to understand whether the positive relationship between domestic inflation and SA 
monetary policy is an outcome of real economic factors or it was wrong result from our 
structural VAR model. Next, our results therefore suggest an important question as to 
whether this evidence can be replicated at the disaggregate level? While our empirical 
evidence fills the gaps about transmission mechanisms in Namibia, we recommend that 
further research should aim to provide evidence about the interest rate and credit 
transmissions to individual sectors such as mining, manufacturing and tourism.  
In this thesis, we recognised the important roles of various spreads in the economy. 
Hence, we recommend that central banks should explicitly account for the variation of 
average spreads in the monetary policy framework. Specifically, we suggest that the 
central bank should remain focused on the base spread and macroeconomics as well as the 
financial fundamentals in order to keep the size of average spread small in the long run. 
We believe that minimising the lead spread (i.e. base spread) will exert much influence on 
other intermediation spreads, reduce uncertainty and consequently enhance monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms from markets to households. Overall, we recommend that 
government should take steps to improve the macroeconomic picture in order to reduce the 
risk perceptions in the financial sector.  
Finally, a number of limitations have to be considered. As it is a common case in many 
studies on issues in developing countries, this thesis also encountered some limitations 
because of the lack of data while some individual institutions were not willing to share 
their data. Firstly, the most important limitation is that we could not obtain all of the data 
we wanted for the investigation of determinants of spreads in chapter three. The current 
investigation was limited by a lack of data at micro level and the fact that the population 
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size of banks is very small. Alternative sources such as the bank scope database were not 
helpful either because it has only five years of recorded observations for the five banks in 
Namibia. Another limitation came from the fact that the Statistic Act in Namibia does not 
permit the Namibia Statistics Agency (NSA) and the Bank of Namibia (BoN) to share 
individual firms’ data with another third party, which we believe could have solved the 
problems related to micro level data.  
Conclusion 
Retuning to our main objectives now it is possible to confidently assert that 
monetary policy in terms of changing the level of interest rate (i.e. the repo rate) is 
effective in relation to the stabilisation of inflation and output fluctuations in Namibia and 
that interest shocks account for more variation in output compared to the credit shocks. 
Spreads are significantly different from zero, and they have unit root with structural 
breaks. There is a significant relationship between changes in macroeconomic realised in 
the country and changes in the spreads. Finally, there is empirical evidence that supports 
the appropriateness of the Spread-adjusted Taylor Rule monetary policy framework.  
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